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The Mechanical Arts and Poiesis in the Philosophy and Literature of the 
Twelfth-Century Schools 
 
Anya Burgon 
 
 
 
The ‘mechanical arts’ or artes mechanicae were first named as a part of Philosophy in Hugh of 
Saint-Victor’s Didascalicon (1120s).  They were identified as seven arts (fabric making, 
armament, commerce, agriculture, hunting, medicine, and theatrics), and positioned as a parallel 
to the seven liberal arts.  Their inclusion in the Didascalicon has been taken by previous 
historians to signal a new interest in science and engineering, an effort to ‘give intellectual status 
to technology for the first time’.   
 
This study reconsiders the significance of the mechanical arts for schoolmen working in northern 
France in the twelfth century.  It argues that while this category designated a set of everyday 
technologies, it also had a more covert, imaginative currency for certain authors – as an image or 
exemplum for the process of learning.  Its procedures and activities could be held up as a mirror 
to those of the liberal and especially verbal arts, picturing these in the terms of poiesis – an ancient 
model for philosophy as ‘sense making’ or ‘world making’.   This metaphorical utility of the artes 
mechanicae can be discerned in Hugh’s discussion, running underneath his more literal concern 
with the mechanical arts as everyday technologies.  It was given fullest expression, I argue, in the 
later allegorical encyclopaedias of ‘Chartrian’ poets, Bernard Silvestris and Alan of Lille (1140s–
80s). 
 
The final part of the thesis discusses Geoffrey of Vinsauf’s Poetria nova (c. 1215).  Here the 
mechanical arts are enlisted to represent the student of the verbal arts as a technite, a technician 
and theorist.  Geoffrey’s work is often considered a summa of medieval thinking about poet-
craft.  But its recruitment of the mechanical arts to picture theoretical mastery also marks the end 
– and a reversal – of the lesser-known invocation of mechanica by twelfth-century authors, the 
one I trace here: which cast the author and scholar as a maker proper, a ‘poet’ in the ancient 
sense of that word.   
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Introduction 
 
I.  The Mechanical Arts and Poiesis in the Twelfth-Century Schools 
 
 
In his Didascalicon of the 1120s, Hugh of Saint-Victor (c. 1096–1141) was the first medieval 
encyclopaedist to make the artes mechanicae, ‘mechanical arts’, a valid component of 
Philosophy, Scientia.  This category of arts (known in shorthand as mechanica) had first been 
named in a philosophical commentary of the ninth century by the theologian, John Scotus 
Eriugena (c. 800–877).1  But Hugh – a teacher at the Abbey of Saint Victor in Paris – was the 
earliest scholar to elaborate on the category.  He divided it up into seven individual artes – fabric 
making, armament, commerce, agriculture, hunting, medicine, and theatrics – to parallel the 
traditional seven liberal arts (made up of three verbal arts known as the trivium: grammar, 
rhetoric, and dialectic; and four mathematical arts known as the quadrivium: arithmetic, 
geometry, music, and astronomy).2  While the liberal arts liberate man from material and sensible 
concerns, the mechanical arts are wholly concerned with the material realm, which they adapt to 
human utility and comfort.   
 
Hugh introduced the mechanical arts by positioning them as the lowest of three works, opera, 
making up the cosmos: 
 
The work of God, the work of nature, and the work of the artificer, who imitates 
nature.  The work of God is to create that which was not … the work of nature is to 
bring forth into actuality that which lay hidden … the work of the artificer is to put 
together things disjoined or to disjoin those put together.  Among these three works 
… the human work which is not nature, but imitates nature is fitly called mechanical, 
that is adulterate.3 
 
                                                        
1 This was Eriugena’s commentary on Martianus Capella’s De nuptiis Philologiae et Mercurii, discussed in depth in 
Chapter One (and passim). 
2 Hugh of Saint-Victor, Didascalicon 2.20.  I use the Latin edition by Brother Charles Henry Buttimer (Washington, 
D. C. 1939), pp. 38–39. I use the translation by Jerome Taylor, The Didascalicon of Hugh of Saint Victor: A 
Medieval Guide to the Arts (New York 1961), pp. 74–75. 
3 ‘... opus Dei, opus naturae, opus artificis imitantis naturam. opus Dei est, quod non erat creare … opus naturae, 
quod latuit ad actum producere … opus artificis est disgregata coniungere vel coniuncta segregare … neque enim 
potuit vel terra caelum creare, vel homo herbam producere, qui nec palmum ad staturam suam addere potest.  in 
his tribus operibus convenienter opus humanum, quod natura non est sed imitatur naturam, mechanicum, id est, 
adulterinum nominatur.’  Didascalicon 1.9, ed. Buttimer, p. 16; trans. Taylor, p. 55. 
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He explains that unlike animals, man was brought forth ‘naked and unarmed’, and has to work 
‘from nature’s example’, ‘to devise for himself by his own reasoning those things naturally given 
to all other animals’.4  Nature left man bereft because ‘man’s reasoning shines forth much more 
brilliantly in inventing these very things than ever it would have had man naturally possessed 
them.’5  ‘Nor is it without cause’, Hugh says,  
 
that the proverb goes, ‘ingenious want hath mothered all the arts.’  Want is that which 
has devised all that you see most excellent in the occupations of men.  From this the 
infinite varieties of painting, weaving, carving, and founding have arisen, so that we 
look with wonder not at nature alone but at the artificer as well.6 
 
In Hugh’s account of the mechanical arts, which we will come back to in full, Winthrop 
Wetherbee has observed, ‘it is easy to feel that we have located that Promethean strain in twelfth-
century thought, the humanisme intégral that views all human skills as means to redemption.’7  
Such readings are implicit, and often explicit, in works by historians of medieval progress and 
technology, a field of inquiry that developed in earnest from the middle of the twentieth century, 
as historians sought to backdate the modern triumph of science and technology.  The twelfth 
century seemed to mark a turning point in the development of man’s utilitarian attitude towards 
nature.  One historian who promoted this conception was Lynn Townsend White, who opened 
his 1978 book of essays Medieval Religion and Technology with the observation that in the years 
between 1925 and the time of writing, the Middle Ages ‘has changed almost beyond recognition’.8  
While at school White learned ‘there wasn’t any’ medieval science.  By the seventies, he says, ‘it 
has become almost axiomatic that medieval science, from the late 11th century onward, 
represents the earliest stratum of our present scientific movement’.9  The twelfth century saw the 
‘transition from the hierarchical-qualitative science of tradition to the egalitarian-quantitative 
                                                        
4 ‘solus homo inermis nascitur et nudus.  oportuit enim ut illis, quae sibi providere nesciunt, natura consuleret, 
homini autem ex hoc etiam maior experiendi occasio praestaretur, cum illa, quae ceteris naturaliter data sunt, 
propria ratione sibi inveniret.’  Ibid., Buttimer, p. 17; Taylor, p. 56. 
5 ‘multo enim nunc magis enitet ratio hominis haec eadem inveniendo quam habendo claruisset.’  Ibid. 
6 ‘nec sine causa proverbium sonat quod Ingeniosa fames omnes excuderit artes.  hac equidem ratione illa quae 
nunc excellentissima in studiis hominum vides, reperta sunt.  hac eadem pingendi, texendi, sculpendi, fundendi, 
infinita genera exorta sunt, ut iam cum natura ipsum miremur artificem.’ Ibid.  
7 Winthrop Wetherbee, ‘Philosophy, Cosmology and the Twelfth-Century Renaissance’ in A History of Twelfth-
Century Western Philosophy, ed. by Peter Dronke (Cambridge, UK 1988), pp. 21–53, at 23. 
8 Lynn White, Medieval Religion and Technology: Collected Essays (Berkeley 1978), p. xi.  
9 Ibid. 
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science of modern times.’10  The monastic tradition of labour evolved, with the help of ‘new’ 
Aristotelian empiricism, into a fully technological revolution.   
 
White cited Hugh’s inclusion of the mechanical arts as the ultimate statement of this transition.  
According to White, Hugh ‘believed ardently that the entire traditional concept of philosophy 
was pernicious, partly because it excluded from consideration all that we of the twentieth century 
would call engineering.’11  His aim was to give ‘intellectual status to technology’ for the first time.12  
Scholars who followed in this vein include Jacques Le Goff, George Ovitt, and Elspeth Whitney.  
Le Goff wanted to emphasise the forces of innovation at work in the twelfth and thirteenth 
centuries.13  He saw Hugh’s inclusion of the mechanical arts as an indicator of a general recasting 
of labour and technology as positive means for salvation in the socially and politically progressive 
atmosphere of the twelfth century.14  George Ovitt likewise identified the mechanical arts with the 
growth of a medieval technological mindset out of the older monastic principle that laborare est 
orare.15  In 1990, Elspeth Whitney drew the findings of scholars such as White, Le Goff, and 
Ovitt together to provide the first ‘detailed and coherent assessment of what might properly be 
called the philosophy of technology in the Middle Ages’.16 For Whitney, whose essay remains 
the single-most nuanced treatment of the place of the mechanical arts in medieval categorisations 
of knowledge, Hugh is again something of a Promethean hero, who ‘goes much further towards 
a comprehensive understanding of technology as a distinct sphere of human activity than do any 
of his sources.’17 
 
The ‘Exemplary’ Mechanical Arts 
 
                                                        
10 Ibid., p. 39. See also White, ‘Historical Roots of our Ecologic Crisis’, Science, New Series, 155, 3767 (1967), pp. 
1203–1207.  White was influenced by the research into medieval technological change carried out from the 1920s 
by Richard Lefebvre des Noëttes (e.g. La force motrice animale à travers les âges, Paris 1924).   
11 White, Medieval Religion and Technology, p. 325.  
12 Ibid., p. 328. 
13 Jacques le Goff, ‘Licit and Illicit Trades’ and ‘Trades and Professions’ in Time, Work and Culture, trans. by 
Arthur Goldhammer (Chicago 1980), pp. 58–62 and 116–121. 
14 Ibid. 
15 George Ovitt, ‘The Status of the Mechanical Arts in Medieval Classifications of Learning’, Viator 14 (1983), pp. 
89–106, at 92.  A similar view was taken by Franco Alessio, ‘La filosofia e le “artes mechanicae” nel secolo XII’, 
Studi Medievali ser. 3, 6 (1965), pp. 110–129.   
16 Elspeth Whitney, ‘Paradise Restored:  The Mechanical Arts from Antiquity through the Thirteenth Century’, 
Transactions of the American Philosophical Society 80, Part 1 (1990), pp. 1–169, at 1. 
17 Ibid., p. 88. 
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Outside of the history of medieval science and technology, the mechanical arts are rarely 
discussed in scholarship on the Middle Ages.  Those working in the fields of medieval art, 
literature, philosophy, and theology, have on the whole had little reason to refer to this ‘category’ 
– and for obvious reasons.18   Beyond the odd cursory allusion, the category is seldom named in 
texts outside of the encyclopaedic tradition.  There was also no medieval ‘iconography’ of the 
mechanical arts – as there was for the liberal arts (on cathedral facades, in manuscripts, and so 
on) – that would indicate their importance as an independent theme.19  The present thesis does 
not claim to recover any lost sources, textual or visual, which fill this blank in the discourse.  So, 
what does it hope to say about this category that has not already been said?  
 
In a sense it calls for a reorientation of attention.  Instead of looking at the mechanical arts as a 
fixed set of activities, that are either mentioned or not mentioned in medieval sources, it explores 
the possibility that the mechanical arts, or ‘the mechanical’, also had a more covert currency, as 
a metaphor, or exemplum for the process of learning – which was established in the Didascalicon 
itself, and elaborated in a family of works which came after it.  This involves nothing like a 
‘counter-survey’ of the mechanical arts, to challenge the exhaustive account of Whitney.  Nor 
does it aim to disparage the study of these arts from the perspective of science and technology.  
Rather, it seeks to map the mechanical arts’ significance – as a kind of knowledge – in the wider 
pedagogical or encyclopaedic ‘imaginary’, that has been obscured by the emphases of previous 
scholars.   
 
While it offers a stark contrast to the established view of the artes mechanicae, this argument 
does speak to a recent impetus in medieval studies – that (until now) has left Hugh’s category 
untouched – to re-stress the imaginative and exemplary significance of the ‘crafts’ in medieval 
intellectual culture.20  In her 1998 book, The Craft of Thought, Mary Carruthers influentially 
                                                        
18 An exception is Ellie R. Truitt, who has recently spoken briefly about the mechanical arts in relation to fictional 
automata in the Middle Ages, in her Medieval Robots: Mechanism, Magic, Nature, and Art (Philadelphia 2015), 
pp. 43–47. 
19 For the medieval iconography of the liberal arts and other educational themes see Laura Cleaver, Education in 
Twelfth-Century Art and Architecture (Woodbridge, UK 2016), esp. pp. 7–36; and the classic essay by Adolf 
Katzenellenbogen ‘The Representation of the Seven Liberal Arts’, in Twelfth Century Europe and the Foundations 
of Modern Society, ed. by Marshall Clagett, Gaines Post, and Robert Reynolds (London 1966), pp. 35–59.  (Further 
references for this topic are given below, p. 94, n. 90). While there is no iconography of the ‘mechanical arts’ per 
se, the thesis does include contemporaneous images which refer to the arts in ways which illuminate the core analysis. 
20 The works of Mary Carruthers have arguably spearheaded this impetus (see also subsequent note).  In the field of 
literature studies, Lisa H. Cooper has explored artisanal metaphors, in her Artisans and Narrative Craft in Late 
Medieval England (Cambridge, UK 2014).  Paul Binski has emphasised the importance of technique to the affective 
power of medieval artefacts – their rhetorical persuasiveness – and craft as a model for rhetorical invention and 
persuasion itself.  With regard to this latter intervention in particular, I am indebted to his works: which include 
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claimed that ‘monastic education is best understood … on [an] apprenticeship model, more like 
masonry or carpentry than anything in the modern academy’.21  Learning in schools and 
monasteries ‘involved making mental images or cognitive “pictures” for thinking and 
composing.’22  Carruthers drew attention to copious passages in medieval texts from the period 
400–1200, in which a craft or techne – such as milling, or weaving – was used to envisage and 
encourage the creation of thoughts by the ‘machine of the mind’, machina mentis.23   
 
Carruthers’ argument that ‘monastic meditation is the craft of making thoughts about God’ 
should have repercussions for the study of the mechanical arts.  Indeed, having said how tempting 
it is to find in Hugh’s treatment of mechanics ‘that Promethean strain in twelfth-century thought’, 
Winthrop Wetherbee himself went on to say that what Hugh in fact valued was not ‘the practice 
of the mechanical arts, but the ratio in the light of which they become sources of a knowledge 
that leads ultimately to God.’24  Hugh’s thinking, he continued, ‘is in a tradition which goes back 
through Augustine to antiquity.’25  However, Wetherbee makes these rather enigmatic remarks 
in the context of a broader overview of twelfth-century philosophy: he gives no real clues as to 
what an alternative, less literal assessment of the mechanical arts might entail.   
 
The present study seeks to fill this lacuna: to bring our account of the mechanical arts up to date 
and into line with our improved understanding of the imaginative potential of ‘craft’ in medieval 
ascetic educational psychology.26  This does not mean merely showing how those individual crafts 
which Hugh discusses appeared in diverse contexts for metaphorical purposes, or producing a 
new body of craft imagery to augment that afforded by Carruthers.  It means analysing more 
closely how the category of mechanica was discussed, what ‘space’ in the philosophical 
imagination it filled, from its appearance in the ninth century, to its reintroduction and 
                                                        
Gothic Wonder: Art Artifice and the Decorated Style, 1290-1350 (Cambridge, MA 2014); ‘Working by Words 
Alone: The architect, scholasticism and rhetoric’ in Rhetoric Beyond Words: Delight and Persuasion in the Arts of 
the Middle Ages, ed. by Mary Carruthers (Cambridge, UK 2010), pp. 14–51; ‘Notes on Artistic Invention in Gothic 
Europe’, Intellectual History Review 24, 3 (2014), pp. 283–300; and the most recent ‘Medieval Invention and its 
Potencies’, British Art Studies 6 (2017), at https://doi.org/10.17658/issn.2058-5462/issue-06/pbinski. 
21 Mary Carruthers, The Craft of Thought: Meditation, Rhetoric, and the Making of Images, 400–1200 (Cambridge, 
UK 1998), p. 2.  See also Carruthers’ The Book of Memory: A Study of Memory in Medieval Culture (Cambridge, 
UK 2008).  Further publications by Carruthers are cited in the course of the thesis and listed in the bibliography. 
22 Carruthers, The Craft of Thought, p. 3. My emphasis. 
23 For the particular topos of the machina mentis: ibid., pp. 92–94. 
24 Wetherbee, ‘Philosophy, Cosmology’, p. 23. 
25 Ibid. 
26 I have borrowed the modernised (but I think helpful) term ‘educational psychology’ from the title of an article by 
Paul Gehl, ‘Mystical Language Models in Monastic Educational Psychology’, Journal of Medieval and Renaissance 
Studies 14 (1984), pp. 219–243. 
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elaboration in the twelfth.27  Such analyses reveal that the mechanical arts were not confined 
strictly to the domain of medieval engineering, but also belonged to – or were recruited in service 
of – a poetic vision of learning, deeply rooted in the medieval schools.  They could be taken, I 
suggest, as activities for envisaging and idealising man’s philosophical education – at this time 
essentially equivalent to his verbal or ‘trivial’ education – as a ‘making sense’ of creation, through 
the co-operation of perception and imagination: a paideic imperative enshrined and elaborated 
in the Platonic, Ciceronian, and Carolingian sources on which Hugh and his contemporaries 
thoroughly depended.28   
 
Before coming back to Hugh, and the successive ‘family’ of works that I think developed this 
‘exemplary’ interpretation of the arts, it is necessary to explain my use of the term ‘poetic’ for the 
schools’ ‘vision of learning’.  As a result of the renewed and broad-ranging influence of Plato’s 
Timaeus in particular, the twelfth-century pedagogical project was deeply informed by the ancient 
epistemological model of poiesis, ‘making’.29  The importance of this model to philosophy prior 
to the rise of thirteenth-century scholasticism has been insufficiently studied, with the exception 
of several publications from the past two decades.  Catherine Brown, for example, drew attention 
in an eloquent study of 1998 to the ‘poetics of didacticism’ in the 1100s: ‘teaching in [didactic] 
texts is poetic in the etymological sense: poiesis is (a) making, and medieval didactic texts 
constantly and insistently show us this making of doctrina in textual and hermeneutic process.’30   
 
Similarly, theologian M. B. Pranger has attempted to uncover the ‘poetics of monasticism’, which 
he argues has been obscured by concentration on the development of later scholastic theology, 
which saw the bearing of the imagination on spiritual discovery reduced.31  At the time of writing, 
                                                        
27 The ninth-century appearance of the term artes mechanicae is discussed in depth in Chapter One. 
28 While the liberal arts curriculum, making up ‘philosophy’, comprised both trivium (grammar, rhetoric, dialectic) 
and quadrivium (arithmetic, geometry, music, astronomy), it is understood that the trivium was the traditional core 
and basis of education, at least until the twelfth century.  When ‘philosophy’ is discussed in this dissertation, it refers 
to a ‘trivial version of philosophy’.  Thus, I sometimes use ‘philosophy’ interchangeably with ‘verbal art’, ‘trivial art’, 
or even ‘rhetoric’: the last of which could designate both the third art of the trivium, and act as a near synonym for 
the trivium as a whole (involving as it does the principles of both grammar and argumentation).  I am indebted to 
Nicolette Zeeman for her advice on terminology here, and particularly on the legitimacy of speaking about a ‘trivial 
version of philosophy’ in this period.   
29 The renewal of interest in this work from the eleventh century has been discussed by Margaret Gibson, ‘The Study 
of the Timaeus in the Eleventh and Twelfth Centuries’, Pensamiento 25 (1969), pp. 183–194; and more recently 
by Anna Somfai, ‘The Eleventh-Century Shift in the Reception of Plato’s Timaeus and Calcidius’s Commentary’, 
Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes 65 (2002), pp. 1–21.  See also Paul Edward Dutton, ‘Medieval 
Approaches to Calcidius’, in Plato’s Timaeus as Cultural Icon, ed. by Gretchen J. Reydams-Schils (Notre Dame, 
IN 2003), pp. 183–205.  
30 Catherine Brown, Contrary Things: Exegesis, Dialectic, and the Poetics of Didacticism (Stanford 1998), p. 10. 
31 M. B. Pranger, The Artificiality of Christianity: Essays on the Poetics of Monasticism (Stanford 2003), p. 3. 
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a volume of essays Medieval Thought Experiments, edited by Phil Knox, Daniel Reeve, and 
Jonathan Morton is in production which promises to ‘consider how intellectual problems were 
approached – if not necessarily resolved – through the kinds of hypothetical enquiry found in 
poetry and in other texts that employ fictional or imaginative strategies.’32  The drift of all these 
studies has been to present poetic ‘making’ not just as a literary style, but as a model for 
philosophy.  This study is party to that effort.  It seeks to recover the poetic thinking or thought-
model of medieval philosophers – an especially apt topic, perhaps, for historians of the Middle 
Ages working in the ‘post-truth age’.33 
 
Now we need to define more carefully what is meant by poiesis.  While it is most obviously the 
root of our ‘poetry’, this term referred in ancient (specifically pre-Socratic) terminology to any 
act which transforms and continues the world.34  It was exemplified by the crafts themselves.  In 
fact, as Penelope Murray has shown, craftspeople – practitioners of what would become the 
‘mechanical arts’ – were known in the classical world as poietai, as well as technites (or 
‘technicians’).35  At the same time, poiesis described mental production.  Writers and 
philosophers followed the poietai: thought, argument and writing involved a mental gathering 
and reworking of natural ‘sense’ material that mirrored the ‘remaking’ of nature which goes into 
(say) carpentry or weaving.  For Plato and his predecessors, then, the crafts were in many ways 
paradigmatic of thought.  Their hands-on procedures represented a ‘poetic’ or poietic ideal on 
which thinking, reasoning, and the attainment of wisdom should be modelled.   
 
                                                        
32 Phil Knox, Jonathan Morton, and David Reeve, eds, Medieval Thought Experiments: Poetry, Hypothesis, and 
Experience in the Middle Ages (Turnhout; forthcoming 2018) 
http://www.brepols.net/Pages/ShowProduct.aspx?prod_id=IS-9782503576213-1 [accessed 6 August 2018]. 
33 Other recent studies which might imply a move in this direction (though which do not mention poiesis) are Aden 
Kumler’s Translating Truth: Ambitious Images and Religious Knowledge in Late Medieval France and England 
(New Haven 2011) and Michelle Karnes, Imagination, Meditation, and Cognition in the Middle Ages (Chicago 
2011). Outside of medieval history, Tita Chico’s The Experimental Imagination: Literary Knowledge and Science 
in the British Enlightenment (Stanford 2018) points to an up-to-the-minute surge of interest in the science-
literature/truth-imagination nexus across the humanities.   
34 In Plato’s Symposium (205b-c), Diotima explains that poiesis refers to ‘any activity which causes something to 
come into being from non-being, and therefore covers the productions of all the technai’ (even if it is used in 
common parlance for writers of poetry, in our sense). For commentary on this see Penelope Murray, ‘Poetic 
Inspiration’, in The Blackwell Companion to Ancient Aesthetics, ed. by Pierre Destrée and Penelope Murray 
(Chichester, UK 2015), pp. 158–174, at 167.  The pre-Socratic roots of poiesis are discussed most thoroughly, and 
in terms prescient to the present argument, by Barry Sandywell, The Beginnings of European Theorizing: Reflexivity 
in the Archaic Age, 3 vols (London 1996), 2: pp. xiv and 306–307.  
35 Murray, ‘Poetic Inspiration’, p. 167.  The terms techne and technites prove more apposite for the crafts as 
understood in Aristotelian texts and later medieval epistemology.  This is one of the main themes of my final chapter 
and is introduced below, p. 14.  
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This ancient epistemological ideal was, I will argue (following Brown and Pranger), entrenched 
in twelfth-century philosophy, and second nature to Hugh of Saint-Victor.  It informed his 
conception of the ‘mechanical arts’, not only as a set of distinct, ‘real-life’ technologies, but as a 
type of knowledge that could be used to exemplify all ‘human work’ (opus humanorum) – to 
evoke the poieticism of philosophy as a whole.  Kathryn Lynch, while not interested in the 
ancient model of poiesis per se has (helpfully for us) characterised the ‘psychology of knowing’ 
which belonged to Hugh and his contemporaries in the schools as a ‘mechanical psychology’: 
consisting of the belief that, ‘by the forming [or making] of analogies between the material and 
the divine, the spirit could journey home to heaven.’36   
 
A precedent for the shape of my argument can be found in James Simpson’s book Sciences and 
the Self in Medieval Poetry.37  This study has as one of its central aims the revelation of 
(apparently) conflicting epistemological systems within single medieval texts.  Specifically, 
Simpson was interested in how (in Alan of Lille and John Gower) ‘psychological hierarchies 
[might] interact with disciplinary hierarchies’.38  Poems such as theirs, which describe (and 
inspire) the formation of the soul, might reveal ‘the very structure of the disciplines’, ‘their true 
relations’, in a fashion which (because true to a psychology) contradicts an ‘official’ hierarchy of 
the sciences, as asserted elsewhere in the text, or which seems to be conventional to the author.39  
This approach lends authority to, and a critical context for, my own: my argument also posits the 
co-existence of epistemologies.  Simpson acknowledges that games might be played with the 
inter-relation of the ‘theoretical’ and the ‘practical’.40  But his focus in the analyses of Alan and 
Gower is on the poetic ‘revision’ of the traditional ‘encyclopaedic’ hierarchy to a ‘psychological’ 
hierarchy, which leads from ethics, to politics, to cosmology.41  My focus is by contrast (but also 
complementarily) on the implicit interaction of the liberal and mechanical.42  I want to show that 
in the light of a psychology informed by poiesis, these two ‘categories’ (specifically the 
‘mechanical’ and the ‘trivial’) necessarily overlap and begin to define one another.  In the 
                                                        
36 Kathryn Lynch, The High Medieval Dream Vision: Poetry, Philosophy, and Literary Form (Stanford 1998), pp. 
28 and 26 (my emphasis and parenthesis). 
37 James Simpson, Sciences and the Self in Medieval Poetry: Alan of Lille’s Anticlaudianus and John Gower’s 
Confessio amantis (Cambridge, UK 1995). 
38 Ibid., p. 15. 
39 Ibid., p. 14. 
40 Ibid., p. 12. 
41 Ibid., p. 14. 
42 Nearly, though not exactly, equivalent to the practical and theoretical – which implies ‘doing’ and ‘thinking’ as 
opposed to ‘making’ and ‘thinking’ (the latter of which is my emphasis).  
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Didascalicon, liberal or trivial art requires a decidedly ‘mechanical psychology’, and this 
complicates, and enriches, the status and encyclopaedic ‘boundaries’ of mechanica. 
 
Hugh of Saint-Victor and the Chartrians: The Structure of the Argument 
 
To make this case, for the wider significance of the mechanical arts in exemplifying the artifice 
of thought – the thought involved in the pursuit of wisdom via the trivial arts – I offer a thorough 
re-assessment of Hugh’s treatment of this category in the Didscalicon.43  In the first chapter, we 
will see how his descriptions of the ‘human devising’ of the mechanical artist, and the 
‘wonderment’ due to mechanical artefacts, cited in my opening, are part and parcel of a wider 
interest, going back to Plato and Cicero – and governing the wider vision of the Didascalicon – 
in how man ‘makes’ knowledge from nature.  We attend, more specifically, to Hugh’s source for 
the term artes mechanicae: a philosophical and allegorical commentary by John Scotus Eriugena, 
mentioned in the opening to this introduction.   
 
This commentary situated the arts within an intellectual marriage of wisdom and eloquence.  Its 
importance for the significance of the arts in twelfth-century philosophy has been glossed over 
by previous scholars, as a mere prelude to the arts’ ‘technological’ elaboration by Hugh.44  I try 
to address that neglect – suggesting that Eriugena, himself sympathetic to a ‘poietic’ model of 
philosophy, might be seen to have included the ‘mechanical arts’ as a gesture to the psychological 
craft, and cultivating power, of eloquence, that went on to inform Hugh of Saint-Victor. 
 
The following two chapters propose that this more imaginative aspect of the arts was elaborated 
by two later authors of the twelfth-century, rarely cited in previous histories of the medieval 
mechanical arts (conventionally understood), but who are well known to medievalists for their 
more obviously poetic approach to philosophy: Bernard Silvestris (d. 1160) and Alan of Lille (c. 
1123–1202/3).  In an uncommon concession to a potentially larger agenda at play in Hugh’s 
discussion of the artes mechanicae, Elspeth Whitney says in her survey that Hugh’s interest 
                                                        
43 It is worth saying that this thesis does not consider the ‘next’ purely encyclopaedic discussion of the mechanical 
arts after Hugh, by Spanish author Domingo Gundisalvo (Dominicus Gundissalinus), in the 1150s or 1160s.  
Influenced by Arabic sources, Domingo used the designation ‘mechanical arts’ to discuss devices and instruments 
more than the art of the artificer.  His view of mechanics, according to Elspeth Whitney ‘existed side by side’ with 
Hugh’s without either influencing each other.  ‘Paradise Restored’, p. 111.  He is discussed by Whitney in her survey 
at pp. 132–137; and in Ovitt’s ‘The Status of the Mechanical Arts’, pp. 97–100.   
44 See below, p. 32. 
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seems ‘in some respects representative of twelfth-century humanism and appears in the work of 
Bernard Silvestris and the author of the Philosophia attributed to William of Conches and 
others.’45  This ‘twelfth-century humanism’ is often linked to the Cathedral School of Chartres – 
where Bernard Silvestris and Alan of Lille both seem to have spent time studying or teaching.46   
 
The School of Chartres is famed for having developed what Édouard Jeauneau has termed, more 
specifically, a ‘scientific and grammatical humanism’.47  A dual emphasis on verbal training, and 
on the discovery of truths through perception of nature, according to Jacques le Goff, 
‘determined the Chartrian spirit, a spirit of curiosity, observation, and investigation which, fed on 
Greco-Arab knowledge, was to flourish and expand.’48  Some of these views have been criticised 
for giving an overly ‘romanticised’ view of the School’s pre-eminence.49  In reality its walls were 
porous, and its members and associates were closely in touch with other schools of northern 
France and those in Paris, such as the Abbey of Saint-Victor, all within two hundred miles of one 
another (figure 1).50  As Lynch has pointed out, in terms of the psychology and epistemology of 
Paris and Chartres, ‘the divergences are not as significant as the similarities.’51  Yet scholars of 
Chartres, or those associated with this centre, undeniably elaborated on the role of the 
imagination in scientific enquiry and pedagogy, less explicit in works by those outside its 
influence, such as Hugh.  Chartres remains a convenient label for a circle of men, and works, 
that concentrated to an unprecedented extent on the ‘psychological aspect of the philosopher’s 
experience’.52 
 
Largely responsible for this concentration was the enormous attention given to the Timaeus at 
Chartres.  Wetherbee says the School considered this work, available via the Latin translation of 
                                                        
45 Whitney, ‘Paradise Restored’, p. 92.   
46 Bernard was a master at the neighbouring School of Tours, but is thought to have had strong links with Chartres 
(see below, p. 54).  Alan is thought to have studied at the School in the 1140s: below, pp. 76–77. 
47 Édouard Jeauneau, Rethinking the School of Chartres (Toronto 2009), p. 65. 
48 Jacques le Goff, Intellectuals in the Middle Ages (Oxford 1957), p. 48 (my emphasis).   
49 I refer specifically to Richard W. Southern, who argued that ‘the importance of the school of Chartres has been 
greatly exaggerated’ in two articles: ‘The Schools of Paris and the School of Chartres’ in Renaissance and Renewal 
in the Twelfth Century, ed. by Giles Constable and Robert L. Benson (Oxford 1982), pp. 113–137, at 113; and his 
earlier ‘Humanism and the School of Chartres’, in Medieval Humanism and Other Studies (Oxford 1970), pp. 61–
85.   
50 Southern, ‘The Schools of Paris and the School of Chartres’. 
51 Lynch, The High Medieval Dream Vision, p. 28. 
52 Winthrop Wetherbee, Platonism and Poetry in the Twelfth Century: The Literary Influence of the School of 
Chartres (Princeton 1972), p. xi (for the convenience of the label) and p. 92 (for the ‘psychological aspect’). 
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Calcidius, the ‘flower of all philosophy’.53  As I said above, Plato’s dialogue was the key conduit 
for the ancient model of learning as poiesis, ‘making’, to the Middle Ages.  Its influence at 
Chartres (along with the influence of Eriugena’s commentary on ‘wisdom and eloquence’) 
underpins my argument for the importance of Hugh’s ‘mechanical arts’ to its schoolmen. 
Famously, the Timaeus described the formation of the world by a craftsman.  This craftsman or 
demiourgos was an image for God, or the One.  This much is familiar to medievalists.  However, 
this craftsman – whose technique was named as poiesis – also stood for the soul’s task (embodied 
by the speaker, Timaeus) of making of an image of God from its perceptions of the natural 
world.54  The myth was prefaced, by Timaeus, as an eikos mythos, what Calcidius translated as a 
mediocris explanatio, an ‘ordinary’ or ‘limited explanation’.55  The craft of the demiurge was to 
be read as a manifestation and dramatisation of the conjectural, ‘ordinary’ and ‘limited’ craft of 
the philosopher-poet. 
 
This reflexive connotation, not always emphasised in passing references to the text, has earned 
the Timaeus a reputation as one of Plato’s most ‘menacing’ works.56  It was also critical to the 
medieval appreciation of the dialogue.57  The Timaeus preserved and transported to the Middle 
Ages (to Eriugena, Hugh, and Chartres in particular) the ancient and essentially pre-Socratic 
notion: that ‘understanding’, even of the divine, is fundamentally poetic, in the sense of a ‘making’ 
– and thus epistemologically modelled by ‘ordinary’ craft, or crafts. 
 
The currency of this idea at Chartres – through the Timaeus – meant that the field of mechanica, 
introduced by Eriugena’s ninth-century commentary, and picked up in the Didascalicon, 
                                                        
53 Ibid., p. 29.  Commentaries on the work were produced by Bernard of Chartres, the ‘intellectual forefather proper’ 
of the School, and its chancellor from 1119 to his death in 1124; and William of Conches.  A major work of Thierry 
of Chartres, chancellor from 1142–50, is the Hexaemeron, which reconciled the creation account of Genesis with 
that of the Timaeus.  For the revival of interest in this text from the eleventh century more generally, see above, p. 
6, n. 29. 
54 Plato called the demiurge a poietes (ποιητὴν) at Timaeus 28c, trans. by R. G. Bury, LCL 234 (Cambridge, MA 
1929), pp. 50–51.  
55 Timaeus had told his audience (in Calcidius’ Latin), to ‘bear in mind that both I who speak and you who are acting 
as judges are human, and that when it comes to realities as sublime as these, even a limited explanation is a burden 
involving some considerable effort.’ (‘Memento enim tam me qui loquor quam vos qui iudicatis homines fore atque 
in rebus ita sublimibus mediocrem explanationem magni cuisdam esse onus laboris.’) Calcidius, On Plato’s 
Timaeus, First Part, 29c–d, ed. and trans. by John Magee (Cambridge, MA 2016), pp. 44–45. 
56 Frank Grabowski, ‘Plato: The Timaeus’, The Internet Encyclopaedia of Philosophy: A Peer-Reviewed 
Academic Resource. http://www.iep.utm.edu/  [accessed 27 May 2018].   
57 The importance of the ‘literary’ dimension of the Timaeus to medieval readers is attested in Tullio Gregory, ‘The 
Platonic Inheritance’, in A History of Twelfth-Century Western Philosophy, ed. by Peter Dronke, pp. 54–80, esp. 
at 57–59; and in John Magee’s ‘Introduction’ to Calcidius, pp. xii–xiii.  See also Winthrop Wetherbee, ‘Philosophy, 
Commentary and Mythic Narrative in Twelfth-Century France’, in Jon Whitman, ‘Interpretation and Allegory: 
Antiquity to the Modern Period’ (Boston 2003), pp. 211–231, at 223–225. 
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assumed special metaphorical prominence.  Scholars here wrote what might be called ‘allegorical 
encyclopaedias’ or ‘cosmological encyclopaedias’.  These prioritised ‘psychological hierarchies’ 
of knowledge, over, or as, ‘disciplinary hierarchies’.58  In such works, the figure of the mechanical 
artist, and the processes of mechanical art in general, are not only implicitly or occasionally 
exemplary of the ‘philosophico-poetic’ process (as they are in the Didascalicon).   The 
mechanical artist and his craft are central within the allegory, as images for the mind or the liberal 
arts’ ‘work’ of coming to terms with nature.59  We could say that within these school works, the 
‘mechanical arts’ were reconsidered in line with their ancient definition as ‘poetic arts’ (poietikai). 
 
The first text which I think demonstrates this rethinking of mechanical art – as a way of visualising 
mental and verbal ‘making’ – is Bernard Silvestris’ Cosmographia, or De universitate mundi, 
completed between 1147 and 1148.  This work, which forms the subject of Chapter Two, is often 
regarded as a twelfth-century Timaeus.60  Like the Timaeus, rather than describing the parts of 
knowledge, it demonstrates or re-imagines the process of knowledge, or ‘knowing’.  This made 
it unique for its time – when prosaic encyclopaedias, such as the Didascalicon, were the standard.  
Elaborating on the double meaning of Plato’s dialogue, the Cosmographia describes the 
composition of the cosmos by a range of ‘demiurgic’ personifications, but at the same time, this 
composition refers back to (and idealises) the ‘external’ work and psychology of the philosopher-
poet.  As Linda Lomperis has evocatively put it, ‘Poetic language itself simultaneously “weaves 
and unweaves” (“texit et retexit”) the fabric of the divinely written cosmic order.’61   
 
As Lomperis’ description suggests, Bernard gives a key place to the lexicon of the mechanical 
arts.  Yet the ‘mechanical’ imagery which animates his ‘limited’ poetic-philosophical procedure 
                                                        
58 Simpson, Sciences and the Self, p. 15. 
59 The ‘philosophico-poetic tradition’ is used by James Simpson to identify the activity of the twelfth-century 
Chartrians in ‘The Economy of Involucrum: Idleness in Reason and Sensuality’, in Through a Classical Eye: 
Transcultural and Transhistorical Visions in Medieval English, Italian, and Latin Literature in Honour of Winthrop 
Wetherbee, ed. by Andrew Galloway and R. F. Yeager (Toronto 2009), pp. 390–412, at 392 and 407. 
60 According to Linda Lomperis, for example, ‘it would not be inaccurate to call it a kind of “medieval Timaeus” 
insofar as its debt to Plato’s speculations on cosmic origins is apparent at every turn.’  Linda Lomperis, ‘From God’s 
Book to the Play of the Text in the Cosmographia’, Medievalia et Humanistica: Studies in Medieval and Renaissance 
Culture 16, ed. by Paul Maurice Clogan (Totowa, NJ 1988), pp. 51-57, at 51. 
61 Ibid., p. 59. Lomperis’ article aims to ‘unmask the rhetorical characteristics of Bernard’s writing’ (paraphrase from 
bottom of p. 51).  The repetition of Bernard’s ‘craft’ imagery in the quote above is helpful, but incidental to her 
core analysis.  It is also worth noting, as an aside, that Lomperis introduces her project (to unmask the rhetorical 
character of the work) as an antidote to the prevalent emphasis on Bernard’s Platonism, and the status of the work 
as a ‘medieval Timaeus’ (previous note).  She seems oddly unaware of the rhetorical and conjectural character of 
the Timaeus itself.  Bernard’s ‘poetic self-consciousness’ (as I stress here, and as is known to other scholars of his 
work) was in many ways the essence of his Platonism. 
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in the Cosmographia has never been treated as a topic worthy of exploration in its own right, and 
certainly never connected with Hugh of Saint-Victor’s innovative treatment of mechanics as a 
part of philosophy just a few years earlier.  The sole exception to this rule is Brian Stock’s 
observation, in his 1972 monograph on Bernard, Myth and Science in the Twelfth Century, that 
the author seemed ‘predominantly interested in the mechanical arts.’62  And that, ‘in a period 
when the mechanical arts were, by and large, considered “adulterine,” Bernard appears to have 
a more positive evaluation of their role.’63  Yet this unusually ‘positive evaluation’ receives no 
sustained analysis from this literary historian.   
 
My thesis aims to provide that analysis.  It seeks to show that in Bernard’s Cosmographia, the 
‘mechanical arts’ have a poietic role, visualising ‘liberal art’ itself, which can be seen as fulfilling 
– and developing – Hugh’s positioning of them.  After Bernard, in Chapter Three, I look to the 
writings of Alan of Lille – already mentioned as an important figure in the work of James 
Simpson, who pinpoints Alan’s playfulness with epistemological hierarchies.  Alan was another 
‘poet-philosopher’, and student of Chartres, who is widely regarded as Bernard’s ‘literary 
successor’.64  His major allegories are De Planctu Naturae (1160s) and Anticlaudianus (early 
1180s).  At an angle from Simpson, I show how following Bernard (and the Timaeus), these 
dramatise the verbal ‘making’ or ‘remaking’ of nature in a way that seems to bring the artes 
mechanicae into touch with their poietic heritage.  In Alan’s works we also see the metaphorical 
mechanical arts in service of polemic, as part of Alan’s defence of the older, poetic model of 
philosophy – rooted in ancient paideia – against encroaching academic specialisation.  This 
author not only constructs a picture of the ‘mechanical art’ of philosophy or the liberal arts, but 
turns this into a narrative device for persuading the reader that intellectual ascent is impossible 
by any other means.  Alan of Lille – benefitting from the inventiveness of Bernard – could be 
seen to bring to a remarkable didactic ‘climax’ the subtly exemplary power of mechanical art 
construed in the Didascalicon.   
 
In the fourth and final chapter I turn to a writer who was not a Chartrian, nor a ‘poet-
philosopher’, nor an encyclopaedist – but whose work demands consideration in order to bring 
this study to a proper close.  This author is Geoffrey of Vinsauf, well known to historians of 
medieval literature for his Poetria nova, the most popular of what were known as the medieval 
                                                        
62 Brian Stock, Myth and Science in the Twelfth Century: A Study of Bernard Silvester (Princeton 1972), p. 196.  
63 Ibid. 
64 See below, p. 75. 
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‘Arts of Poetry’ or Artes Poetriae, and completed in around 1215.  He was working in the 
tradition of Bernard Silvestris and Alan of Lille; he is thought to have known the latter 
personally.65  For Geoffrey, following Bernard and Alan’s example (combined with the recently 
re-popularised example of Horace’s Ars Poetica), the mechanical arts seem to have presented a 
go-to metaphorical resource for describing and dramatising poetic procedure.   
 
At the same time, however, his use of the lexicon of the ‘mechanical arts’ is at odds with the use 
made of them by the Chartrians and represents a subtle inversion of their original imaginative 
currency.  Geoffrey was receptive, I show, to a rethinking of the mechanical arts at the dawn of 
the thirteenth century, under the influence of Aristotelian works, which led to a recasting of them 
not as imitative and manual activities, emblematic of ‘making’, poiesis, but as rational technai, 
emblematic of specialised and theoretical mastery.  He uses the lexicon of the artes not to 
envisage the ‘world-making’ or cosmic interpretation proper to the liberal arts, but to envisage 
poetic art almost as a ‘liberal art’ in its own right.  Images of the architect and medic are deployed 
– in line with both Aristotle, and Horace (himself an Aristotelian) – to suggest rhetorical 
preconception and planning, and to position the author not as a cosmic interpreter, but a 
technical rival of nature, and a creator of trompe l’œil effects.   
 
Geoffrey’s is, in fact, the picture of ‘poet-craft’ that modern readers are more likely to recognise.  
As we will see, Mary Carruthers has paid special attention to Geoffrey’s work as an exemplum 
of the medieval metaphorical use of crafts.66  In the context of the present discussion, we are able 
to show Geoffrey was an anomaly, dependent on and departing from earlier tradition.  His work 
is witness to the demise of the poietic efficacy of the mechanical arts to medieval pedagogues and 
ascetics and the rise of a more recognisable recruitment of the crafts, to describe and confirm 
(rather than to shape and to modify) the agenda of the liberal arts. 
 
To close this first section of the introduction, then: the following thesis has one central aim, to 
show that the artes mechanicae – long the province of the history of medieval science – were also 
the province of a medieval ‘philosophico-poetic tradition’.  Where previous scholars have argued 
(to varying extents) that Hugh’s decision to include them testifies to the first glimmerings of ‘our 
present scientific movement’, I argue they had a parallel exemplary or metaphorical role, and 
                                                        
65 Marjorie Curry Woods, Classroom Commentaries: Teaching the Poetria nova across Medieval and Renaissance 
Europe (Columbus 2010), p. 1, n. 3. 
66 For example, in The Experience of Beauty in the Middle Ages (Oxford 2013), p. 204.   
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were simultaneously brought into relation with the paideic principle of knowing as ‘making’, 
poiesis.  I will show how, via Eriugena, this is felt in Hugh’s discussion of them in the 
Didascalicon, while my ‘core’ chapters consider the works of the Chartrians, in which the artes 
mechanicae are present entirely metaphorically, one can argue, picturing the rhetorical and 
philosophical mission to ‘make sense’ of nature, and bringing to life the ‘mechanical educational 
psychology’ native to the schools (as identified by Lynch).  The example of Geoffrey of Vinsauf 
is offered, in the final chapter, in an attempt to frame this metaphorical tradition, and to make 
sense of its dissolution, under the new influence of Aristotelian epistemology. 
 
At the heart of the dissertation, therefore, is the extent and effect to which the mechanical arts 
described or imagined the opus proper to the liberal arts in works by schoolmen from around 
the 1120s to the beginning of the thirteenth century.  Indeed, it is as much about the mechanical 
arts as it is about twelfth-century education and epistemology in general – fields which not only 
‘included’ the category of mechanica, but which, I suggest, were themselves informed and can be 
better understood by it. 
 
II.  The ‘Promethean’ and the ‘Orphic’ Attitudes to Nature 
(A Critical Framework) 
 
Before venturing into the body of the argument, I want to offer – briefly – a specific critical 
context for my intervention.  For this we need to return to Winthrop Wetherbee’s statements on 
the mechanical arts cited earlier.  Of Hugh of Saint-Victor’s Didascalicon, he said, ‘it is easy to 
feel that we have located that Promethean strain in twelfth-century thought.’67  As I have indicated, 
Wetherbee is not an historian of the mechanical arts in themselves, and in his discussion this 
reference to Prometheus comes as something of an off-the-cuff flourish, aimed to gesture at 
rather than to interrogate the potential misrepresentation of the arts by scholars.  The reference 
is a felicitous one for this enquiry, however.   
 
Prometheus, whose name means literally ‘foresight’, was the heroic trickster figure of the ancient 
world, associated with the origins of the arts of civilization.  Famously, he stole fire, the means of 
metalwork (and all creativity), from Zeus to give to mortals, so they might improve their natural 
                                                        
67 Wetherbee, ‘Philosophy, Cosmology’, p. 23. 
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state.  He was later adopted as a symbolic father figure by the pioneers of the Scientific Revolution 
– who used him to stress man’s liberation from the bonds of religion, and ability to master nature 
through science, rather than simply revere it.68   
 
He occupies an important place in a book which has proved immensely instructive in the 
research for this study: Pierre Hadot’s Veil of Isis: An Essay on the History of the Idea of 
Nature.69  Hadot (1922–2010) was an historian of Greco-Roman conceptions of philosophy.  His 
major studies argue that for the ancients, philosophy was a ‘way of life’ an ‘orientation of the 
attention’, rather than a set of doctrines (as we have come to think of it since the rise of 
universities).70  His Veil of Isis explores this ‘orientation of the attention’ in its cosmic aspect.  It 
tells the winding tale of human attitudes to the natural world from pre-Socratic philosophy to the 
present day.  This study opens with the famous aphorism of Heraclitus, phusis kruptesthai philei: 
‘nature loves to hide’ or ‘nature loves to wrap herself up’ – which Hadot argues ‘held sway for 
centuries over successive generations like a kind of program to be realised, a task to be 
accomplished, or an attitude to be assumed.’71 He suggests that the way in which successive 
generations approached a ‘veiled nature’ can be grouped into two archetypal camps:  
 
If man feels nature to be an enemy, hostile and jealous, which resists him in hiding 
its secrets, there will be an opposition between nature and human art, based on 
human reason and will.  Man will seek, through technology, to affirm his power, 
domination, and rights over nature.   
 
If, on the contrary, people consider themselves to be a part of nature because art is 
already present in it, there will no longer be an opposition between nature and art; 
instead, human art, especially in its aesthetic aspect, will be in a sense the 
prolongation of nature, and then there will no longer be any relation of dominance 
between nature and mankind.  The occultation of nature will be perceived not as a 
resistance that must be conquered but as a mystery into which human beings can be 
gradually initiated.72  
 
Hadot designates these two attitudes the ‘Promethean’ and the ‘Orphic’.  The Promethean is the 
first attitude he describes, that which presupposes a fundamental difference between the 
                                                        
68 See, for example, David S. Landes, The Unbound Prometheus: Technological Change and Industrial 
Development in Western Europe from 1750 to the Present (Cambridge, UK 1969). 
69 Pierre Hadot, The Veil of Isis: An Essay on the History of the Idea of Nature, trans. by Michael Chase (Cambridge, 
MA 2006), p. xiii.  (Originally published as Le Voile d’Isis, Paris 2004). 
70 Pierre Hadot, Philosophy as a Way of Life (Oxford 1995), p. 267. 
71 Ibid., p. xi. 
72 Ibid., p. 92. 
 17 
 
 
 
functioning of nature and the functioning of man, and thus resorts to the ‘violence’ or ‘trickery’ 
of technological means and experimental science in order to unveil nature’s secrets.  As heirs of 
the Scientific Revolution, for Hadot, this is the attitude we moderns know and practise.   
 
The ‘Orphic’ attitude is the second attitude described.  It assumes, by contrast to the 
Promethean, a continuity between the processes of humanity and nature.  Like Prometheus, 
Orpheus was a figure of Greek myth exemplifying the human ability to subdue nature.  However, 
unlike Prometheus, Orpheus’ skill consists in song and poetry.  The major stories about him 
centre on his ability to charm all living things, even his wife Eurydice’s captors in the underworld, 
with his lyre-playing and singing (figure 2).  Hadot uses him to designate the attitude that ‘seeks 
to discover the secrets of nature while confining itself to perception, without the help of 
instruments, and using the resources of philosophical and poetic discourse or those of the 
pictorial arts.’73  Hadot explains – or contends – that this is the older of the two attitudes.  Its first 
expressions are the pre-Socratic cosmogonic songs, and parts of the Homeric epics, while its 
consummate statement is the Timaeus.  Hadot also finds it expressed, however, in the writings 
of Johann Wolfgang von Goethe (1739–1832) – a particular champion of his study, ‘a poet and 
at the same time a scholar, who seemed to me to offer the model of an approach to nature that 
was both scientific and aesthetic’.74   
 
Mechanical Art and the Orphic Attitude 
 
 ‘Mechanics’ has an amphibious character in this framework.  On the one hand, and as we would 
expect, it belongs to the Promethean attitude.  ‘The idea of trickery – and, ultimately, of violence 
– appears in the word “mechanics,” since mēkhanē signifies “trick”’, Hadot tells us.75  He shows 
that this etymology was given in the Pseudo-Aristotelian work Problemata mechanica, 
‘Mechanical Problems’ of the second century BC: the earliest work to treat mechanics as a 
discrete domain, about the creation of effects ‘contrary to nature’ and beneficial to mankind.76  
Hadot goes on to suggest that this discrete, utilitarian picture of mechanics received its superlative 
expression in the works of Francis Bacon, Descartes, and Galileo.77   
                                                        
73 Ibid., p. 155. 
74 Ibid., p. ix. 
75 Ibid., p. 103. 
76 Ibid., p. 102. 
77 Ibid., p. 123. 
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On the other hand, Hadot shows mechanics, or mechanical art, was not contrary to the ‘Orphic’ 
attitude.  Before it was considered a discrete ‘technological’ field in works like the Problemata 
mechanica, the domain of ‘the mechanical’ was seen in accord with, or as a dimension of, the 
poetic and pictorial approach to the natural world.  Here we return to the importance of the long-
lost concept of poiesis, ‘making’, which united under its nomination the physical maker – i.e. the 
engineer or ‘mechanic’ – and the literary maker, the ‘poet’ in the modern sense.  Both these 
figures were poietes.  Mechanics, mēkhanē, was originally a subcategory of poiesis.  It could be 
seen precisely as engaging in a kind of knowingly artificial prolongation and transformation of 
nature; not necessarily as interventionist or aggressive trickery, in the later Greek, and ‘modern’ 
sense.   
 
The creation story of the Timaeus, ‘the archetypal model of what I have called the Orphic 
attitude’ (Hadot says), is witness to this ‘older’ and less ‘specialised’ view of mechanics – as 
continuous with (or an image for) poetic discovery.78  The mechanical work of the Demiurge who 
reflects the mythological work of the poet, is indicative of Plato’s fundamentally poetical (or 
poietical) view of mechanics.  For both domains of human pursuit, Hadot explains, involve the 
projection of a self-consciously imitative model onto natural processes:  
 
Like ‘idealist’ explanations, mechanistic explanations claim mere likelihood and are 
only hypothetical.  They hypothesize a certain mode of functioning…to explain the 
effect that appears before our eyes.  As we have seen, however, they accept that in 
reality, beneath the same appearance, the mode of functioning can be different, and 
another hypothesis may be possible.79  
 
Thus mechanics – while it can be treated as comprising an interventionist system or set of 
methods – can also be seen, from a ‘philosophical distance’ (so to speak), as having a methodical 
structure that is derivative, hypothetical, even poetical.  It involves re-imagining nature, and its 
devices and products are consciously dissimilar to, if based on, a ‘superior’ natural archetype.  If 
mechanics does rely on ‘trickery’, that trickery can be regarded – from this angle – as continuous 
with the kind of artifice inherent to human language, and even to thought.  In this way, then, the 
domain of mechanics could be seen as exemplifying the work of human perception, rather than 
as supplementing or supplanting the methods of perception with instruments.  This is, Hadot 
                                                        
78 Ibid., p. 208. 
79 Ibid., p. 159. 
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suggests, how (an ultimately pre-Aristotelian) ‘mechanics’ could be said to feature in the 
demiurgic myth of the Timaeus – and to be incorporated within an ‘Orphic’ attitude to nature.   
 
Hadot’s critical framework of the ‘Promethean’ and the ‘Orphic’ is an avowedly fictional 
construct.  The historical reality is inevitably more mixed, and more complex, than such a 
dichotomy might have us believe (as Hadot himself emphasises).  But it is ‘good to think with’ 
here.  It allows me to frame my alternative to previous scholars’ readings of the mechanical arts 
as indicative of the rise of ‘modern science’ – or, in Wetherbee’s coincidentally apposite terms, 
of that ‘Promethean strain in twelfth-century thought’.   
 
I have touched on how important the archetypally ‘Orphic’ text of the Timaeus was to twelfth-
century schoolmen.  It seems to me that the ‘mechanical arts’ were also understood in line with 
the picture and function of craft created in this work: as a dimension and illustration of our 
imaginative coming-to-terms with nature.  One could point out at this stage that Hugh of Saint-
Victor actually thought mechanics derived not from mēkhanē, to do with ‘trickery’ and machines 
– but specifically from the Greek moikhós, and the Latin moechus, for ‘adulterer’.80  Hence his 
definition in the passage we opened with, in which he says the human work, because it imitates 
nature, ‘is fitly called mechanical, that is adulterate’.81  This etymology plays down the aggressive 
aspect of mechanics, and plays up its conjectural nature.  Hugh suggests the mechanic makes 
nature ‘intelligible’ through the joining and disjoining of her parts.  He is a student of nature, and 
becomes, as a result, a ‘type’ for the student in Hugh’s vision: an exemplum for the poetical 
discovery of nature and journey back to God. 
 
In giving this kind of ‘poetical attitude’ a patron in Orpheus, Hadot bestows a more suitable 
patron, perhaps, for the mechanical arts as they were interpreted in the works of certain twelfth-
century schoolmen.  Indeed, in response to Wetherbee’s criticism, this thesis can be read as an 
exploration of the mechanical arts as demonstrative of ‘that Orphic strain’ in the thought of the 
medieval schools. 
 
                                                        
80 Jerome Taylor shows this etymology had earlier appeared in the Scholica graecarum glossarum of Martin of Laon 
(d. 875).  See Max L. W. Laistner, ‘Notes on Greek from the Lectures of a Ninth Century Monastery Teacher’, 
Bulletin of the John Rylands Library 7 (1922–1923), pp. 421–456, at 439; and Taylor, p. 191, n. 64. 
81 ‘… opus humanum, quod natura non est, sed imitatur naturam, mechanicum, id est, adulterinum nominator.’  
Didascalicon 1.9, Buttimer, p. 16; Taylor, p. 55 (cited above, p. 1). 
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This argument is set out across the four chapters already outlined.  The first of these, to which 
we now proceed, deals with the presentation of the mechanical arts in the Didascalicon itself.  In 
doing so, we return to the mechanical arts’ original formulation in the ninth century, in Eriugena’s 
commentary on a work about unifying wisdom and eloquence.  These two concepts are 
personified as a mythological couple: ‘Philology’ and ‘Mercury’. The artes mechanicae are 
presented, by Eriugena, as the ‘handmaids’ of Mercury: who was not only the god of eloquence, 
and poetry, but the inventor of Orpheus’ own lyre from a turtle shell.  As I have said, this 
allegorical background has been glossed over.  In what follows I want to show it laid the 
groundwork for their Orphic – or indeed ‘Mercurial’ – significance for both Hugh, and later for 
the poet-philosophers of Chartres. 
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I. 
 
The Mechanical Arts in Hugh of Saint-Victor’s Didascalicon 
 
Hugh of Saint-Victor’s Didascalicon is the supreme example of what Rita Copeland and Ineke 
Sluiter have called the twelfth-century ‘meta-scientific statement’.1  It was conceived as an up-to-
date, exhaustive textbook on the parts and procedures of philosophy for a new influx of students 
arriving at the Abbey School of Saint-Victor in Paris, where he was master from around 1120 
(figure 3).  Hugh’s ultimate objective was to clarify how the liberal arts (‘philosophy’) serve the 
discovery of divine wisdom in Scripture – to turn the Boethian dictum, philosophia est amor 
sapientiae into a practical strategy (figure 4).2   
 
He did so by dividing philosophy into four parts: the theoretical, the practical, the logical, and 
the mechanical (theorica, practica, logica, mechanica).3  The theoretical contains theology, 
physics, and the mathematical arts of the quadrivium; practica contains ethics, economics, and 
politics; and logica comprises the verbal arts of the trivium (grammar and the ‘theory of 
argument’, or dialectic and rhetoric).4  Mechanica comprises the seven arts of fabric making, 
armament and building, commerce, agriculture, hunting, medicine, and theatrics.   
 
Hugh maintains this fourfold division, but he simultaneously maintains a more straightforward, 
twofold view of philosophy: as composed of ‘liberal’ (whose arts are technically divided between 
the classifications ‘theory’ and ‘logic’) and ‘mechanical’.  He reiterates, over the course of the 
encyclopaedia, a basic structural contrast between the liberal arts which ‘restore in us the likeness 
                                                        
1 Rita Copeland and Ineke Sluiter, eds, Medieval Grammar and Rhetoric: Language Arts and Literary Theory, 
(Oxford 2012), p. 368. 
2 Boethius’ dictum is cited at the opening of Book Two, Hugh explaining that this definition of philosophy ‘pays 
special attention to the etymology of the word.  For philos in Greek means love, and sophia means wisdom, so that 
from them “philosophy”, that is “love of wisdom”, was coined.’  (‘haec definitio magis ad etymologiam nominis 
spectat.  philos enim Graece, amor dicitur Latine, sophia, sapientia, et inde philosophia tracta est, id est, amor 
sapientiae.’)  Didascalicon 2.1, Buttimer, p. 23; Taylor, p. 62. 
3 Didascalicon 1.5–11; Taylor, pp. 51–60. 
4 A useful analysis and diagram of Hugh’s division can be found in Stephen Ferruolo’s The Origins of the University, 
The Schools of Paris and their Critics, 1100–1215 (Stanford 1985), p. 34.  Jerome Taylor discusses the division in 
the ‘Introduction’ to his edition and translation, pp. 7–8. 
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of the divine image’, and the mechanical arts which address our bodily weakness, or ‘take thought 
for the necessity of this life.’5 
 
The main discussion of the mechanical arts is found in Book Two, across eight short chapters, 
from Chapter Twenty to Chapter Twenty-seven.  The first of these deals with the ‘division of the 
mechanical arts into seven’, and the remaining treat each of these seven artes mechanicae in turn: 
giving an overview of their individual origins, tools, and products.  The first is on fabric making 
(lanificium) – whose example gives a flavour of the set: 
 
Fabric making includes all the kinds of weaving, sewing, and twisting which are 
accompanied by hand, needle, spindle, awl, skein winder, comb, loom, crisper, iron, 
or any other instruments whatever; out of any material made of flax or fleece, or any 
sort of hide, whether scraped or hairy, out of cane as well, or cork, or rushes, or hair, 
or tufts, or any material of this sort which can be used for the making of clothes, 
coverings, drapery, blankets, saddles, carpets, curtains, napkins, felts, strings, nets, 
ropes; out of straw, too, from which men usually make their hats and baskets.  All 
these pursuits belong to fabric making.6 
 
Such passages abound in quotidian observation.  They show us Hugh in an empirical and 
practical light: as a man who, while he was a philosopher and pedagogue within the walls of Saint-
Victor, was in touch with the contemporary life of workshops and markets.  As one scholar has 
put it, particularly vividly: 
 
These lists of specific subdivisions and lively examples of the mechanical read like a 
comprehensive affirmation of daily life in the world at large, the world of blankets, 
saws, trade, meadows, beer, surgery, and amphitheatres.  Here and elsewhere, Hugh 
does not disparage the physical created world but affirms it.7   
 
In scholarship of the 1960s and 70s, there was a fresh impetus to investigate Hugh’s chapters on 
mechanica and their importance in the scheme of the Didascalicon.  In his analysis of their 
technological content, Lynn White argued that Hugh should be re-instated as ‘one of the most 
                                                        
5 ‘… divinae imaginis similitudo in nobis restauretur … vitae necessitudini consulatur’.  Ibid. 1.7, Buttimer, p. 15; 
Taylor, p. 54.   
6 ‘Lanificium continet omnia texendi, consuendi, retorquendi genera, quae fiunt manu, acu, fuso, subula, girgillo, 
pectine, alibro, calamistro, chilindro, sive aliis quibuslibet instrumentis, ex quacumque lini vel lanae materia et omni 
genere pellium erasarum vel pilos habentium, cannabis quoque, vel suberis, iuncorum, pilorum, floccorum, aut alia 
qualibet re huiuscemodi, quae in usum vestimentorum, operimentorum, linteorum, sagorum, sagmatum, 
substratoriorum, cortinarum, matularum, filtrorum, chordarum, cassium, funium, redigi potest.  stramina quoque 
ex quibus galeros et sportulas texere solent homines.  haec omnia studia ad lanificium pertinent.’  Didascalicon 2.21, 
Buttimer, pp. 39–40; Taylor, p. 75.   
7 Paul Rorem, Hugh of Saint Victor (Oxford 2009), p. 26. 
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adventurous spirits of his age’.8  He cast Hugh as an ‘engineer’, rebelling against the literary 
traditionalism of his contemporaries – as the proponent of a technological humanism, or what 
Wetherbee coined the ‘Promethean strain in twelfth-century thought’.9   
 
This chapter aims, likewise, to readdress the importance of mechanica to Hugh of Saint-Victor.  
But it does so from a different angle.  It explores how Hugh’s conception of mechanics as a 
discrete, single category, made up of seven individual arts, exists in tandem with a more abstract 
conception of mechanica, not as a ‘part of’ – but as an image for philosophy as a whole, with a 
significance that transcends and encompasses his ‘official’ categories of ‘mechanical’ and ‘liberal’ 
(or ‘theoretical’, ‘practical’, and ‘logical’).  The mechanical arts are on occasion exemplary of the 
higher – specifically the trivial, or logical – arts in Hugh’s vision.10  Their hands-on procedures – 
or ‘taking thought for necessity’ – serve as illustrations for the mission of ‘recovering the divine 
likeness’, which is elsewhere said to be a wholly separate and superior project. 
 
Importantly, this argument does not mean refuting or underplaying Hugh’s genuine enthusiasm 
for contemporary craft in his accounts of the individual artes mechanicae, as evidenced in his 
description of fabric making.  Hugh’s desire to incorporate the day-to-day world of production 
in his soteriological scheme is indisputable – and of fundamental importance to my argument.  
Rather it means treating the accounts of the mechanical arts as a part, or an expression of a wider, 
ultimately classical interest in the contribution of mechanical art to philosophy, that surfaces in 
unexpected places of the Didascalicon, and in less obvious, subtler forms.  I want to show that 
the mechanical arts – with all their diverse practices, instruments, and materials – matter to Hugh 
not only as ‘real-life’ activities, but also as a means of elaborating on a basically poetic, or poietic, 
vision of learning as a whole, as a ‘making sense’ of nature, or ‘necessity’.  They elucidate his 
philosophical psychology as well as denoting a ‘part’ of philosophy.  To use the relevant terms 
of Hadot’s framework: they exemplify not so much a ‘Promethean’ or utilitarian attitude to 
                                                        
8 White, Medieval Religion and Technology, p. 325.  See Introduction, pp. 2–3. 
9 Ibid., p. 325; and for Wetherbee, above, p. 2, n. 7. 
10 I have already spoken (above, p. 6, n. 28) about the essentially ‘trivial version of philosophy’ native to the twelfth-
century schools.  It is one of the challenges and propositions of this dissertation that medieval encyclopaedias like 
the Didascalicon can present several ‘systems’ at once: an explicit system (in this case, theorica, practica, logica, 
mechanica) being undercut (without being destabilised) by an alternative hierarchy, implicit within the text.  In the 
Didascalicon, the fourfold division of philosophy exists alongside assertions of an essentially trivial (or logical) 
version of philosophy.  In the same paradoxical or ‘collateral’ fashion, mechanica appears both as a ‘category’ and 
as an ‘exemplary’ field.   
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nature in Hugh’s encyclopaedia – but an ‘Orphic’ attitude.  They can be seen to describe and 
evoke man’s perception and cognition of nature; not man’s technological manipulation of it.   
 
This argument falls into two main parts.  The first considers the terms in which Hugh introduces 
the mechanical arts in Book Two.  Previous scholars of the mechanical arts, including White, 
have failed to assess in due depth their introduction in the Didascalicon: as ‘handmaids’ in an 
intellectual marriage of wisdom and eloquence, or Philology and Mercury.  As Elspeth Whitney 
notes, such references have led to Hugh being ‘accused of relying overmuch on literary 
convention and of being overly metaphorical and “bookish”’.11  They have been seen to distract 
from his more technical, more ‘adventurous’ language for the individual arts.12  I contend that 
this mythological introduction, which alludes to their source in a commentary by John Scotus 
Eriugena, should be taken seriously as a conceptual – and poetical – ‘frame’ for the catalogues 
of the artes mechanicae.  
 
The second part of this chapter, related to the first, and similarly overlooked by scholars of the 
mechanical arts, concerns Hugh’s separate discussion of the mechanic in Book One of the 
Didascalicon.  This discussion includes the vision of the three works, tria opera, of God, nature, 
and man, which make up the cosmos.13  If scholars have looked at this, they have treated it in 
isolation from the complex metaphysical scene-setting of Book One as a whole – taking it instead 
as an ‘add-on’ to the catalogues of Book Two.  I consider this discussion of the artificer as cosmic 
agent, and ‘interpreter’ of nature, in its own right, and in the context of the exemplary and 
synoptic thrust of Book One.  I show that it implies a poetical role for the mechanical artist, 
which in turn could be seen to elaborate on the arts’ allegorical heritage. 
 
The body of this chapter therefore has two main sections.  It may strike the reader as 
counterintuitive to move (backward) from Book Two to Book One.  I hope the rationale for this 
trajectory becomes clear: first, it allows us to move from the explicit locus of Hugh’s discussion 
of mechanics outwards – and therefore to show more persuasively how the previous scholarship 
has been limited.  It is also an argumentative necessity.  Establishing the meaning of the 
                                                        
11 Whitney, ‘Paradise Restored’, p. 87. 
12 The point has been made by Barbara Newman that goddesses in medieval poetry ‘have been something of an 
embarrassment to medievalists’.  Perhaps the same embarrassment has prevented serious attention to allegorical 
references in otherwise ‘serious’ texts like Hugh’s.  Barbara Newman, God and the Goddesses: Vision, Poetry, and 
Belief in the Middle Ages (Philadelphia 2003), p. 1. 
13 Above, p. 1 (and below, p. 44). 
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framework of wisdom and eloquence, introduced in Book Two, is important context for the 
arguably wider significance of mechanical art in the first book.  The argument thus calls for a 
right-to-left approach, beginning with the mechanical arts’ patron in the eyes of medieval 
schoolmen: the Roman god of eloquence and poetry, Mercury. 
 
I. Wisdom and Eloquence 
 
In his introductory comments ‘on the division of the mechanical arts into seven’, just before his 
catalogues of their individual processes and products, Hugh explains ‘Hae sunt septem ancillae 
quas Mercurius a philologia in dotem accepit; quia nimirum eloquentiae cui juncta fuerit 
sapientia, omnis humana actio servit’: ‘These are the seven handmaids which Mercury received 
in dowry from Philology, for every human activity is servant to eloquence wed to wisdom.’14  He 
goes on, ‘Thus Tully, in his book on rhetoricians, says concerning the study of eloquence’: 
 
By it life is made safe, by it fit, by it noble, and by it pleasurable: for from it the 
commonwealth receives abundant benefits, provided that wisdom, which 
regulates all things, keeps it company.  From eloquence, to those who have 
acquired it, flow praise, honor, dignity; from eloquence, to the friends of those 
skilled in it, comes most dependable and sure protection.15 
 
This introduction relies on three separate, and interrelated historical sources.  To begin with 
Hugh’s most specific claim: the idea that the mechanical arts belonged to Mercury ‘received in 
dowry from Philology’ is taken from John Scotus Eriugena, and his ninth-century commentary 
on a pagan work by the fifth-century Roman author Martianus Capella, ‘The Marriage of 
Philology and Mercury’, or De nuptiis Philologiae et Mercurii.  The union of Philology and 
Mercury is original to this work – a ceremony to which Eriugena added, in his commentary, the 
dowry of the artes mechanicae.  However, Hugh also refers, synchronously, to the words of 
‘Tully’, that is Cicero, ‘concerning the study of eloquence’, as if to support his characterisation 
of the mechanical arts as Mercury’s ‘handmaids’.  Cicero was Martianus Capella’s own source 
                                                        
14 Hugh of Saint-Victor, Didascalicon 2.20, Buttimer, p. 39; Taylor, p. 75. 
15 ‘sicut Tullius in libro rhetoricorum de studio eloquentiae dicit: Hoc tuta, hoc honesta, hoc illustris, hoc eodem 
vita iucunda fiat.  nam hinc ad rem publicam plurima commoda veniunt, si moderatrix omnium praesto est sapientia.  
hinc ad eos qui ipsam adepti sunt, laus, honos, dignitas, confluit.  hinc amicis quoque eorum certissimum, et 
tutissimum praesidium est.’  Ibid.  The original passage is at De Inventione 1.4 – trans. by H. M. Hubbell, LCL 386 
(Cambridge, MA 1949), pp. 12–13.  
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for the idea of Philology and Mercury’s marriage.16  These mythological figures were 
personifications for an educational ideal of combining ‘wisdom’ and ‘eloquence’ set out in 
Cicero’s De Inventione – from which Hugh quotes here.  Martianus, by allegorising this ideal, 
popularised it for the Middle Ages.  In order to fully comprehend Hugh’s own understanding of 
the marriage, his frame for the artes mechanicae, we need to address these three complementary 
sources (Cicero, Martianus, and Eriugena) in turn, and in some depth – starting with what Cicero 
had himself meant by the union.   
 
Cicero 
 
There is, in the first place, Cicero’s passage quoted by Hugh – describing the good which 
eloquence, when accompanied by wisdom (sapientia) does for states (offering nobility, pleasure, 
praise, honour, dignity, and protection).  His discussion of the union also included an ‘origin 
myth’ for eloquence: ‘If we wish to consider the origin of this thing we call eloquence – whether it 
be an art, a study, a skill, or a gift of nature’, he says, ‘we shall find that it arose from most 
honourable causes and continued on its way from the best of reasons’:17 
 
For there was a time when men wandered at large in the fields like animals and lived 
on wild fare; they did nothing by the guidance of reason, but relied chiefly on physical 
strength; there was as yet no ordered system of religious worship nor of social duties 
… At this juncture a man – great and wise [sapiens] I am sure – became aware of the 
power latent in man and the wide field offered by his mind for great achievements if 
one could develop this power and improve it by instruction.  Men were scattered in 
the fields and hidden in sylvan shelters [tectis silvestribus] when he assembled and 
gathered them in accordance with a plan; he introduced them to every useful and 
honourable occupation, though they cried out against it at first because of its novelty, 
and then when through reason and eloquence [rationem atque orationem] they had 
listened with greater attention, he transformed them from wild savages into a kind and 
gentle folk.  To me, at least, it does not seem possible that a mute and voiceless wisdom 
[tacita nec inops dicendi sapientia] could have turned men suddenly from their habits 
and introduced them to different patterns of life.18  
                                                        
16 Cicero was Martianus’ obvious source, and it was also to Cicero that medieval authors traced the wisdom-eloquence 
topos.  However, as Gabriel Nuchelmans shows, Cicero himself took it from the Greek Stoics and specifically 
Isocrates (c. 436–338 BC): Gabriel Nuchelmans, ‘Philologiae et son marriage avec Mercure jusqu’a la fin du XIIe 
siecle’, Latonus 16 (1957), pp. 84–107. 
17 ‘Ac si volumus huius rei quae vocatur eloquentia, sive artis sive studi sive exercitationis cuiusdam sive facultatis ab 
natura profectae considerare principium, reperiemus id ex honestissimis causis natum atque optimis rationibus 
profectum.’  Cicero, De Inventione 1.1; Hubbell, pp. 4–5. 
18 ‘Nam fuit quoddam tempus cum in agris homines passim bestiarum modo vagabantur et sibi victu fero vitam 
propagabant, nec ratione animi quicquam, sed pleraque viribus corporis administrabant; nondum divinae religionis, 
non humani offici ratio colebatur … Quo tempore quidam magnus videlicet vir et sapiens cognovit quae materia esset 
et quanta ad maximas res opportunitas in animis inesset hominum, si quis eam posset elicere et praecipiendo meliorem 
 27 
 
 
 
 
This elaborates on eloquence as a civilizing power.  Cicero imagines it as the very foundation of 
the Roman polis.  Without it there would be no culture.  Romans would not be Romans, but 
wild men, living in ‘sylvan shelters’ with no knowledge of their own innate wisdom (or reason) 
and potential for greatness.  Wisdom is again stressed as the more elevated partner of the ‘union’, 
as it was in the passage quoted by Hugh (where it ‘regulates’ and directs eloquence).  In this 
‘origin myth’ Cicero goes further to define wisdom as a native thing: that power ‘latent in man’, 
which needs developing and improving by instruction by eloquence.  Eloquence, he seems to 
confirm, is by contrast ‘an art, a study, a skill’.  It makes wisdom effective; it releases it from its 
initially ‘mute and voiceless’ condition.  It is instrumental in what Cicero elsewhere called the 
‘cultura animi’, the cultivation of the soul.19  It is the means by which we emerge from, improve, 
and eventually master our natural state.  Via eloquence, in other words, we tackle and rise above 
‘necessity’.   
 
Martianus Capella 
 
The terms and images of this origin myth for wisdom and eloquence were taken up, and 
dramatically rephrased, by Martianus Capella, in his pagan allegory De nuptiis Philologiae et 
Mercurii, written sometime between 410 and 439.20  Cicero’s union had in fact received earlier 
commentary from the Christian convert Marius Victorinus (c.350), and was discussed in some 
                                                        
reddere; qui dispersos homines in agros et in tectis silvestribus abditos ratione quadam compulit unum in locum et 
congregavit et eos in unam quamque rem inducens utilem atque honestam primo propter insolentiam reclamantes, 
deinde propter rationem atque orationem studiosius audientes ex feris et immanibus mites reddidit et mansuetos.  Ac 
mihi quidem videtur hoc nec tacita nec inops dicendi sapientia perficere potuisse ut homines a consuetudine subito 
converteret et ad diversas rationes vitae traduceret.’  Ibid. 1.2; Hubbell, pp. 4–7.  I make a single modification to 
Hubbell’s translation – translating tectis silvestribus (which he translates as ‘sylvan retreats’) as ‘sylvan shelters’, which I 
judge to be more accurate.  We come back to this term in brief below, p. 68. 
19 At Tusculan Disputations 2.5, Cicero writes: ‘cultura autem animi philosophia est’ (‘the cultivation of the soul is 
philosophy’).  This suggests the synonymy of philosophy and eloquence in his works (eloquence being the equivalent 
‘cultivator’ in De Inventione).  For further study of Cicero’s agricultural metaphors see Catherine Connors, ‘Field 
and Forum: Culture and Agriculture in Roman Rhetoric’, in Roman Eloquence: Rhetoric in Society and Literature, 
ed. by William J. Dominik (London 1997), pp. 71–89. 
20 I use the Latin edition by James Willis, Bibliotheca scriptorum Graecorum et Romanorum Teubneriana (Leipzig 
1983); and the English translation in the second volume of William Harris Stahl, Richard Johnson and E. L. Burge, 
eds, Martianus Capella and the Seven Liberal Arts, 2 vols (New York 1971) – hereafter referred to as ‘Stahl et al.’.  
The date of De nuptiis has been debated.  Martianus laments the demise of Rome, leading scholars to believe the 
work postdates the sack of the city in 410.  The terminus of 439 has been inferred from his references to the 
prosperity of Carthage, which fell into the hands of the Vandals in that year.  For a summary of the arguments and 
the case for the timeframe 410–439, see Stahl et al., Martianus Capella, 1: pp. 12–15. 
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depth by Augustine in his fourth book of De Doctrina Christiana.21  Thus by the time it ‘reached’ 
Martianus it was something of a commonplace in both pagan and Christian circles.22  But his 
eccentric take on it is almost exclusively responsible for its popular reception in the Middle Ages. 
 
According to one of his modern translators, William Stahl, Martianus was a prominent official 
in Roman provincial administration, and seems to have been born and educated at Carthage, 
perhaps alongside Augustine.23  De nuptiis (as I will refer to it) is his only surviving work.  It put 
Cicero’s civilizing partnership into the terms of a complicated Neoplatonic allegory, written in a 
mixture of prose and richly allusive verse, known as a prosimetrum.24  Instead of describing or 
promising the foundation of the state, the union of wisdom and eloquence becomes in this text 
the foundation for the mind or soul’s ascent to heaven.   
 
Cicero’s eloquentia is personified as Mercury, Roman god of communication (associated with 
eloquence, poetry, commerce, and travel).25  It is worth noting that there was some kind of 
precedent for this: in Horace’s Ars Poetica, Cicero’s idea of eloquence turning wild men to 
civilized folk had been attached to the figure of Orpheus.26  Martianus chooses instead Mercury, 
like Orpheus a player (actually inventor) of the lyre, but also associated with boundaries – with 
‘marking’ them and crossing them – specifically boundaries between the human and the divine.27  
                                                        
21 Relevant extracts of Marius Victorinus’ commentary are included in Copeland and Sluiter, Medieval Grammar 
and Rhetoric, pp. 105–124. The critical edition is by Karl Halm, Explanationes in Ciceronis Rhetoricam, in 
Rhetores Latini Minores (Leipzig 1863), pp. 153–304. 
22 For the shared inheritance of Christian and pagan circles in late antiquity, see the work of Peter Brown, e.g. Power 
and Persuasion in Late Antiquity: Towards a Christian Empire (London 1992), pp. 35–70; and Alan Cameron, The 
Last Pagans of Rome (Oxford 2011). 
23 He refers to himself as a ‘fosterling of the prosperous city of Dido’.  William H. Stahl, ‘To a Better Understanding 
of Martianus Capella’, Speculum 40, 1 (1965), pp. 102–115, at 105. 
24 This form was traditionally connected with the Greek satirist Menippus from Gadara, now in Jordan, and usually 
reserved for satirical contents.  It was introduced to Latin Literature by Varro in his Saturae Mennipaeae.  A satirical 
element is preserved in Martianus’ text.  For the influence of the prosimetrum on the literature of the Middle Ages 
see Eleanor Johnson, Practicing Literary Theory in the Middle Ages: Ethics and the Mixed Form in Chaucer, 
Gower, Usk, and Hoccleve (Chicago 2013). 
25 His Latin name is possibly related to merx for ‘merchandise’, mercari ‘to trade’, and merces for ‘wages’.  Another 
possible connection is the Proto-Indo-European root merĝ- for ‘boundary, border’, whence we get the Old Norse 
mark and the Latin margo.  One might add that while Greek language theory centered on poiesis, in the Roman 
period, much of this was carried over to eloquentia – the equivalent in conceptual size and application.  Thus 
Mercury was the god of poetry and of orators. 
26 Horace, Ars Poetica 391–407: ‘While men still roamed the woods, Orpheus, the holy prophet of the gods, made 
them shrink from bloodshed and brutal living; hence the fable, that he tamed tigers and ravening lions.’ (‘Silvestris 
homines sacer interpresque deorum caedibus et victu foedo deterruit Orpheus, dictus ob hoc lenire tigris rabidosque 
leones.’)  trans. by H. Rushton Fairclough, LCL 194 (Cambridge, MA 1926), pp. 482–483. 
27 The story of his creation of the lyre from a turtle shell is related in the Homeric Hymn to Hermes, referenced in 
Adeline Grand-Clément, ‘Poikilia’, in The Blackwell Companion to Ancient Aesthetics, ed. by Pierre Destrée and 
Penelope Murray, pp. 406–421, at 406. 
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In choosing Mercury, Martianus created a vivid picture of Cicero’s eloquence as a cultivator of 
nature, through poetic means (speech or song) – and also a merchant, traveller, and messenger.  
He was also able to imply the mischievous character of eloquence when not applied to a proper 
purpose. 
 
The personification Martianus chose for Cicero’s ‘wisdom’ (sapientia or ratio) was by contrast 
not a familiar figure of myth, but a creation of his own imagination.  He named her ‘Philology’, 
from philo + logos, meaning literally ‘love of letters’ or ‘love of reason’.  That she is a ‘love of’ 
logos (as opposed to a personification of ‘reason’ or ‘wisdom’ itself) echoes Cicero’s definition 
of wisdom as a latent, mute power, a potential in the mind or soul that has to be realised.  Indeed, 
Martianus’ allegory – like Cicero’s ‘origin myth’ - paints wisdom as a rather passive figure in 
Philology.  The actual plot of De nuptiis centres on how eloquence (Mercury) is brought into 
her service: how education makes man civilized, or (here) immortal.   
 
Medieval students must have enjoyed Martianus’ irreverence.  The work opens with the story of 
the couple’s courtship, ‘fixed up’ by Mercury’s mother Juno.  Martianus plays on Cicero’s 
warning that eloquence without wisdom can be harmful or ‘mischievous’ in Juno’s fears about 
the young god’s licentious lifestyle: 
 
She was concerned about him, especially because his body, through the exercise of 
wrestling and constant running, glowed with masculine strength and bore muscles of 
a youth perfectly developed.  Already with the first beard on his cheeks, he could not 
continue to go about half naked, clad in nothing but a short cape covering only the 
top of his shoulders – such a sight caused the Cyprian great amusement.28 
 
Mercury’s beauty is wasted, even precarious, until he is put to good use.  Martianus’ description 
of the fit young god is faithfully illustrated in a medieval tapestry of the marriage, dating to the 
late twelfth century, from the German Abbey of Quedlinberg, shown in figure 5 (although his 
cape has been sensitively lengthened).   
 
When Jupiter (Juno’s husband and Mercury’s father) worries that Mercury might make a lazy 
husband for Philology, Juno reassures him that ‘it is fitting that he should be married to the very 
                                                        
28 ‘… praesertimque quod palaestra crebrisque discursibus exercitum corpus lacertosis in iuvenalis roboris 
excellentiam toris virile quadam amplitudine renidebat, ac iam pubentes genae seminudum eum incedere 
chlamidaque indutum parva, invelatum cetera, umerorum cacumen obnubere sine magno risu Cypridis non 
sinebant.’ Martianus Capella, De nuptiis Philologiae et Mercurii 1.5, ed. Willis, p. 3; trans. Stahl et al., 2: p. 6. 
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maiden who would not tolerate his dozing off.’29  Philology is a dedicated scholar and will be a 
good influence.  She is shown on the far right of the Quedlinberg tapestry in noticeably modest, 
colourless dress.  Martianus says that before her marriage she sits locked away in lonely and 
‘wearisome vigils’ of research, pervigilia laborata, into the constitution of the world.30  The 
correspondingly unruly, colourful Mercury ‘will be encouraged by her to move and stir his wings 
and seek the utmost limits of the world,’ what Martianus calls extramundanas.31  
 
Once a council of the gods has been called, and the marriage put to a vote, the union is 
confirmed, and the wedding preparations begin.  Philology, unlike Mercury, is a mortal, and part 
of the nuptial contract involves her promotion to immortality (representing the soul’s 
immortality) under the protection of the celestial delegation, including the Muses, the Cardinal 
Virtues, and the Graces (a scattering of whom are shown on the Quedlinberg tapestry).  When 
Philology has ascended to the lap of the gods and finally enters the ceremony, Phronesis, her 
mother, requests that Mercury bestow his wedding gifts, after which ‘a gift should be given by the 
maiden’.32  Thus Mercury gives his gifts to Philology: seven serving maids – ancillae – who will be 
her servants.  They are the seven liberal arts: Grammar, Dialectic, Rhetoric, Geometry, 
Arithmetic, Astronomy, and Harmony.  This all ‘teaches’ a basic Neoplatonic and paideic lesson 
– that the immortality of the soul, the recovery of innate wisdom, depends on the study and 
‘servitude’ of these disciplines.  As Andrew Hicks puts it, in his insightful essay on the text, 
Martianus’ allegory emphasises the liberal arts’ ‘propaedeutic value’: as a means and a result of 
Philology’s metaphysical journey, ‘they are a path to salvation’.33  The rest of De nuptiis takes the 
form of an encyclopaedia, with individual books given over to descriptions of each of these 
‘maidens’ in turn.34  But the gift to be ‘given by the maiden’ to her husband Mercury is never 
                                                        
29 ‘tunc Iuno “atquin” ait “euisdem convenit virginis subire vinclum, quae illum etiam quiescere cupientem conivere 
non perferat…”.’  Ibid. 1.37, Willis, p. 15; Stahl et al., 2: p. 19. 
30 Ibid.  
31 ‘tam vero abest ut sub hac possit pigrescere intricarique Cyllenius, ut commotis ab eadem suscitatisque pinnis 
extramundanas petere latitudines urgeatur.’  Ibid., Willis, p. 16. 
32 ‘… ac demum dos a virgine non deesset ...’.  Ibid. 2.217, Willis, p. 57; Stahl et al., 2: p. 63. 
33 The allegory rejects direct and detailed translation into a pedagogical ‘strategy’ (hence we have to be satisfied with 
the liberal arts as both ‘means’ and ‘ends’ of Philology’s marriage journey).  Hence also I put the word ‘teach’ in 
inverted commas: Martianus’ ‘lesson’ is his imagery.  Nevertheless, we can ascertain his general points – on which 
Andrew Hicks’ essay is excellent: ‘Martianus Capella and the Liberal Arts’, in The Oxford Handbook of Medieval 
Latin Literature, ed. by Ralph Hexter and David Townsend (New York 2012), pp. 307–334, at 315. 
34 In the last of these, about Harmony (or Harmonics), Martianus notes that Apollo ‘suggested that medicine and 
architecture were standing by, among those who had been prepared to perform.  But since these ladies are 
concerned with mortal subjects and their skill lies in mundane m 
atters, and they have nothing in common with the celestial deities, it will not be inappropriate to disdain and reject 
them.  They will keep silent in the heavenly company’.  Ibid. 9.891, Willis, p. 339; Stahl et al., 2: p. 346. 
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resolved.  Martianus moves onto these later encyclopaedic books without ever referring back to 
this earlier promise.  
 
John Scotus Eriugena 
 
As early as the sixth century, another African, Fulgentius, wrote a text based on Martianus’, and 
in the sixth century Gregory of Tours (c. 538–594) attested that De nuptiis had become a school 
manual.35 But it was not until the ninth century that commentators picked up on Martianus’ 
omission of Philology’s gift and decided what it should be. Those who did so were two 
Carolingian scholars, John Scotus Eriugena and Remigius of Auxerre (c. 841–908).    
 
Eriugena was an Irish ascetic and theologian who had migrated to France to head the Palace 
School of Charles the Bald.  Remigius was taught by one of Eriugena’s own disciples, Heiric of 
Auxerre and after Heiric’s death became head of that school, before teaching in Reims and Paris.  
Both were prolific compilers and commentators on classical texts, but it was Eriugena who 
commented on Martianus’ De nuptiis first; to a great extent Remigius only glossed his version.36  
Eriugena’s commentary, Wetherbee has noted, is perhaps ‘the first instance of a medieval reader 
approaching an ancient text in full awareness, both of the errors to which its pagan Platonism 
gives rise, and of all that it can nonetheless offer to the Christian student.’37  Despite the text’s 
many circumlocutions and complications, which often seem to undermine straightforward 
definitions of Philology and Mercury, Eriugena (and Remigius alike) took Martianus to be 
allegorising the union of Cicero, and defined Philology as ratio or sapientia, and Mercury as 
sermo (speaking) or facundia sermonis (eloquence of speaking).38  
 
On Philology’s gifts to her new husband, Eriugena added in his commentary that it was ‘as if 
[Martianus] had said: after Mercury has given the seven liberal arts, the maiden will then give the 
seven mechanical arts.’39  At this point he elaborated no further.  Then later, in his annotations 
                                                        
35 Lewis Thorpe, The History of the Franks (London 1974), p. 30. 
36 See Ilaria Ramelli, ‘Eriugena’s Commentary on Martianus in the Framework of his Thought and the Philosophical 
Debate of his Time’ in Carolingian Scholarship and Martianus Capella: Ninth-Century Commentary Traditions on 
‘De Nuptiis’ in Context, ed. by Mariken Teeuwen and Sinead O’Sullivan (Turnhout 2011), pp. 245–272, at 246–
248. 
37 Winthrop Wetherbee, ‘Learned Mythography: Plato and Martianus Capella’, in The Oxford Handbook of 
Medieval Latin Literature, ed. by Ralph Hexter and David Townsend (New York 2012), pp. 335–355, at 338. 
38 Hicks, ‘Martianus Capella’, p. 317. 
39 ‘Ac si dixisset: Postquam Mercurius dederit septem liberales artes, tunc virgo dabit septem mechanicas.’  Iohannis 
Scotti: Annotationes in Marcianum, 79, 12, ed. by Cora Lutz (Cambridge, MA 1939), p. 74.  All translations from 
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on Martianus’ book on Dialectica, where Martianus defines the term qualitas and the liberal arts 
as ‘qualities’ of mind, Eriugena returned to the topic of the mechanical arts, differentiating them 
from the liberal arts.40  He wrote: 
   
[The liberal] disciplines are perceived only by the mind itself, nor are they assumed 
from any other place, but comprehended naturally in the soul.  Not so the other 
[mechanical] arts, which are made by a certain imitation or by a human devising, 
such as architecture etc.’41   
 
In studies of the mechanical arts by White, Ovitt, and others, the fact that these arts first appear 
in the context of Martianus’ marriage story is more or less glanced over.42  Concerned primarily 
with the mechanical arts’ later and fuller treatment in taxonomies of knowledge, scholars have 
looked back on Eriugena, rather like Hugh, as a prophet of science and engineering, who used 
Martianus’ text as an ‘excuse’ to invent a category of ‘mechanical arts’.  To me, this reading of 
Eriugena and Remigius seems to miss the more poetic, allegorical motivations which might also 
be at play in their addition (and thus perception) of the so-called ‘mechanical arts’.  There is, of 
course, very little to go on.  Eriugena’s only comments on this dowry, from the book on 
Dialectica, are an effort to distinguish them from the liberal arts.  Where the latter are 
comprehended naturally in the soul (‘naturaliter in anima intelliguntur’), Eriugena tells us, the 
mechanical arts are made ‘by a certain imitation or by a human devising, such as architecture 
etc.’ (‘imitatione quadam vel excogitatione humana fiunt, ut architectoria et caetere.’).43  His 
                                                        
this commentary are my own.  Remigius copied Eriugena’s decision in his own commentary, writing at the point of 
the dowry exchange, ‘Ac demum id est post modum, hoc est postquam Mercurius ostenderat septem liberales artes, 
tunc demum et Philologia traderet septem mechanicas artes.’  Remigii Autissiodorensis: Commentum in Martianum 
Capellam Libri I-II, 79.11, ed. by Cora Lutz (Leiden 1962), p. 208. 
40 The passage Eriugena comments on is at De nuptiis Philologiae et Mercurii 4.367, Willis, p. 120; Stahl et al., 2: 
p. 122. 
41 ‘…ipse disciplinae sola ipsa anima percipiuntur nec aliunde assumuntur, sed naturaliter in anima intelliguntur.  
Non sic ceterae artes quae imitatione quadam vel excogitatione humana fiunt, ut architectoria et caetere.’  Iohannis 
Scotti: Annotationes 170, 14, Lutz, pp. 96–97.  I have translated anima as ‘mind’ in the first instance and ‘soul’ in 
the second although these could be swapped around, or the same term used twice.  Lutz remarks in her introduction 
(p. xxx), the sole surviving manuscript of Eriugena’s commentary contains two versions of the annotations on De 
dialectica (the fourth of the nine books of De nuptiis).  ‘The first, announced simply as “De dialectica,” is somewhat 
abbreviated and contains glosses from 151, 1 to 174, 11, where upon it is followed immediately by the more formal 
“Incipiunt haec pauca in dialectica Martiani”.’  The comments on the mechanical arts cited above are therefore 
repeated in the manuscript (and in Lutz’ edition), with slight variation.  Here I have cited the fuller passage from the 
second and more formal version of the annotations.  For the first version of the annotation see Lutz, p. 86.  One of 
the main distinguishing factors between the two versions is the omission in the first of the notion of imitation 
(‘imitatione quadam’) from the definition of the mechanical arts (which are defined at p. 86 just as belonging to 
‘human devising’, excogitatione humana).   
42 Whitney discusses Eriugena’s addition at ‘Paradise Restored’, pp. 70–73, but there is no mention of the allegorical 
‘setting’ of the Marriage.  George Ovitt includes no reference to Eriugena’s commentary in his ‘The Status of the 
Mechanical Arts’. 
43 Note 41. 
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twofold definition (the mechanical arts come about by imitation or by human devising) positions 
them as products of man’s external engagement with the world, his inventing on the basis of what 
he sees around him.  It seems primarily intended to set the mechanical arts in contrast to the 
liberal arts which, as Eriugena says in the previous sentence, are not ‘assumed from any other 
place’, ‘nec aliunde assumuntur’, but arise internally.  In this brief description, the mechanical 
arts appear as the artificial or ‘acquired’ counterpart to the liberal arts, that allow us to cope 
corporeally, in the physical world, while the ‘natural’ liberal arts belong to and sustain our inner 
lives. 
 
Eriugena’s distinction between the liberal and the mechanical arts might be seen to echo roughly 
the distinction, going back to Cicero, and central to the myth of wisdom and eloquence, between 
wisdom (Philology) as an innate and native power, and eloquence (Mercury) as ‘an art, a study, 
a skill’.44  While Eriugena gives us no direct or explicit reasoning for his addition of the artes 
mechanicae as the dowry received by Mercury from Philology in his annotation to the marriage 
episode, one could argue there is a clue to his logic embedded in this short, later annotation: that 
is, the mechanical arts imaginatively ‘match with’ eloquence as learned skills, that improve our 
natural state – as the liberal arts match, or serve, Philology as ‘naturally comprehended’ arts.   
 
At the same time, we know that within this marriage, eloquence (or Mercury) acts ‘on’ wisdom 
(Philology).  As Cicero explained (and as is central to the whole structure and meaning of De 
nuptiis), eloquence is required to cultivate wisdom, to help realise the soul’s potential for the 
liberal arts.  Is there a sense, then, in which the mechanical arts, arguably ‘matching with’ the 
practical skill of eloquence, also ‘gloss’ the process by which wisdom is realised?  In other words, 
are they more than a random choice?  Do they have an intended imaginative function as 
Mercury’s dowry, the equivalent to Philology’s dowry?  Given the brevity of Eriugena’s remarks 
there is, of course, no discoverable answer to such questions.  What we could say, perhaps, is 
that the text is open to such questioning.  Eriugena’s distinction between the liberal and 
mechanical, in terms which to some extent echo the distinction between Philology and Mercury, 
invites us to consider that at some level the mechanical arts could have been intended to invoke 
the artificial, acquired skill (the ‘devising’) Mercury brings to wisdom – and which (concomitantly) 
underpins ascent through the liberal arts.   
 
                                                        
44 ‘…artis sive studi sive exercitationis’ cited above n. 17, p. 26. 
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This reading could be developed with reference to David Summers’ remarks on the appearance 
of the term ‘mechanical arts’ in Eriugena’s commentary, in his book The Judgement of Sense.  
First of all, Summers summarises Eriugena’s gloss distinguishing the liberal and mechanical arts 
(in roughly the same way we have above): 
 
The liberal and mechanical arts are thus opposed as inner and outer, and for our 
purposes it is crucial that inwardness and outwardness are associated with higher and 
lower faculties, the lower of which is called excogitatio. The mechanical arts deal with 
the world of sense and subjection to circumstance, the liberal arts deal with the world 
of mind and the autonomous rational soul.45   
 
Then, elsewhere in his book, Summers examines the meaning of the term excogitatio – here the 
‘lower faculty’ relevant to the mechanical arts – outside of Eriugena’s commentary.  In classical 
Latin, Summers says ‘cogitare meant to consider thoroughly, to turn over in the mind, picture to 
oneself, intend, design, or plan.’46  He goes on that, 
 
Excogitatio covered a similar range of meaning but also meant to contrive or devise, 
and excogitatus meant “choice” or “select”.  It might be argued that the simple 
metaphor underlying these terms, as Augustine suggested, was that of gathering, 
collecting, and uniting.  This simple metaphor was deeply important, however, 
because in such gathering, which might be called the first activity of mind, mind itself 
becomes visible.  By “gathering” our experience, we form universals and form the 
idea of the beautiful, and at the level of gathering, which is always by some individual, 
sensation becomes individual thought, memory, and imagination.47 
 
Here, then, Summers elucidates how for classical Latin writers, and for Augustine, the ostensibly 
lower faculty of excogitatio (which Eriugena associates with the mechanical arts) contributed to 
the higher faculties.  The ‘gathering, collecting, and uniting’ of experience this faculty denoted 
was considered the basis of human imagining and forming of universals.  To illuminate this 
participation of excogitatio in the higher operations of the mind, Summers highlights how ‘Cicero 
made excogitatio a part of his definition of rhetorical invention: “Inventio est excogitatio rerum 
verarum aut verisimilium”, which might be translated as “invention is the imagination and 
selection of true and probable things”’.48  For Cicero, eloquence itself began in ‘devising’, or as 
Summers translates excogitatio, an ‘imagination and selection’ of things – arguments, 
                                                        
45 David Summers, The Judgement of Sense: Renaissance Naturalism and the Rise of Aesthetics (Cambridge, UK 
1987), p. 244. 
46 Ibid., p. 198. 
47 Ibid., p. 199 
48 Ibid.; Cicero, De inventione 1.7. 
 35 
 
 
 
impressions, experiences.49  It is from this basis, of ‘gathering’ the raw data of experience, that we 
go on to form ideas and images in our minds – through which in turn, according to Summers, 
‘mind itself becomes visible’.  Understood in this way, rhetorical excogitatio (defined at 1.7 of 
De Inventione) seems to be precisely the intellectual process (or key to the process) dramatised 
in Cicero’s origin myth at 1.1.  The story of the eloquent man who ‘gathered and assembled’ 
scattered, uncivilised men ‘in accordance with a plan’ (‘ratione quadam compulit unum in locum 
et congregavit’), and in the process uncovered their potential for wisdom, reads essentially as a 
metaphor for this first step in the rhetorical process, and its ultimate effect of self-recognition.50 
 
While it is unnecessary to insist that Eriugena was making deliberate reference to Cicero’s use of 
excogitatio in his annotations on Martianus, we know that he was familiar with the De Inventione 
(the earliest source for the union of wisdom and eloquence available to him).51  He must have 
known Cicero’s definition and terminology for the first procedure of eloquence, before he used 
the particular word excogitatio to describe the mechanical arts, given to eloquence.  This 
correspondence of terms should not, of course, be used to attribute a special and determinate 
meaning to the mechanical arts in the commentary.  But it is worth highlighting.  The fact that 
Eriugena chose a word which defined rhetorical invention in one of his key sources to describe 
the ‘mechanical arts’, allows us to ponder the possibility these arts were inserted to reflect the 
‘human devising’ brought by eloquence to wisdom. 
 
At this point, we can recapitulate our findings with reference to an ancient (and medieval) concept 
encountered in the introduction – that of poiesis.  The image of eloquence that emerges in 
Cicero, in Martianus, and perhaps also through the lens of Eriugena’s inserted mechanical arts, 
could be seen as testament to the legacy of this epistemological model.  Poiesis, as set out in the 
introduction, referred to ‘making’ in the ancient world, and was used to designate a huge variety 
of activities we would now consider distinct.  Specifically, it included verbal invention alongside 
physical acts of ‘making’, like weaving or building.  This is why ‘poetry’ is the basic verbal ‘style’ 
of the ancient world: because it was seen as a necessity.  Verbal invention was by definition poetic, 
                                                        
49 Summers translates rerum as ‘things’.  In the Loeb translation by H. M. Hubbell rerum is translated as ‘arguments’, 
and a few lines later as ‘matter’ or ‘subject matter’, to be fitted with words (verba): pp. 18–21.  Rhetorical invention 
is the first of five parts of rhetoric, or eloquence, described at De Inventione 1.7 – the others being arrangement 
(dispositio), expression (elocutio) memory (memoria), and delivery (pronuntiatio). 
50 Above, pp. 26–27, n. 18. 
51 See Stephen Gersh, ‘Eriugena’s Ars Rhetorica – Theory and Practice’, in Ioannes Scottus Eriugena: The Bible 
and Hermeneutics: Proceedings of the Ninth International Colloquium of the Society for the Promotion of 
Eriugenan Studies, ed. by Gerd Van Riel, Carlos Steel and James McEvoy (Leuven 1996), pp. 261–278, at 273. 
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or poietic – an imitation and ‘remaking’ of the world’s materials into the shape of the mind.  
While Cicero is interested in oratory, in political speeches – not in the composition of epics – 
his mythological introduction and definitions in De Inventione suggest he sees oratory and 
rhetoric at least partly in this ‘poietic’ light, as a recuperation and ‘making sense’ of experience 
through language.52   
 
Cicero’s later readers, Martianus Capella and Eriugena, seem commited to this classical attitude 
and to preserve it in their own works.  Martianus describes the realisation of wisdom, or the 
ascent of the soul, through the ‘crafty’ work of eloquence, or Mercury: a tamer of natural and 
supernatural boundaries through speech and song.  Eriugena’s addition of the ‘mechanical arts’ 
as Mercury’s ancillae is at no point explicitly explained or justified in his ninth-century 
commentary.  Hence the tendency by previous scholars to overlook the potential significance of 
these arts within the story, and instead to read them as a foreshadowing of later scientific 
interests.53  As against this tendency, I propose that Eriugena’s addition of these arts, ‘made by a 
certain imitation or by a human devising’ (‘imitatione quadam vel excogitatione humana fiunt’) 
could be interpreted as a partly allegorical move.  In many ways, these mundane arts correspond 
to the characterisation and role of eloquence in the allegory, and in Cicero’s definition and origin 
myth before it – as the practical, ‘acquired’ and we might say ‘poietic’ counterpart to (and 
cultivator of) wisdom.  Were we to take this reading further, we might say that the mechanical 
arts simultaneously hold up a kind of mirror to the liberal arts in Martianus’ story – that they 
picture for the reader how the higher arts, received by Philology and ‘comprehended naturally 
in the soul’, also demand the acquired the skill and excogitatio of Mercury in order to become 
visible or actualised in the soul. 
 
To come back to Hugh of Saint-Victor’s introduction to the mechanical arts – as the ‘seven 
handmaids which Mercury received in dowry from Philology’, elaborated with reference to 
Cicero’s account of eloquence in De Inventione, it is clear that these references alone do not tell 
us unequivocally that Hugh took a metaphorical view of the mechanical arts.  Yet it would be 
equally wrong, I think, to write off these citations as meaningless, to assume that the mechanical 
arts’ place in the marriage of wisdom and eloquence – which Hugh draws our attention to from 
the off – had no significance for his view of mechanics.  Given his allegorical introduction, and 
                                                        
52 We return to the presence of cosmogonic vocabulary in Cicero’s rhetorical treatises in Chapter Two, pp. 60–61. 
53 Above, p. 32.  
 37 
 
 
 
putting to one side the claims of more recent historians about Hugh’s status as an ‘engineer’ that 
have coloured readings of him in the past, it seems possible to speculate that he thought of the 
artes mechanicae as having a meaningful part to play in the knowledge-structure of the De nuptiis.  
He could very well have seen these arts, I think, as an addition that glossed the excogitative 
practice of eloquence, and by extension the skill in invention, in gathering and re-imagining 
experience required in the practice and perfection of the liberal arts.   
 
Before moving on to the second section of this chapter – where I want to speculate further on 
this more complex attitude to the mechanical arts with reference to Book One of the 
Didascalicon – it is worth highlighting that in the same breath as Hugh introduces the mechanical 
arts as handmaids in the union of wisdom and eloquence, he maps the mechanical arts onto the 
liberal arts, remarking on the ‘likeness’ between the arrangement of the two categories.  When 
he defines the mechanical arts as fabric making, armament, commerce, agriculture, hunting, 
medicine, and theatrics, he adds: 
 
Three of these pertain to extrinsic cover for nature, by which she protects herself 
from harms, and four to the intrinsic, by which she feeds and nourishes herself.  In 
this division we find a likeness to the trivium and quadrivium, for the trivium is 
concerned with words, which are extrinsic, and the quadrivium investigates concepts, 
which are intrinsically conceived.54 
 
George Ovitt has suggested that ‘this analogy was necessary in order to lend legitimacy to the 
inclusion of the mechanical arts’.55  Indeed, the details of the ‘likeness’, similitudo, Hugh discerns 
here – the way the trivium and first three mechanical arts deal with ‘intrinsic’ things, and the 
quadrivium and last four mechanical arts with ‘extrinsic’ things – is not pursued in his discussion 
of the arts in the following chapters.  It reads less as a fully thought-out ‘theory’ of the mechanical 
arts than as an effort to show the reader how these arts fit within or against the structure of the 
higher disciplines.  This effort does not have to be the product, however, of a desire to give 
‘legitimacy’ to the inclusion of the mechanical arts.  It might also be informed by Hugh’s 
understanding of these arts within the union of wisdom and eloquence, as a parallel set of 
                                                        
54 ‘…ex quibus tres ad extrinsecus vestimentum naturae pertinent, quo se ipsa natura ab incommodis protegit, 
quattuor ad intrinsecus, quo se alendo et fovendo nutrit, ad similitudinem quidem trivii et quadrivii, quia trivium de 
vocibus quae extrinsecus sunt et quadrivium de intellectibus qui intrinsecus concepti sunt pertractat.’ Hugh of Saint-
Victor, Didascalicon 20.20, Buttimer, p. 39; Taylor, p. 75.  I have made some adjustments to Taylor’s translation, 
for example, where he uses ‘external’ and ‘internal’ for Hugh’s extrinsecus and intrinsecus, I have used the more 
literal ‘extrinsic’ and ‘intrinsic’. 
55 Ovitt, ‘The Status of the Mechanical Arts’, p. 93. 
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handmaids to the liberal arts (as he immediately goes on to describe: ‘these are the seven 
handmaids which Mercury received in dowry from Philology…’).  It could be seen as an attempt 
to make sense of the relationship of the two categories set in place by Eriugena.  The mechanical 
arts are not metaphors for the liberal arts here, but they are positioned as revealing of the liberal 
arts’ processes.  The way the mechanical arts devise cover and sustenance for nature throws light 
on, or clarifies, even, the way the liberal arts devise words and concepts in the mind or soul.  
Invention as it takes place in the lower category helps to define patterns of invention in the higher 
category; the former might even be said to be exemplary of the latter here.  In the next part of 
the chapter, I want to show how this analogical relationship between the liberal and mechanical, 
arguably a way of enlarging on the knowledge-structure of Eriugena’s commentary, is preceded 
by (and thus should be read together with) a very clearly metaphorical take on the mechanical 
artist, as a figure for imagination, reasoning, and thought, in the first book of the Didascalicon.  
 
II. The Mechanical Artist as Poietes 
 
Indeed, as we move on in Book Two, the analogy or similitudo Hugh lays out in the passage 
above receives no specific elaboration.  Hugh restates the difference, or rather opposition, 
between the liberal and mechanical arts in more straightforward terms: 
 
These arts are called mechanical, that is adulterate, because their concern is with the 
artificer’s product, which borrows its form from nature.  Similarly, the other seven 
are called liberal because they require minds which are liberal, that is free and 
practised.56   
 
Despite framing the mechanical arts within the marriage of Philology and Mercury, and 
developing the ‘similitude’ of the liberal and mechanical (as suggested by the marraige structure), 
on the whole Book Two discusses the mechanical arts in this literal vein: as a distinct domain of 
pursuits, with its own tools, procedures, and practitioners – as attested by the ‘lively’ catalogues 
                                                        
56 ‘hae mechanicae appellantur, id est, adulterinae, quia de opere artificis agunt, quod a natura formam mutuatur. 
sicut aliae septem liberales appellatae sunt, vel quia liberos, id est, expeditos et exercitatos animos requirunt.’  
Didascalicon 2.20, Buttimer, p. 39; Taylor, p. 75.  Taylor translates the adjective expeditus as ‘liberal’ to match liber 
exactly (so that the passage reads, in his rendering, ‘…require minds that are liberal, that is liberal and practised.’).  I 
have opted for ‘free’, but could also have chosen ‘unencumbered’ or ‘ready’: all given as English cognates for 
expeditus by Charlton T. Lewis and Charles Short, A Latin Dictionary (Oxford 1879) available online at Perseus 
Digital Library ed. by Gregory R. Crane, Tufts University 
http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus:text:1999.04.0060:entry=expeditus [accessed 1 October 
2018]. 
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described earlier.  The potentially ‘poietic’ aspect of the mechanical arts, their more complex, 
imagined relationship to eloquence and the higher disciplines, which can be inferred when we 
backtrack through Cicero, Martianus, and Eriugena, remains by and large unrealised and 
unspoken. 
 
While Book Two concerns the ‘distinguishing of the arts’, de discretione artium, the shorter 
Book One concerns the origin of the arts, de origine artium.  Here, at the start of the 
Didascalicon, we find Hugh making distinctions between the ‘parts’ of philosophy as in Book 
Two, but also pondering the nature and purpose of philosophy as a whole.  In this context, Hugh 
engages more freely, I want to suggest, with the ancient ideal and imagery of education as poiesis 
– a ‘making’ of knowledge through sensory engagement with nature. And as he does so, he draws 
on the imagery of the artes mechanicae – unravelling, consciously or subconsciously, the 
implications of their position in the union of wisdom and eloquence.  As I said earlier, Hugh’s 
reference to the sphere of mechanica in this book has been looked at by previous scholars – but 
largely as an ‘add-on’ to the technical catalogues of Book Two.  Here we can remedy that 
inadequacy by considering more closely the actual aims of Book One – which draws on 
Ciceronian lore, at the time as the system of Plato’s Timaeus, to introduce students to the poietic 
craft of wisdom and salvation.  This book can be seen to give us the expansive, imaginative picture 
of mechanical art, as exemplary of liberal art, that anticipates its importance to the Chartrians. 
 
World-making 
 
Hugh opens his first book:  
 
Of all things to be sought, the first is that Wisdom in which the Form of the Perfect 
Good stands fixed.  Wisdom illuminates man so that he may recognise himself; for 
man was like all the other animals when he did not understand that he had been 
created of a higher order than they.57   
 
This opening strongly echoes the opening origin myth of Cicero’s De Inventione.  Being 
‘illuminated’ by wisdom, recognising ourselves, is put in terms of our relationship with the animal 
kingdom.  Becoming wise is recognising we were created ‘of a higher order’ than they, that we 
                                                        
57 ‘Omnium expetendorum prima est sapientia, in qua perfecti boni forma consistit.  sapientia illuminat hominem 
ut seipsum agnoscat, qui ceteris similis fuit cum se prae ceteris factum esse non intellexit.’  Didascalicon 1.1, 
Buttimer, p. 4; Taylor, p. 46. 
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can live rationally, above the level of nature and necessity.  As in Cicero, this description of the 
‘origin’ of philosophy helps to set out and even visualise the individual’s philosophical mission, 
the civilizing mission of the liberal arts in the soul.58  Hugh goes on – in what is perhaps one of 
the most demanding passages of the encyclopaedia: 
 
An opinion approved among philosophers maintains that the soul is put together 
[compactam] out of all the parts of nature.  And Plato’s Timaeus formed the 
entelechy out of substance which is ‘dividual’ and ‘individual’ and mixed of these 
two; and likewise out of nature which is the ‘same’ and ‘diverse’ and a mixture of this 
pair, by which the universe is defined.  For the entelechy grasps ‘not only the 
elements but all things that are made from them’, since, through its understanding, 
it comprehends the invisible causes of things and, through sense impressions, picks 
up the visible forms of actual objects.  ‘Divided it gathers movement into two spheres’ 
because, whether it goes out to sensible things through its senses [per sensus ad 
sensibilia exeat] or ascends to invisible things through its understanding [per 
intelligentiam ad invisibilia ascendat], it circles about, drawing to itself the likenesses 
of things; and thus it is that one and the same mind, having the capacity for all things 
[capax universorum], is fitted together out [coaptatur] of every substance and nature 
by the fact that it represents within itself their imaged likeness [similitudinis 
repraesentet figuram].59 
 
In his translation of the Didascalicon, Jerome Taylor provides two pages of explanatory notes 
for this one passage.60  It is not my concern to give a comprehensive account of its implications.  
What interests us is the imagery of artifice, ‘making’, and imitation Hugh uses to characterise the 
soul here.  The soul is ‘put together’ out of the parts of nature, he says, using the term compactam, 
from the verb compingere, ‘to attach’, ‘bind’, or ‘join’.  The source for this view or ‘opinion’ 
about the soul – ‘approved among philosophers’ – is given as Plato’s Timaeus.  Specifically, 
                                                        
58 That the recognition of wisdom is the mission of philosophy is made clear shortly later at 1.2 (Buttimer, p. 6; 
Taylor, p. 48): ‘Philosophy then, is the love and pursuit of Wisdom’ (‘Est autem philosophia amor et 
studium…sapientiae’); repeated at the opening of Book Two, cited above, p. 21, n. 2.  That Philosophy is in turn 
‘the arts’ was commonly understood from the works of Boethius, Cassiodorus and others.  See, for example, figure 
4 in this thesis and Hugh’s further comments at 2.1 (Buttimer, p. 23; Taylor, p. 61, and notes pp. 195–196): ‘This, 
then, is what the arts are concerned with, this is what they intend, namely, to restore within us the divine likeness… 
The more we are conformed to the divine nature, the more to we possess wisdom…’.  My emphasis.  (‘Hoc ergo 
omnes artes agunt, hoc intendunt, ut divina similitudo in nobis reparetur, quae nobis forma est, Deo natura, cui 
quanto magis conformamur tanto magis sapimus.’) 
59 ‘probata apud philosophos sententia animam ex cunctis naturae partibus asserit esse compactam.  et Timaeus 
Platonis ex dividua et individua mistaque substantia itemque eadem et diversa, et ex utroque commixta natura, quo 
universitas designatur, entelechiam formavit.  ipsa namque et initia et quae initia consequuntur capit, quia et 
invisibiles per intelligentiam rerum causas comprehendit, et visibiles actualium formas per sensuum passiones 
colligit, sectaque in orbes geminos motum glomerat, quia sive per sensus ad sensibilia exeat sive per intelligentiam 
ad invisibilia ascendat.  ad seipsam rerum similitudines trahens regyrat, et hoc est quod eadem mens, quae 
universorum capax est, ex omni substantia atque natura, quo similitudinis repraesentet figuram, coaptatur.’ Ibid. 
1.1, Buttimer, pp. 4–5; Taylor, p. 46. 
60 Taylor, The Didascalicon, pp. 177–180. 
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Hugh is employing the imagery of Plato’s ‘entelechy’, also known as the World Soul or anima 
mundi.61  In Plato’s text (accessible to Hugh via Calcidius’ translation and commentary) this 
referred to the production of the divine demiurge – the ‘intelligent’ cosmos he forged out of 
chaos.  Yet Hugh uses it for the human soul, to describe our own potential for self-recognition 
and wisdom.62   
 
As introduced earlier, the Timaeus was understood by twelfth-century intellectuals to have a 
reflexive structure and meaning.63  The demiurge – whose technique Plato named as poiesis – 
could be seen as an image or dramatisation of the poiesis of the author (Timaeus, or Plato).64  By 
extension, the World Soul that the demiurge creates shadowed the achievement of the author: it 
was the world-in-the-soul of the speaker, or rather the world as articulated by the speaker.65  This 
explains Hugh’s use of ‘entelechy’ – purportedly a macrocosmic thing – to idealise the human 
soul, the soul of the student and philosopher.  Hugh, ‘among [other] philosophers’, understood 
the reflexive connotation of the Timaeus – as referring to the craft of the mind, or what one critic 
has called ‘the craft of psychagogy’.66  This myth, in combination with the Ciceronian doctrine (of 
excogitatio) was fundamental to Hugh’s vision of human learning and salvation – as a poietic 
undertaking: a ‘fitting together’ (coaptare, compingere) of nature into an ‘imaged likeness’, 
similitudo figura.   
 
In the third chapter of Book One Hugh discerns the ‘threefold power of the soul’, De triplici vi 
animae.67  The first of the three powers is a vivifying power, which forms, nourishes, and sustains 
bodies and which we see at work in all living things.68  The second is ‘the judgement of sense 
perception’, sentiendi iudicium, which (like the first power) belongs to man and animals alike, 
and seems close to what we would consider imagination.69  It is ‘a composite and conjoint power’, 
                                                        
61 The ‘entelechy’ was in fact given as the term for Plato’s anima mundi in Remigius of Auxerre’s Commentary on 
Martianus Capella: see Taylor’s note 7, p. 178. 
62 This change of meaning is identified by Taylor in his ‘Introduction’, p. 26. 
63 Above, Introduction, p. 11 (note 57).   
64 For the metaphorical status of the dêmiourgos see for example John Magee’s note to 28a in Calcidius’ translation, 
(p. 718 of the edition), where he notes ‘the metaphor targets the notion of an artisan who manipulates materials…and 
it reflects that the cosmology is a “myth” based on likelihood rather than scientific certitude.’ 
65 See previous two notes, and Wetherbee, ‘Philosophy, Commentary, and Mythic Narrative’, pp. 222–225.   
66 Glenn R. Morrow, ‘Necessity and Persuasion in Plato’s Timaeus’, Philosophical Review 59, 2 (1950), pp. 147–
163, at 163. 
67 Didascalicon 1.3, Buttimer, pp. 7–10; Taylor, pp. 48–50. 
68 ‘quarum quidem primae id officium est, ut creandis, nutriendis alendisque corporibus praesto sit…’.  Ibid.  
Buttimer, p. 8; Taylor, p. 49. 
69 Ibid., Buttimer, p. 7; Taylor, p. 48. 
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Hugh says, ‘which subsumes the first [power] and makes it part of itself’.70  It apprehends and 
retains impressions received by the senses, according to the ability of each animal.  However, 
animals beneath man possess these impressions, Hugh says, ‘in a confused and unclear manner, 
so that they can achieve nothing from joining or combining them’.71  In order to make sense of 
them, the judgement of sense perception (or imagination) must attract the support of (trahit) the 
third power of the soul – reason – which belongs to man alone.72  Of this power, Hugh says, 
 
It not only takes in sense impressions and images which are perfect and well founded 
[perfectas et non inconditas], but by a complete act of the understanding, it explains 
and confirms what imagination has only suggested [quod imaginatio suggessit, 
explicat atque confirmat].  And, as has been said, this divine nature is not content 
with the knowledge of those things alone which it perceives before its senses, but, in 
addition, it is able to provide even for things removed from it names which 
imagination has conceived from the sensible world [ex sensibilibus imaginatione 
concepta], and it makes known, by arrangements of words, what it has grasped by 
reason of its understanding.73   
 
 
Thus, the conjoining of sense impressions in the power of sentiendi iudicium (shared by animals) 
does the groundwork for human understanding.  Throughout this chapter, Hugh can be seen to 
stress the interdependence of the three powers: reason, while a separate faculty that distinguishes 
us from all the other living creatures, is in many respects an extension of imagination, its ‘judging’ 
part.  It is what makes this second power effective (for in animals, the judgement of sense 
produces impressions, but it cannot join them to any useful effect).  Hugh describes how reason 
takes the imagination’s images, which are ‘perfect and well founded’, or ‘not irregular’ (perfectas 
                                                        
70 ‘composita atque coniuncta est, ac primam sibi sumens, et in partem constituens…’.  Ibid.  Buttimer, p. 8; Taylor, 
p. 49.  Hugh’s view of the judgement of sense (or imagination) as a ‘composite’ power has a correlate in his view of 
the sacraments – described, in his De Sacramentis, as ‘re-making’ or ‘re-fashioning’ human nature in God’s likeness. 
For Hugh, the sacraments ‘mend’ the soul, left ‘fragmented’ by the Fall.  Like the liberal arts, they appear to conform 
to (and confirm) his basically artificial or ‘mechanical psychology of knowing’.  See De Sacramentis 1.9 and 1.10.  
The language of reformation, restoration, and (occasionally) ‘refashioning’ and ‘remaking’ in Hugh’s theology (but 
not in his characterisation of philosophy and the liberal arts) has recently been discussed by Boyd Taylor Coolman, 
in The Theology of Hugh of St. Victor: An Interpretation (Cambridge, UK 2010).  The application of this language 
to the sacraments is discussed at pp. 103–123, esp. 119–121.  The manipulation of this imagery by later medieval 
allegorists Guillaume de Deguileville and John Lydgate to comment on penitential instruction (‘shaping souls’) is 
the subject of a chapter of Lisa Cooper’s Artisans and Narrative Craft, pp. 106–145. 
71 ‘sed eas imaginationes confusas atque inevidentes sumunt, ut nihil ex earum coniunctione ac compositione 
efficere possint...’.  Didascalicon 1.3, Buttimer, pp. 8–9; Taylor, p. 49.     
72 ‘sed vis animae tertia, quae secum priores alendi ac sentiendi trahit...’.  Ibid., Buttimer, p. 9; Taylor, p. 49.   
73 ‘…quae non solum sensus imaginationesque perfectas et non inconditas capit, sed etiam pleno actu intelligentiae, 
quod imaginatio suggessit, explicat atque confirmat.  itaque, ut dictum est, huic divinae naturae non ea tantum in 
cognitione sufficiunt, quae subiecta sensibus comprehendit, verum etiam ex sensibilibus imaginatione concepta, et 
absentibus rebus nomina indere potest, et quod intelligentiae ratione comprehendit, vocabulorum quoque 
positionibus aperit.’  Ibid.; Taylor, pp. 49–50. 
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et non inconditas) to form concepts and names, not only for things accessible to sense, but also 
for those things removed from sense, absentibus rebus, by inferring and extrapolating from the 
former.  It makes known these new things by ‘arrangement of words’, 
(vocabulorum…positionibus).  Thus, while reason, which makes the ‘discovery of things 
unknown’, is above our ‘composite and conjoint power’, in Hugh’s description it is also reliant 
upon it; it completes its work.  The way the mind ‘seeks after things not known’, ignota vestiget 
(and perhaps Hugh would include divine matters in this category) is intimately tied up with, and 
seems in many ways inseparable from, its gathering and sorting of its experiences and 
impressions.74  The activation of reason can be seen as a largely ‘poietic’ endeavour here – which 
accords with Hugh’s description of the soul as entelechy drawing from the Timeaus.  As in that 
complex passage at the opening to Book One, here Hugh (while he establishes a hierarchy of 
faculties) also marks no firm line or cut-off point between the makings of the mind, its 
recombination of experiences of the outside world and nature, and its knowledge of things not 
directly present in the world and nature.  The one appears to occur in and through the other, 
knowledge through making. 
 
The soul as mechanical artist 
 
Some lines after his description of the human entelechy, Hugh discusses the soul’s imitative 
internalisation of nature with reference to the mechanical art of metalwork, or minting: 
 
We see how a wall receives a likeness when the form of some image or other is put 
upon it from the outside.  But when a coiner imprints a figure upon metal, the metal, 
which itself is one thing, begins to represent a different thing, not just on the outside, 
but from its own power and its natural aptitude to do so.75   
 
This image seems on the one hand designed to downplay the role of external stimuli in the soul’s 
formation.   Hugh wants to show ‘the soul grasps the similitude in and of itself, out of a certain 
native capacity and proper power of its own’.76  Yet as with his account of the three powers of the 
                                                        
74 Hugh continues, ‘For it belongs to this nature, too, that by things already known to it, it should seek after things 
not known…’.  (‘illud quoque ei naturae proprium est, ut per ea quae sibi nota sunt, ignota vestiget…’).  Ibid.; Taylor, 
p. 50.   
75 ‘videmus cum paries extrinsecus adveniente forma imaginis cuiuslibet similitudinem accipit.  cum vero impressor 
metallo figuram imprimit, ipsum quidem non extrinsecus, sed ex propria virtute et naturali habilitate aliud iam 
aliquid representare incipit.’  Ibid. 1.1, Buttimer, p. 5; Taylor, p. 47. 
76 ‘neque enim haec rerum omnium similitudo aliunde aut extrinsecus animae advenire credenda est, sed ipsa potius 
eam in se et ex se nativa quadam potentia et propria virtute capit.’  Ibid. 
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soul – where reason is above imagination, and works intimately with imagination – Hugh cannot 
do away with the external impressor (the ‘coiner’), signifying the role of sense.  What this 
metaphor seems in fact to demonstrate is not so much that the soul is self-sufficient and takes its 
shape independently of sensation, but that the soul has an active part in the realisation of its 
received impressions; that external influence is not ‘all’.  The soul is not a passive surface, like a 
wall (paries), which shows an image on its outside.  It is more like a metal, in that it receives an 
image, but as it does so, changes its shape and thus remakes that image by and within itself, ‘from 
its own power and natural aptitude to do so’.  Given our discussion of Hugh’s third chapter, De 
triplici vi animae, this image could be seen to visualise how the impressions gathered by ‘sentiendi 
iudicium’ are ‘made sense’ of by the higher power of reason.  The changing form of the metal 
under the figure seems to illustrate how (as Hugh explains in his third chapter) images are not 
just put inside the mind, from without, but grasped and clarified actively by the mind’s rational 
power to become part of its intellectual shape and make-up.77 
 
This brief mechanical image for the soul as metal, changing in and of itself with the impression 
of the coiner’s stamp, is succeeded later in Book One by a passage (partially cited in my 
introduction) which draws more extensively on the processes of mechanical art to evoke, it seems, 
how the soul is made in the image of its impressions.  This reference takes the form of a division 
of the cosmos into three works:  
 
The work of God is to create that which was not, whence we read ‘In the beginning 
God created heaven and earth’; the work of nature is to bring forth into actuality that 
which lay hidden, whence we read ‘Let the earth bring forth the green herb’, etc.; the 
work of the artificer is to put together things disjoined or to disjoin those put together, 
whence we read, ‘They sewed themselves aprons.’ … Among these works, the human 
work, because it is not nature but only imitative of nature, is fitly called mechanical, 
that is adulterate.78 
                                                        
77 Hugh uses a similar image – of the soul or person as impressed matter – in chapter seven of his De institutione 
novitiorum, cited in Stephen Jeager’s The Envy of Angels: Cathedral Schools and Social Ideals in Medieval Europe, 
950–1200 (Philadelphia 1994), pp. 258–259.  The form of God’s likeness is engraved in good men, he says here, 
and ‘when through the process of imitation we are pressed against that likeness, we too are moulded according to 
the image of that likeness.’  This image involves an emphasis, again, on the agency of the matter that receives the 
impression; how it changes its own shape rather than passively receiving a picture.  The wax has to be softened – 
and not by another’s hands but by the individual’s own effort to remove pride and contrariness. 
78 ‘... opus Dei, opus naturae, opus artificis imitantis naturam.  opus Dei est, quod non erat creare.  unde illud: In 
principio creavit Deus coelum et terram.  opus naturae, quod latuit ad actum producere.  unde illud: Producat terra 
herbam virentem etc.  opus artificis est disgregata coniungere vel coniuncta segregare.  unde illud: Consuerunt sibi 
perizomata… in his tribus operibus convenienter opus humanum, quod natura non est sed imitatur naturam, 
mechanicum, id est, adulterinum nominator.’  Ibid. 1.9, Buttimer, p. 16; Taylor, p. 55.  There are analogues to this 
passage in Calcidius’ Commentary on the Timaeus, for example at 1.23 and 13.278; Magee, pp. 154–155 and 562–
563. 
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Hugh continues that to describe how each kind of artisan imitates nature ‘is a difficult matter to 
pursue in detail’.  For illustration, however, he gives ‘the founder who casts a statue [who] has 
gazed upon man as his model’, and ‘the builder who has constructed a house [who] has taken 
into consideration a mountain’.79  Furthermore, 
 
He who first invented the use of clothes had considered how each of the growing 
things one by one has its proper covering [propria munimenta] by which to protect 
itself [defendunt] from offense. Bark encircles the tree, feathers cover the bird, scales 
encase the fish, fleece clothes the sheep, hair garbs cattle and wild beasts, a shell 
protects the tortoise, and ivory makes the elephant unafraid of spears.80   
 
Man alone was brought forth ‘naked and unarmed’ – and thus he has to follow these examples 
to equip himself.  Thus, it is not without cause, Hugh says, ‘that the proverb says “ingenious want 
hath mothered all the arts”’.  From ‘ingenious want’, ingeniosa fames, ‘infinite varieties of 
painting, weaving, carving and founding have arisen, so that we look with wonder not at nature 
alone but at the artificer as well’.81  For ‘man’s reasoning shines forth much more brilliantly in 
inventing these very things than ever it would have had man naturally possessed them.’82    
 
This meditation on mechanical art can of course be read literally.  At one level, Hugh is simply 
describing how man imitates, or adulterates, nature in his creation of artefacts.  But he also gives 
mechanical art a wider field of reference.  In this hierarchy of ‘three works’, the work of the 
artificer or artifex stands for all ‘human work’, opus humanum.  Hugh inserts references from 
Genesis, giving as an example for ‘mechanical art’ Adam and Eve’s sewing of aprons after the 
Fall.  In Hugh's tripartite scheme all human endeavour is levelled under the exemplum of the 
mechanical artist – including, we can infer, the student of philosophy himself.  This hierarchy 
reminds the reader of the necessitous origins of his ‘liberal’ art, that he is just another 
postlapsarian craftsman.   
                                                        
79 ‘qui statuam fudit, hominem intuitus est. qui domum fecit, montem respexit.’  Didascalicon 1.9, Buttimer, p. 16; 
Taylor, p. 56. 
80 ‘qui usum vestimentorum primus adinvenit, consideravit quod singula quaeque nascentium propria quaedam 
habeant munimenta quibus naturam suam ab incommodis defendunt.  cortex ambit arborem, penna tegit volucrem, 
piscem squama operit, lana ovem induit, pilus iumenta et feras vestit, concha testudinem excipit, ebur elephantem 
iacula non timere facit.’  Ibid. (Buttimer, p. 17). 
81 ‘hac eadem pingendi, texendi, sculpendi, fundendi, infinita genera exorta sunt, ut iam cum natura ipsum 
miremur artificem’.  Ibid. 
82 See above, p. 2.  ‘multo enim nunc magis enitet ratio hominis haec eadem inveniendo, quam habendo claruisset.’  
Ibid. 
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Indeed, the language of ‘joining and disjoining’ seems to rehearse the language Hugh used to 
describe the craft of the soul we encountered in his opening to Book One – ‘fitting together’ 
nature into an ‘imaged likeness’, similitudo figura.  In Hugh’s formulation, the mechanical artist 
– founder, builder, clothier, or other – works upward from perception.  He or she considers the 
various inventions ready-formed in God’s creation (‘how each of the growing things one by one 
has its proper covering’) and imitates or combines these into novel forms that suit a particular 
human ‘want’.  In that mechanical process – or its inventions – Hugh emphasises, ‘Man’s 
reasoning shines forth much more brilliantly’ than ever it would have had man naturally 
possessed protection, dwelling, and so on.83  Given such emphases, it seems possible to argue 
that mechanical art, what Hugh also calls simply ‘the human work’, provides an opportunity for 
Hugh to distil what the soul does, to illustrate through a real-life actor (the mechanic) the internal 
and interdependent processes of sense perception, imagination, and rational conception he has 
attempted to clarify earlier.  That the mechanic’s reason shows itself in inventions that are in turn 
combinations and remakings of natural and animal exempla, echoes Hugh’s earlier lessons about 
how we arrive at ‘things unknown’ and ultimately recognise our own rationality through our 
composite and conjoint power, sentiendi iudicium, itself reliant on sense.  
 
The mechanical artist or artifex of Book One thus might be seen to embody our larger poietic 
responsibility.  His ‘making’ can be read as physical making (at the literal level) but also as 
reflective of psychological or verbal making – a theme which actually frames the discussion of 
the tria opera in Book One.  One might even argue (given Hugh’s appreciation of, and 
dependence on, the Timaeus) that the opera of God and nature which Hugh describes in the 
triple hierarchy (God creating that which was not; nature bringing forth into actuality that which 
lay hidden) are to be read as poetic creations or fictions, that arise from the mechanic’s (or the 
soul’s) joining and disjoining.  Were we to extend the terms of his idealistic opening to Book 
One, these would correspond to the ‘likenesses’ – those ‘things not known’ – which reason 
generates by working with the compositions of imagination.   
 
To conclude this section, while elsewhere in his first book, and in his later chapters on 
mechanica, Hugh insists on a distinction between the recovery of the ‘divine likeness’, the goal 
of the liberal arts, and ‘taking thought for the necessity of this life’, which is the goal of the 
                                                        
83 Quoted above, p. 45, n. 82. 
 47 
 
 
 
mechanical – in the passages quoted here, he seems less able to distinguish those enterprises.  
Hugh, as we have seen, is commited to hierarchies – of both disciplines (mechanical and liberal), 
and faculties (from the vivifying power to the rational power) – but when illustrating how certain 
of the higher faculties and disciplines actually ‘work’, he appears to take recourse to the language 
and imagery of artistic, specifically mechanical processes.  The mechanical ‘part’ of philosophy 
(traditionally understood) is recruited to visualise or distil philosophical labour as a whole, to 
elaborate on what Cicero called the cultura animi.  Whether or not Hugh would admit the 
charge, his first book, deeply informed in outlook by the Timeaus, Cicero, and Eriugena, puts 
the project of recovering our divine likeness, ostensibly via the liberal arts, in close relation to 
‘taking thought for necessity’, and in ‘borrowing forms from nature’, activities ostensibly proper 
to the mechanical arts.  These imitative and mundane habits of the artificer take on a separate 
metaphorical value in Hugh’s psychology, it seems, for imagining the inner habits of the liberal 
artist’s ‘free and practised’ mind, or soul.84   
 
Conclusion: from poiesis to poetry 
 
In conclusion I want to summarise the findings of this chapter, but also to address a final 
distinction within the vision of the Didascalicon that will propel us forward – between the model 
of poiesis, which seems implicit in Hugh’s philosophical outlook, and the literary art of poetry, 
which by contrast he excludes from the philosophical project.   
 
On the first count: this chapter has argued that Hugh of Saint-Victor’s inclusion of the artes 
mechanicae or mechanica as one of four categories making up philosophy can be read in more 
than one way.  Historians of technology have thus far exercised a monopoly on the assessment 
of these arts.  They have seen in his accounts of their individual products, tools, and procedures 
the imprint of a man eager to bring philosophy into touch with ‘daily life in the world at large, 
the world of blankets, saws, trade, meadows, beer, surgery, and amphitheatres’.85   
 
These ‘technical’ accounts – located in Book Two of the Didascalicon – are prefaced and framed 
in the terms of a marriage between ‘wisdom and eloquence’, or Philology and Mercury.  In the 
first part of this chapter I attempted to show what these terms meant to Hugh – and how they 
                                                        
84 See above, p. 38, n. 56. 
85 (Above, p. 22, n. 7). 
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might be used to rethink the significance of the artes mechanicae in his encyclopaedia.  Attention 
to these terms’ source in Cicero, Martianus Capella, and John Scotus Eriugena, suggested Hugh 
could have taken the mechanical arts, at least to some extent, as exemplary or illustrative of 
invention or excogitatio in general – and particularly of the invention, or craftiness, considered 
(going back to Cicero) proper to eloquence, and to the practice and perfection of the (‘opposite’) 
liberal arts. 
   
In the second part of the chapter I aimed to show how a more complex, not entirely ‘literal’ view 
of mechanical art takes root in Hugh’s first book, on the origins of philosophy. This first book 
testifies, I suggested, to Hugh’s profound assimilation of Ciceronian and Platonic paideia.  It 
introduces philosophy, and thus the liberal arts, as means by which man realises his potential for 
reason and elaborates on the interaction of sense and imagination in that pursuit.  Hugh 
introduces the domain of mechanica, I proposed, to instance the poietic aspect of philosophy 
which emerges in the process – to evoke how the student of the liberal arts has to master and 
‘make sense’ of nature en route to wisdom.  In this opening discussion, ‘liberal’ and ‘mechanical’ 
projects become blurred: ‘taking thought for necessity’, consisting in the adulteration of nature 
to make new inventions, becomes a metaphorical tool for the inner processes of understanding 
elsewhere said or assumed to belong to liberal art. 
 
Guided by his use of the mechanical arts, this discussion has therefore painted a picture of Hugh 
as a particular promoter of the imaginative faculty, and of a kind of ‘poetic’ philosophical practice.  
Yet as is well known – and as may well be levelled against this picture – when it came to the 
question of poetry as a literary form, whether poetry should be read or composed by students, 
Hugh was emphatic about its unsuitability.  In Book Three he discussed the types of writings 
proper, or not proper, to the schoolroom: 
 
There are two kinds of writings.  The first kind comprises what are properly called 
the arts; the second, those writings which are appendages of the arts.  The arts are 
included in philosophy: they have, that is, some definite and established part of 
philosophy for their subject matter – as do grammar, dialectic, and others of this sort.  
The appendages of the arts, however, are only tangential to philosophy.  What they 
treat is some extra-philosophical matter.  Occasionally, it is true, they touch in a 
scattered and confused fashion [sparsim et confuse attingunt] upon some topics lifted 
out of the arts, or, if their narrative presentation is simple, they prepare the way for 
philosophy [viam ad philosophiam praeparant].  Of this sort are all the songs of the 
poets – tragedies, comedies, satires, heroic verse and lyric, iambics, certain didactic 
poems, fables and histories, and also the writings of those fellows whom today we 
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commonly call ‘philosophers’ and who are always taking some small matter and 
dragging it out through long verbal detours, obscuring simple meaning in confused 
discourses [facilem sensum perplexis sermonibus obscurare] – who, lumping 
dissimilar things together [diversa simul compilantes] make, as it were, a single 
‘picture’ from a multitude of ‘colours’ and forms [quasi de multis coloribus et formis, 
unam picturam facere].86  
 
Poetry (or ‘the songs of the poets’, carmina poetarum) falls into the second of two types of 
discourses: it is not of the arts, but one of the appendages of the arts, appendentia artium.  This 
consignment of poetry beyond the sphere of the seven liberal arts, as extra-philosophical, can be 
seen given visual form in a later twelfth-century diagram, probably inspired by the programme of 
the Didascalicon (figure 6).87   
 
The passage quoted has been taken as evidence of an antagonism between the Victorine project 
and the Chartrian project.88  The Chartrians – a group to which Bernard Silvestris and Alan of 
Lille are often seen to belong – saw the literary form of the auctores as a means of doing 
philosophy, as superior, even, for the discovery of ‘truth’ to the rational, prosaic discourse of 
scholars such as Hugh.  Scholars commenting on this difference of attitude turn, in particular, to 
the latter part of the above passage (on ‘those fellows whom today we commonly call 
“philosophers”’).89  Interestingly, this latter part (introduced after Hugh’s reference to the various 
‘carmina poetarum’, with ‘etiam illorum’) could be taken not to refer to poets, but rather to 
logicians, new-age sophists.  As we will see when we come to John of Salisbury, it was 
commonplace to introduce show-off logicians – a growing breed in twelfth-century Paris – in the 
terms Hugh uses here: as those who publically ‘call themselves’ philosophers (but who lack the 
                                                        
86 ‘Duo sunt genera scripturarum.  primum genus est earum quae propriae artes appellantur.  secundum est earum 
quae sunt appendicia artium.  artes sunt quae philosophiae supponuntur, id est, quae aliquam certam et 
determinatam partem philosophiae materiam habent, ut est grammatica, dialectica, et ceterae huiusmodi.  
appendentia artium sunt quae tantum ad philosophiam spectant, id est, quae in aliqua extra philosophiam materia 
versantur.  aliquando tamen quaedam ab artibus discerpta sparsim et confuse attingunt, vel si simplex narratio est, 
viam ad philosophiam praeparant.  huiusmodi sunt omnia poetarum carmina, ut sunt tragoediae, comoediae, satirae, 
heroica quoque et lyrica, et iambica, et didascalica quaedam, fabulae quoque et historiae, illorum etiam scripta quos 
nunc philosophos appellare solemus, qui et brevem materiam longis verborum ambagibus extendere consueverunt, 
et facilem sensum perplexis sermonibus obscurare.  vel etiam diversa simul compilantes, quasi de multis coloribus 
et formis, unam picturam facere.’  Didascalicon 3.4, Buttimer, p. 54; Taylor, p. 88. 
87 Ironically, the manuscript that contains this diagram includes poems written by its own compiler, Herard of 
Landsberg – testament, again, to the apparently contradictory opinions a single medieval author (and particularly 
authors of encyclopaedias) could hold.  The manuscript is the Hortus Deliciarum, described further below, at p. 
141, and the topic of a recent monograph by Danielle Joyner, Painting the Hortus Deliciarum: Medieval Women, 
Wisdom, and Time (Philadelphia 2016). 
88 See Taylor, The Didascalicon, pp. 211–212; Wetherbee, Platonism and Poetry, pp. 51–55; and Simpson, Sciences 
and the Self, pp. 232–233. 
89 Ibid. 
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learning).90  But for Winthrop Wetherbee and Nicolette Zeeman amongst others, these men – 
with a special place at the end of Hugh’s list – who take some small matter and drag it out through 
detours, making verbal pictures from various colours and forms (‘de multis coloribus et formis, 
unam picturam facere’), seem to refer to yet another ‘kind’ of poet: those poets who also take 
themselves to be philosophers, such as those one might find at Chartres in the first half of the 
twelfth century.91  Wetherbee states, also citing the comments of Jerome Taylor, that Hugh’s 
criticisms in this part ‘correspond almost point for point with the practices of the Chartrians’, 
whether or not Hugh actually had the Chartrians in mind.92  
 
Nicolette Zeeman has suggested Hugh’s description fits in a long tradition of describing poetry 
as ‘figural, entangling, labor-intensive, and sometimes obscure’.93  Taking Hugh’s target, like 
Wetherbee, to be a contemporary sub-group of the poeta (perhaps but not necessarily the 
Chartrians), Zeeman suggests specifically how, in engaging with this long tradition of 
characterising poetry’s oblique dealings with truth, Hugh’s condemnation contains seeds of a 
perhaps more ‘ambivalent’ attitude to poetry than has previously been observed.94  ‘These lines’, 
Zeeman writes, ‘argue for linguistic opacity and polysemy as the defining feature of poetry’.95  
According to Zeeman, Hugh’s ‘exclusion of poetry from the canon may actually allow him to 
describe it more freely.’96  What Hugh says here could, in fact, ‘be appropriated with or without 
the condemnation he wrote into it’.97  Similarly, James Simpson, who also identifies Hugh’s 
description of writing that is perplexus as referencing poetry, has highlighted how the terms of 
the critique reveal a nuanced understanding of poetic composition – even if it is ultimately to be 
denounced: 
 
                                                        
90 See the discussion of John of Salisbury in Chapter Three, below, pp. 78–80. 
91 One might note, in support of this reading, that Hugh has already mentioned dialectica as having a subject matter 
that places it firmly within philosophy.  It would perhaps be less coherent if he was returning to the topic of logicians 
or dialecticians at this later stage in his description of the appendentia artium.  Furthermore, Hugh goes on, just after 
the long quotation cited, to quote Virgil (Ecalogue 5.16–17), writing ‘Between [the arts and the appendages of the 
arts], there is in my view such distance as the poet describes when he says: “As much as the wiry willow cedes to the 
pale olive, or the wild nard to roses of Punic red.”’ This metaphorical quotation from one of the best-known classical 
poets in Hugh’s day would arguably make greater sense deployed as an image for the relation of poetry to philosophy 
than it would for the relation of logic or sophism to philosophy.  See Zeeman’s comments on Hugh’s use of Virgil’s 
image in ‘The Schools Give a License to Poets’, in Criticism and Dissent in the Middle Ages, ed. by Rita Copeland 
(Cambridge, UK 1996), pp. 151–180, at 173. 
92 Wetherbee, Platonism and Poetry, pp. 54–55; Taylor, Didascalicon, pp. 211–212. 
93 Zeeman, ‘The Schools Give a License to Poets’, p. 172. 
94 Ibid. 
95 Ibid., p. 172. 
96 Ibid., p. 173. 
97 Ibid., p. 174. 
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[Hugh] certainly registers the formal complexity of the works he is considering, and 
the wholeness of the finished artefact – he says that artist-philosophers seek to 
construct a ‘single picture’.  But this aesthetic wholeness does nothing, in Hugh’s 
view, to strengthen the philosophical fragility of literature – its unsystematic, confused 
quality and its philosophically dependent status.98 
 
James Simpson goes on to contrast Hugh’s critique with a passage from the Metalogicon of John 
of Salisbury (c. 1159) – a student and later bishop of Chartres (who we return to later) – which 
offers a similar view of poetic composition, minus the condemnation:  
 
For when the auctores, by way of diacrisis (which we may call illustratio or picturatio) 
took up the unformed matter either of a history of a verisimilar story, or of a fable, 
or any other narrative whatever, they refined it with such plenitude of learning, and 
with such grace of comparison and taste, that the completed work seemed to be in 
some way an image of all the arts.99 
 
Simpson suggests that,  
 
This passage uses cosmological, Timaean language to describe poetic making: the 
‘rude material’ of the narrative is shaped and adorned by the poet’s knowledge and 
rhetorical skill, to produce an image, or picture…of all the arts.  And this Timaean 
language – a language of formation, embellishment, and wholeness – implies that the 
meaning of a work of literature is to be located in its wholeness; like the universe 
created, shaped and embellished by God, the opus consummatum of the poet finds 
its meaning through the inter-relation of its different parts.100 
 
This notion of poetry as a cosmic piecing-together is already implicit in Hugh’s ‘condemnation’.  
While Hugh’s own crude choice of terms is clearly designed to deter the student from the 
‘hodgepodge’ efforts of poets, the actual process he describes, of ‘lumping dissimilar things 
together’, recalls and can be connected to his description of the ‘making’ soul in the opening to 
Book One – joining together the world of sense into the ‘well-founded’ likenesses of imagination.  
Arguably, he recognises and appreciates poetry’s poietic logic, just like (and thirty years before) 
John of Salisbury.   
 
                                                        
98 Simpson, Sciences and the Self, p. 233.  My emphasis. 
99 ‘Illi enim per diacrisim, quam nos illustrationem siue picturationem possumus appellare, cum rudem materiam 
historiae aut argumenti aut fabulae aliamue quamlibet suscepissent, eam tanta disciplinarum copia, et tanta 
compositionis et condimenti gratia excolebant, ut opus consummatum omnium artium quodam modo uideretur 
imago.’  John of Salisbury, Metalogicon 1.24.  I use the Latin edition by John Barrie Hall and K. S. B. Keats-Rohan, 
Corpus Christianorum Continuatio Mediaeualis XCVIII (Turnhout 1991), p. 52; cited and translated by Simpson, 
Sciences and the Self, p. 234. 
100 Simpson, Sciences and the Self, p. 234. 
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At the same time, his account could be seen to offer a further instance of ‘mechanical art’ used 
to characterise imaginative art.  Poetry is framed by Hugh, one could suggest, as the most direct 
literary expression of the ‘mechanical psychology’ – the ‘joining and disjoining’ of matter – that 
he elsewhere uses to depict man’s inner processes, his assimilation of sense materials into the 
images of imagination, that furnish the concepts and words of reason.101  He objects to it as a 
discrete literary form perhaps because most poems fail to convey, or they obscure, this 
psychological and ‘poietic’ rationale, uniquely visible in the cosmological and ‘pyschagogic’ poem 
of the Timaeus.102  
 
I do not intend, by this, to suggest Hugh would have embraced the ‘allegorical’ or ‘cosmogonic 
encyclopaedias’ of Bernard Silvestris and Alan of Lille.  But, following Zeeman (and to some 
extent, Simpson), I think we can see that if Hugh disapproves of poetry, qua poetry, he describes 
its practice in his most approving metaphors.  It is by the light of this criticism (a criticism so open 
to praise) that we can read the poetic works of the Chartrians – which are often aligned with the 
attitude of John of Salisbury, but might also be seen in a new relation to Hugh’s philosophy: as 
pursuing the poetic implications already at play within his pedagogic system.   
 
As we see in the next two chapters, Bernard Silvestris and Alan of Lille used the poetic, or 
mythological form, according to its ancient rationale, as Plato had done: to demonstrate and to 
critique the mind’s effort to make sense of nature through sense and language.  The liberal arts, 
and related scientific categories, are not classified and described, as they are in the Didascalicon, 
but personified – in the spirit of the Timaeus, and De nuptiis – as actors in a cosmological drama, 
tasked with ‘remaking’ the cosmic order.  This ‘remaking’ also reflects the liberal or trivial artistry 
of the poet.  Thus the poem – imagined as a kosmos – is to be read as ‘an image of all the arts’.103 
It is (we are persuaded) a picture composed by the arts. 
 
In this context, the exemplary, poietic potential of mechanica that I have argued is implicit in 
Hugh’s Didascalicon becomes more fully realised.  The liberal arts – imaginatively set into 
motion ‘re-making’ nature – are envisaged wholly through the lens of mechanica, as imitators of, 
and inventors from, natural materials.  At the same time, in the works of Bernard and Alan, the 
                                                        
101 Simpson can be seen to register the artisanal (or mechanical) tone of Hugh’s language when he characterises 
Hugh’s view of the poem as an ‘artefact’, above, p. 51. 
102 For the Timeaus as demonstrating the ‘craft of psychagogy’ see above p. 41, n. 66. 
103 I discuss the significance of the term kosmos in Chapter Two, below, pp. 64–65. 
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category of mechanics takes on an exclusively ‘Orphic’ colouring – to return to Hadot’s terms of 
reference.  This ‘part’ of philosophy no longer has any literal place ‘under’ liberal art.  It is 
accommodated solely dramatically, as a metaphor, or set of metaphors, for picturing the mind’s 
prolongation and transformation of nature.  Approaching the philosophical project not only with 
respect to, but as poiesis, these later authors could be seen as having promoted the crafts 
considered under the designation of the artes mechanicae to a higher role in philosophy.  These 
figure the very habits of eloquence, or of the ‘free and practised mind’ – bringing to fruition the 
exemplary potential of these lower artes in the often conflicted, provocative vision of the 
Didascalicon. 
 
Thus, at this stage we leave behind Paris, and the 1120s, for the milieu of the Cathedral Schools, 
and the 1140s.  There is a roughly twenty-year hiatus, and a shift in intellectual atmosphere, 
between the Didascalicon and the Cosmographia.  Hugh is thought to have died in 1141, most 
likely before the Cosmographia was completed (or even begun).  We cannot know if he and 
Bernard met, although it is possible Bernard attended one of Hugh’s lectures in Paris as a 
student.  The lack of clear historical connection, and the very different forms their major works 
take, has often prevented the two authors from being discussed together (in the way that Hugh 
and Peter Abelard or Bernard and Alan are discussed together).  If they have been connected – 
it is, as I have said, most often to highlight a twelfth-century ‘dispute’ about the usefulness of 
poetry.  However, by the 1140s, Hugh’s Didascalicon had become a classic, relied on in the 
majority of French classrooms – and, like most leading scholars of the mid-twelfth century 
(whether or not they attended his classes), Bernard would have regarded Hugh as one of his 
mentors.  His Cosmographia abandons the hard-and-fast divisions and prosaic form of Hugh’s 
encyclopaedia.  But it does so, I argue, in a way that also pursues and exposes Hugh’s ‘inward’ 
pedagogical principles.  It is born out of an intimate knowledge and scholarly dialogue with the 
Didascalicon.  The ‘thread’ of the mechanical arts unlocks this symbiotic relationship between 
the two authors – all the richer for their flourishing decades and towns apart.  
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II. 
 
The Mechanical Arts in the Commentaries and Cosmographia of Bernard 
Silvestris 
 
Bernard Silvestris (figures 7 and 8) dedicated his major work, the Cosmographia, to Thierry of 
Chartres.1  For this reason, he is commonly associated with the School at Chartres, where Thierry 
was a prominent figure and later chancellor.  But he spent the majority of his career as a master 
at the neighbouring School of Tours, where he is likely to have completed the Cosmographia, 
sometime between 1141 and 1148.2  As I have said, the Cosmographia is not – at first sight – an 
obvious contender for inclusion in a study of the medieval ‘mechanical arts’.  It is an allegory 
written in a mixture of prose and verse (a prosimetrum).3  It centres on the actions of a set of 
personified abstractions, drawn from ancient philosophy and metaphysics (such as Natura, Noys, 
and Physis), as they embark on a project of cosmic and human reformation.   
 
While its ‘mode’ is mythological, however, the Cosmographia is still ‘for’ the student of 
philosophy.  Earlier I called it a ‘cosmological’ or ‘allegorical encyclopaedia’.4  Like the 
Didascalicon, its subject is the pursuit of the liberal arts and salvation – it is ‘encyclopaedic’ in 
conception and aim.  The distinction lies in Bernard’s demonstrative approach to the 
presentation of knowledge.  He imagines knowledge in process – an approach drawn ultimately 
from the example of Plato’s Timaeus, and new for an author of the Middle Ages.  In the 
Cosmographia, Noys, Natura, and Physis reform the cosmos through handiwork; and like the 
                                                        
1 Jeauneau, Rethinking the School of Chartres, p. 65.  The Bernard of the Cosmographia was, in fact, long thought 
to be Bernard of Chartres.  That they were distinct figures, Bernard of Chartres dying at least a decade before 
Bernard Silvestris wrote, was demonstrated by Barthélemy Hauréau, ‘Maitre Bernard’, Bibliothèque de l’École des 
Chartres 54 (1893), pp. 792–794; followed by Jules Alexandre Clerval, Les écoles de Chartres au moyen âge, du xie 
siècle (Chartres 1893); and Jules Alexandre Clerval, Les écoles de Chartres au moyen âge, du ve siècle au xvie siècle 
(Chartres 1895), pp. 158–162.  The identity of the two men was argued by C.-V. Langlois, ‘Questions d’histoire 
littéraire: Maître Bernard’, Bibliothèque de l’École des Chartres 54 (1893), pp. 225–250, at 237–247.  For a 
summation of these arguments, see Mark Kauntze, Authority and Imitation: A Study of the Cosmographia of 
Bernard Silvestris (Leiden 2014), p. 15. 
2 Our chief evidence for his link to Tours is the account of his best-known student, Matthew of Vendôme, who 
wrote, ‘I was taught the art of composition by the glory of Tours, Master Silvestris, the jewel of studies and ornament 
of the school.’  (‘Me docuit dictare decus Turonense magistri Silvestris studii gemma, scolaris honor.’)  Epistola 
1.3.69–70, in Mathei Vindocinensis Opera, ed. by Franco Munari, 3 vols (Rome 1977–1978), 2: p. 90.  For an 
account of the School at Tours in Bernard’s time, see the edition Bernardus Silvestris: Cosmographia, ed. by Peter 
Dronke (Leiden 1978), pp. 1–15.  Winthrop Wetherbee suggests Bernard may also have taught at the School at 
Orléans in Platonism and Poetry, p. 104. 
3 As was Martianus Capella’s De nuptiis Philologiae et Mercurii, above, p. 28, n. 24. 
4 Above, pp. 11–12. 
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demiurge of the Timeaus, their activities reflect the author-student’s ‘making sense’ of the world 
through language.5  They imagine the liberal (particularly trivial) arts as involving mental craft, a 
‘craft of thought’.  
 
At no stage does Bernard mention the ‘liberal’ or ‘mechanical’ as discrete domains: there is no 
room, in the terms of this myth, for the sorts of divisions and catalogues we found in the 
Didascalicon.  Yet – as Brian Stock perceived, in his 1972 monograph on the text – given 
Bernard’s descriptions of the ‘craft’ of Noys, Natura, and Physis, he seems to have been 
‘predominantly interested in the mechanical arts’.6  Stock took this claim no further in his study; 
he was mostly interested in finding a contemporaneous term to pinpoint the handiwork which 
drives the narrative of the Cosmographia.  But his observation is to the present point.  In what 
follows, I suggest – for the first time – that Bernard’s ‘allegorical encyclopaedia’ entails a 
promotion of the mechanical arts, as an image for the liberal arts, which brings to fruition the 
metaphorical and poietic aspect to mechanica seemingly present in Hugh’s discussions a decade 
or two earlier.   
 
We have seen how Plato’s ‘demiurgic’ and ‘poietic’ personification of the soul was entrenched 
in Hugh’s own pedagogical outlook – and engendered a more complex picture of the 
‘mechanical arts’ in the Didascalicon than has previously been identified.  Under the influence 
of Plato, as well as Cicero, Martianus, and Eriugena, Hugh conceived of the artes mechanicae as 
a discrete segment of the scientific hierarchy, beneath the liberal arts, but also at times, I have 
suggested, as an image for the liberal arts, imagination, and ingenium.  On occasion Hugh was 
drawn to the mechanical artist as exemplary of the soul’s poiesis, ‘world-making’, contrary to the 
liberal-mechanical hierarchy and distinction that he elsewhere maintained.   
 
In his Cosmographia Bernard can be seen to enlarge on this second aspect, the ‘exemplary 
flipside’, of mechanica.  Bernard’s ‘demiurgic’ personifications, while they emulate the Timaeus, 
also constitute a consummation of Hugh’s own Timaean (and Eriugenan) take on mechanica, as 
a way of illustrating learning-as-making or language-as-making. By extension, they iterate (in the 
terms of Hadot’s essay) a wholly ‘Orphic’ attitude to mechanical art.  They confirm a twelfth-
                                                        
5 Bernard’s ultimate reference to the human auctor is the standalone subject of Linda Lomperis’ article ‘From God’s 
Book’, cited above p. 12, notes 60 and 61 (though, as I say, Lomperis fails to identify Bernard’s source for this in 
the Timaeus). 
6 Stock, Myth and Science, p. 196; and above, p. 13. 
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century view of mechanics that is in keeping with ancient thinking about the crafts, as ‘poetic arts’ 
or poietike, picturing our mental imitation and transformation of the world – which has been 
obscured by the customary study of these arts from the perspective of the history of science and 
technology.  
 
The present chapter attempts to unravel this figurative, ‘Orphic’ presentation of mechanics in 
the Cosmographia.  First, however, it turns to two commentaries attributed to Bernard, one on 
Virgil’s Aeneid, and the other on Martianus Capella’s De nuptiis Philologiae et Mercurii.  While 
mechanica is never explicitly named in his Cosmographia – it does receive attention in these two 
surviving commentaries.7  Both rely on Hugh’s earlier classification, though they more openly 
detail, and elaborate on, the mechanical arts’ allegorical origin and meaning.  They suggest 
Bernard’s ‘predominant interest’ in the mechanical arts as it informed his Cosmographia was 
related to, and possibly a product of, his awareness of this category’s ancestry as dramatic 
personae, as ‘handmaids to eloquence wed to wisdom’. 
 
I. The Commentaries Attributed to Bernard Silvestris 
 
Commentary on the De nuptiis 
 
At the Cathedral Schools, and particularly at Chartres, Cicero’s wisdom and eloquence (and 
Martianus’ Philology and Mercury) became what Wetherbee has described as an ‘almost sacred 
theme for implying the mind’s power to attain truth through universal knowledge’.8  Bernard 
Silvestris is thought to have authored his own commentary on Martianus’ allegorisation, the De 
nuptiis, sometime between the early 1130s and 1150, and probably before he wrote a 
                                                        
7 The attribution of these commentaries to Bernard has not been definitively proven, but it is widely accepted.  The 
modern editor of the De nuptiis commentary, Haijo Jan Westra, says that while it is difficult to be certain of its 
authorship, ‘it may be useful to retain the attribution’ to Bernard Silvestris: The Commentary on Martianus Capella’s 
De nuptiis Philologiae et Mercurii Attributed to Bernardus Silvestris (Toronto 1986), p. 10.  Brian Stock discusses 
the same commentary in Myth and Science, pp. 33–54, noting Édouard Jeauneau ‘thinks that the commentary was 
written by Bernard Silvester’ and that ‘even if it is not, it illustrates a view of literature and philosophy in fashion at 
both Chartres and Tours.’ (pp. 36–37).  In other words, for Stock (and for Westra) it helps us to imagine a 
‘Silvestrian’ take on Martianus, if we are not dealing with one already.  The same arguments have been made about 
the commentary on the Aeneid.  In a recent article, Kurt Smolak has compared the philosophy and language of the 
Cosmographia with the philosophy and language of both glosses, and concluded, ‘it is not improbable that Bernardus 
Silvestris is really the author of both commentaries’: ‘Two 12th century-commentaries on Martianus Capella and 
Virgil’, Weiner Studien 126 (2013), pp. 249–260.  Wetherbee assumes (and implicitly argues for) their common 
authorship in his discussion at Platonism and Poetry, pp. 104–125. I follow that lead here.   
8 Wetherbee, Platonism and Poetry, p. 26.   
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commentary on the first six books of the Aeneid.9  Both seem to predate, and prepare the ground 
for, his own myth, the Cosmographia.10  
 
Martianus’ allegory was made up of nine books, the first two describing the betrothal and 
marriage of Mercury and Philology, and the remaining seven describing each of the liberal arts 
in turn.  As Andrew Hicks has noted – and as suggested by our analysis of Hugh – ‘the twelfth 
century inaugurated a new focus on Martianus’ introductory allegory’.11  Bernard’s commentary 
(consistent with this) is on only the first two books: the ‘union’ proper, and the ‘Ciceronian’ part 
of the text.   
 
Like Hugh – in his introduction to the mechanical arts – Bernard quotes in his accessus to the 
commentary on the marriage from ‘Tully’s’ De Inventione, on the necessity of wisdom bound 
to eloquence’, showing his awareness of the allegory’s classical and paideic roots.12  Wetherbee 
notes that Bernard’s commentary reads the union ‘in terms of the intellectual pilgrimage from 
earthly to divine knowledge’.13  Throughout, Bernard emphasises the education and development 
of Mercury – who is presented, again to quote Wetherbee, as ‘a link between the divine and 
human comprehension, and … a means whereby the human soul may realize its situation and 
destiny.’14  Mercury presents an opportunity for that Chartrian, and indeed Bernardine, penchant 
to envisage ‘the psychological aspect of the philosopher’s experience’.15  Philology becomes an 
                                                        
9 These dates are suggested by Haijo Jan Westra, The Commentary, p. 9.  Kurt Smolak posits that the commentary 
on Martianus was written before that on Aeneid, since the latter contains near-quotations from the former. Winthrop 
Wetherbee argues, by contrast, that the commentary on Martianus was written later, ‘when Bernard’s own thought 
had matured’, since it is both more serious and more original than the gloss on Virgil (Platonism and Poetry, p. 
111).  It is not necessary for me to come down on either side of the argument, though as will become clear I 
(cautiously) opt for Smolak’s thesis, since the Aeneid commentary does indeed seem to depend heavily on the 
Martianus commentary.  Wetherbee himself admits this (see below, p. 62). 
10 Scholars suspect, unsurprisingly, that a third Bernadine commentary on his central model of the Timaeus has 
been lost.  Wetherbee, Platonism and Poetry, p. 111; Édouard Jeauneau, ‘Notes sur l’École de Chartres’, Studi 
medievali 5 (1964), pp. 845–850, at 846. 
11 Hicks, ‘Martianus Capella’, p. 319. 
12 ‘In prohemio Rhetoricorum asserit Tullius eloqentiam sine sapientia multum obesse, sapientiam vero sine 
eloquentia parum prodesse.  Hec autem est huius parva commoditas est illius vehemens importunitas quod 
sapientia, licet sola, mundanorum tamen naturam aperit eorumque contemptum suadet homini se predito.’  
Commentum in Martianum 2.125–130, Westra, p. 47.   
13 Wetherbee, Platonism and Poetry, p. 105. 
14 Ibid., p. 87.   
15 Ibid., p. 92 (and cited above, p. 10).  Bernard was probably inspired in his psychological allegorisation of Mercury 
by William of Conches’ interpretation of Orpheus in a gloss on Boethius’ Consolatio Philosophiae (Book Three).  
William suggested that Orpheus’ search for Eurydice in the underworld (related in a song by Lady Philosophy) 
represented the philosopher’s struggle to detach his attention from the world, and re-attach it to higher things.  
Bernard interprets Mercury in roughly the same way.  This is discussed by Wetherbee in Platonism and Poetry, pp. 
92–104.   
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even more passive figure than she was in the original: she represents the wisdom which this god 
of speech and poetry finds within himself.   
 
Martianus had described, in the opening to the text, the ‘wanderings’ of Mercury prior to his 
betrothal – a re-imagining of the eloquent man’s emergence from ‘sylvan shelters’, tectis 
silvestribus, depicted in De Inventione.16  Looking for his brother Apollo, Mercury searched out 
temples, ‘but in these leading shrines and these deserted caves they found … only a few leaves of 
withered laurel’. 17  He went on through forests with ‘drooping boughs’, and past the violent rivers 
and whirlpools of Destiny, before he reached his goal.18  And then, to meet the mortal Philology, 
he was forced to make a descent to the lap of the earth.  Bernard took special interest in these 
passages, which he interpreted as a metaphor for Mercury’s (or man’s) inner improvement.  The 
descent to earth is cast in his commentary, for example, as the immersion in sense and experience 
necessary to the discovery of wisdom (Philology).19 
 
This amplification of the psychological aspects of Martianus’ plot could be seen to extend to 
Mercury’s reception of the ‘handmaid’ mechanical arts in the commentary.  Bernard provided 
his own classification of this dowry gift, as well as enlarging on its possible position in the scheme 
of Scientia.  More or less following Hugh’s definition, he introduced the ancillae that are offered 
to Mercury by Philology by stating, ‘Mechanics is truly knowledge about human work complying 
to the necessities of the body’.  Only now, 
 
This has eight parts: fabric making, architecture, metalwork, commerce, hunting, 
agriculture, medicine, and the magical arts.  While fabric making and architecture 
thrust off excess warmth or cold in the air, armour (metal-working) prevents 
annihilation, commerce, hunting and agriculture prevent poverty, and medicine 
prevents illness; the magical arts prevent unknown events.20 
 
                                                        
16 Cicero, De Inventione 1.1; Hubbell, pp. 4–5 (and above, pp. 26–27). 
17 ‘sed his adytorum fastigiis specubusque viduatis absque lauri arentis paucis admodum foliis vittisque semivulsis …’.  
De nuptiis Philologiae et Mercurii 1.10, Willis, p. 6; Stahl et al., 2: p. 7. 
18 Ibid., 1.10–22, Willis, pp. 6–11; trans. Stahl et al., 2: pp. 7–14.  
19 Westra, ‘Introduction’ to The Commentary, p. 20. 
20 ‘Mechania vero est scientia humanorum operum corporeis necessitatibus obsequentium. Hec octo habet partes: 
lanificium, architectoriam, armaturam, navigationem venationem, agriculturam, medicinam, magicam artem.  
Retrudunt autem lanificium et architectoria aeris intemperiem ut calorem, algorem; armatura casaulem mortem; 
navigatio, venatio, agricultura pauperiem; medicina morbos; magica ambiguitatem eventuum ...’.  Commentum in 
Martianum 3.986–100, Westra, pp. 81–82. My translation. 
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Taken in its entirety, Bernard’s description echoes Hugh of Saint-Victor’s.  Bernard gets eight 
rather than seven arts by separating metalwork and building (grouped together under armatura 
in the Didascalicon).  The other distinction is his substitution of theatrica for ars magica 
(divination and astrology) – an interest which Westra suggests is reflected in a later poem by 
Bernard Silvestris, the Mathematicus, or Astrologer.21  The numbering of eight arts does not 
appear to have serious conceptual motivation: Bernard seems simply to be less concerned with 
creating a symmetry between the liberal and mechanical, typical of Hugh’s love of order.  He 
sticks to Hugh’s broader emphasis on mechanics’ curative origin and function, born out of 
‘necessity’.  Fabric making and architecture keep man warm and sheltered; armament or 
metalwork provide him with defence in battle; commerce, hunting and agriculture allow him to 
feed and support himself financially; medicine lets him tackle natural illness; the magical arts 
allow him to foresee or conjecture about the future. 
 
Again, in keeping with Hugh, Bernard suggested a philosophical division or scheme, on the basis 
of the marriage structure, in which mechanics is one of four major categories.  This division was 
given form in a stemma-type diagram in the unique manuscript of the text, Cambridge University 
Library’s Mm.I.18 (figure 9), thought to date from between 1200 and 1220.  The scribe of 
Mm.I.18 may well have been copying from a lost twelfth-century diagram by Bernard’s own 
scribe (and thus conceived by Bernard himself). 
 
The diagram shows Scientia as a genus divided into four categories, or species: sapientia, 
eloquentia, poesis, and mecanica.  The first three of these (sapientia, eloquentia and poesis) are 
shown directly beneath Scientia, with mecania set apart and to the right.  This division, while it 
echoes Hugh’s in being fourfold, contrasts with it in terms of its contents (Hugh’s categories 
having been theorica, practica, logica, and mechanica).22  Bernard prioritises the Ciceronian 
concepts and allegorical figures of wisdom and eloquence, sapientia and eloquentia, important 
to Hugh in less explicit ways (unsurprisingly, given the setting of this division within a commentary 
on the marriage).23  Also unsurprising given Bernard’s subject of the De nuptiis is the privileged 
                                                        
21 Westra says this particular substitution supports the attribution to Bernard: it is, he says, ‘indicative of a 
preoccupation with magic, divination and astrology on the part of the author’.  Westra, ‘Introduction’ to The 
Commentary , p. 14. 
22 For Hugh’s division see above, p. 21. 
23 He puts the trivium under eloquentia and the quadrivium (via theorica) under sapientia.  Note the arts of the 
trivium, belonging to eloquence, are made conspicuous by being set in individual boxes, as though they have some 
privileged relationship to Scientia (also outlined) – a possible hint at the essentially ‘trivial’ or ‘eloquential’ nature of 
philosophy.  Sapientia also comprises theorica and practica – which were independent in Hugh’s scheme.  Theorica 
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position he gives to poetry, poesis.  As we saw earlier, for Hugh, the ‘songs of the poets’, were 
tangential and extra-philosophical.  For Bernard, whose very effort to define and divide Scientia 
is born out of his reading of the poem – or prosimetrum – of the De nuptiis, poetry is by contrast 
of great assistance and even indispensible to the philosophical project.  Following William of 
Conches, Bernard considered poetic or mythological discourse (such as the De nuptiis) capable 
of presenting truths under a ‘covering’, the integumentum – a term we return to below.24  The 
‘integumental’ manner in which poetry could be said to ‘do’ philosophy or to participate in 
philosophy perhaps lies behind its inclusion here.  On this point it is perhaps worth noting that 
poesis is given no subdivisions of its own in the scheme (as are sapientia, eloquentia, and 
mecania).  While it would be imprudent to see such features as signs of larger, hidden meanings, 
we could note that this anomaly (poesis’ lack of subcategories) would be in keeping with an 
appreciation of poetry in fact less as a ‘category’, and more as a modus agendi, a ‘way of doing’ 
philosophy. 
 
To the right of poesis and stemming from the top right-hand corner of Scientia’s text-box is 
mecania, in turn divided into the eight arts defined above.  The placement of this ‘fourth’ category 
is striking.  First, its distance from the main tree might be seen as indicative of its ‘lower’ status, 
or rather its tangential status, with respect to the arts of the mind (grouped under sapientia, and 
so on) which spread out directly beneath Scientia.  At the same time, mechanics occupies 
considerably more space on the page than its companion categories.  Precisely because of its 
separateness from the main grouping, mechanics is, one might argue, the most conspicuous of 
Scientia’s subcategories in the diagram.  Visually speaking, as it is set apart from the main stemma, 
mecania also provides a parallel to it, and the divisions of sapientia, eloquentia and poesis taken 
collectively.  As with the position of poesis, it is not my intention to build a case for the wider or 
metaphorical significance of mecania in Bernard’s thought on the basis of its formal positioning 
or attributes.  These traits, which are probably also outcomes of scribal convenience and 
pragmatism, cannot add up to any determinate significance for mechanics – in the diagram or, 
by extension, the text.  The diagram is, after all, part of an attempt to translate the allegory into a 
taxonomy, to sort out the encyclopaedic implications of Martianus’ myth of intellectual 
development.   
                                                        
contains theologia, phisica, and mathesis – the last of which contains the arts of the quadrivium; and practica contains 
solitaria, privata, and communis (i.e. ethics).  It is beyond the scope and need of this study to provide a detailed 
analysis of this division, for which one should see Hicks, ‘Martianus Capella’, p. 320.  
24 At pp. 64–65. 
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But it is also conceived within a commentary intended, more broadly, to show what Martianus’ 
story can tell us about the philosopher’s psychology (for example, how Mercury’s descent to the 
earth is also his sensory and corporeal education).  In this light, it is interesting to note, I think, 
that mechanics is not exactly ‘relegated’ in the diagram.  While technically it comes ‘fourth’ in 
the order of philosophy, it does not look (at least to me) like the ‘inferiormost’ of philosophy’s 
parts in the stemma.  Whether the scribe of Mm.I.18 was copying an original drawing known to 
(even designed by) Bernard, or interpreting this order diagrammatically for the first time, he 
positioned mecania in a way that invites the reader to consider it in a more complex or nuanced 
relation to Scientia than is available from a written list of the categories.  Mecania’s placement to 
the right of the main division could be seen as an effort to accommodate this category’s status as 
‘fourth’ in the philosophical scheme, and – we might venture – as a distinctive ‘kind’ of 
knowledge, sensory or bodily knowledge, that has to be considered on its own terms.  To follow 
that visual lead further we might say the stemma for mechanics, as it parallels that of Scientia, 
also holds up a mirror to it.  Mechanics could be said to appear, in this arrangement, as an 
alternative, even complementary way of knowing to the kind of abstract or cerebral knowing 
which takes place in (or through) sapientia, eloquentia and poesis arrayed to its left.  
 
Commentary on the Aeneid 
 
To explore Bernard’s attitude to the mechanical arts further we can turn to his commentary on 
Virgil’s Aeneid, again written sometime between 1130 and 1150.25  As Jan Ziolkowski has 
remarked, ‘to call Virgil canonical [in the medieval schools] would be an understatement’.26  His 
Aeneid was construed by students of the Middle Ages ‘as the script for how a man … should lead 
life.’27  The most important books for this were the first six, which tell the story of Aeneas’ 
wanderings from Troy to Italy (before the war in Italy, in books seven to twelve).  The 
commentary attributed to Bernard is on these first six books only, which Bernard interprets as 
                                                        
25 See above, p. 57, n. 9.  The commentary’s modern English translators suggest it may have been compiled from 
lecture notes, Bernard occasionally referring to time limitations and the length of the syllabus.  See the ‘Introduction’ 
to the Commentary on the First Six Books of Virgil’s Aeneid by Bernardus Silvestris, trans. by Earl G. Schreiber 
and Thomas E. Maresca (London 1974), p. xx.  
26 Jan Ziolkowski, ‘Virgil’, in The Oxford History of Classical Reception in English Literature, Volume I: 800–1558, 
ed. by Rita Copeland (Oxford 2016), pp. 165–186, at 166. 
27 Ibid., p. 176.  This meaning was established by an influential sixth-century commentary on the text by Fulgentius 
(also the first commentator on Martianus Capella).  See Ziolkowski’s essay (this and previous note); and Schreiber 
and Maresca’s introduction to their translation of Bernard’s Commentary on the First Six Books, pp. xiv–xviii. 
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an image for the pilgrimage of the soul.  Indeed, Wetherbee says that ‘as Bernardus’ analysis 
develops, the Aeneid comes to sound strangely like the De nuptiis … Virgil’s Aeneas, like 
Martianus’ Mercury, undergoes a definite psychological education in the course of his 
wanderings.’28  In his preface, Bernard says, Virgil’s ‘procedure [modus agendi] is to describe 
allegorically by means of an integument what the human spirit does and endures while 
temporarily placed in the human body’.29   
 
The theme of descent to ‘sense’ or even ‘sense making’ is again central.  In De nuptiis, Bernard 
had discerned this ‘meaning’ above all in Mercury’s search for Apollo, and flight down to earth, 
which preceded (and enabled) his union with wisdom.  In his reading of the Aeneid, Bernard 
discerned the same psychological meaning in Aeneas’ descent to the underworld, descensus ad 
inferos.30  Virgil, Bernard says, uses this motif to depict man’s descent to consider earthly things 
so that it might then turn to invisibilia.31  ‘[Aeneas] is admonished thus: to descend to earthly 
things through thought’ – ‘ad mundana per cognitionem descendat’.32  Aeneas is ‘the wise man 
who descends to creatures through contemplation in order to know better the creator.’33   
 
There is – of course – no precedent for the mechanical arts in the Aeneid, as there was in De 
nuptiis (via the commentary of Eriugena).  But Bernard, who sees the system of knowledge 
presented in De nuptiis as universally applicable, brings them into his discussion of Book Six, as 
one of the sections of knowledge Aeneas encounters (and he suggests, masters) on his descent.  
He introduces the category: ‘Mechanics is the knowledge of human works connected with 
corporeal needs’.34  Oddly, this time he follows Hugh’s classification exactly in his identification 
of its constituents, writing ‘there are seven parts to it: weaving, armament, navigation, hunting, 
                                                        
28 Wetherbee, Platonism and Poetry, p. 105. Again, Bernard is drawing on William of Conches’ interpretation of 
Orpheus in his gloss on Boethius: above, p. 57, n. 15. 
29 ‘Modus agenda talis est: in integumento describit quid agat vel quid paciatur humanus spiritus in humano corpore 
temporaliter positus.’  Commentum Super Sex Libros Eneidos Virgilii, Praefatio, ed. by Julian Ward Jones and 
Elizabeth Frances Jones (London 1977), p. 3; trans. by Schreiber and Maresca, Commentary on the First Six Books, 
p. 5.  Latin edition hereafter cited as ‘Jones and Jones’. 
30 This term is used at 6.108–109, Jones and Jones, pp. 51–52; Schreiber and Maresca, pp. 51–52. 
31 Wetherbee, Platonism and Poetry, p. 107. 
32 ‘In qua ille monetur ut ad mundana per cognitionem descendat’.  Commentum Super Sex Libros 5.723, Jones 
and Jones, p. 27; Schreiber and Maresca, p. 29.   
33 As paraphrased by Schreiber and Maresca in the introduction to their translation of the Commentary on the First 
Six Books, p. xxvii.  This is based on Bernard’s remark, at 6.108: that ‘we have taught before in the fifth book why 
the descent to the underworld must be made … because knowledge of creatures leads to knowledge of the Creator.’ 
(‘Predocimus in quinto volumine quod ad inferos descensus sit faciendus … quia creaturae agnitio ad 
contemplationem adducit creatoris.’)  Jones and Jones, pp. 51–52; Schreiber and Maresca, p. 52. 
34 ‘Mechania vero est scientia humanorum operum corporeis necessitatibus obsequentium.’  Ibid. 6.2, Jones and 
Jones, p. 34; Schreiber and Maresca, p. 34. 
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agriculture, theatrics and medicine’.35  He also follows Hugh in declaring: ‘they are called 
mecanice, that is, adulterine, “forged”.’36  The arts are then invoked in a similar place to their 
invocation in Bernard’s commentary on De nuptiis, and arguably to the same effect – as a ‘gloss’ 
on the protagonist’s earthly wanderings and ascent through sense.  As with Mercury, they 
highlight Aeneas’ need to internally imitate the material and corporeal world in his pursuit of 
divine knowledge.  They function as an image, again, for the soul’s (poetic, or poietic) ‘making 
sense’ of its earthly existence. 
 
Thus, in his two commentaries – on De nuptiis and the Aeneid – Bernard displays an awareness 
of and an attachment to the artes mechanicae as set out in the Didascalicon some years earlier.  
He is faithful to Hugh’s classification, which he imitates closely in both glosses (with some 
modification in the first).37  By virtue of the very nature of these writings, however, Bernard stays 
truer to the allegorical significance of the mechanical arts as the ‘handmaids’ of eloquence.  This 
ideal intellectual union is not a passing comment, as it was in Hugh, but the explicit context for 
their discussion.  In both his glosses, based on Eriugena’s, Bernard can be seen to think about 
mechanics as a category or species of Scientia (alongside other categories) and – more explicitly 
than Hugh – as a stage on the soul’s pilgrimage from mundana to extramundana. 
 
At the same time, mechanics could be seen as an image for the work of the poet, for the ‘making’ 
of the myth on which the commentary is built.  This reflexive connotation will be important for 
the Cosmographia.  In the diagram accompanying the gloss on De nuptiis, Bernard included 
poesis as a gesture (I argued) to the mythic structure of the text itself.  For him, poesis – as 
practised by Martianus and Virgil – is the only way to truth, the ideal vehicle or modus agendi of 
philosophy.  In the preface to the commentary on the Aeneid, he calls Virgil a ‘poet and a 
philosopher’.38  Virgil ‘taught the truth of philosophy, and he did not neglect the poetic fiction.’39  
Virgil knew poetic fiction was the best way to access highest truths; his very myth was an exercise 
in ‘making sense’ of the world.  As quoted above: ‘His procedure is to describe allegorically by 
                                                        
35 ‘Huius sunt septem partes: lanificium, armatura, navigium, venatio, agricultura, theatrica, medicina.’  Ibid. 
36 ‘dicuntur mecanice, id est adulterine’.  Ibid.; Schreiber and Maresca, p. 35. 
37 i.e., the identification of eight, not seven arts: above, p. 58. 
38 ‘… in our work we treat Virgil as both a poet and as philosopher …’. (‘… in hoc opera et poeta philosophus 
perhibetur esse Virgilius …’).  Commentum Super Sex Libros, Praefatio, Jones and Jones, p. 1; Schreiber and 
Maresca, p. 3.  
39 ‘… et veritatem philosophie docuit et ficmentum poeticum non pretermisit.’  Ibid.  Bernard attributes this quotation 
to Macrobius, though it does not correspond exactly to any of Macrobius’ surviving writings.  See the note provided 
by Schreiber and Maresca, p. 109 (n. 1). 
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means of an integument what the human spirit does and endures while temporarily placed in the 
human body’.40   
 
This term integumentum is taken from a natural lexicon: its original meaning is the ‘covering’ or 
protective outer layer of a plant or animal.  Bernard, following William of Conches, adopted it 
to describe how literary fictions reveal truths.41  This particular term is revealing of the model of 
poiesis – ‘world-making’.  It tells us how the ideal text is conceived as a reworking of natural 
appearances, a crafted microcosmus, which makes the world more intelligible by transforming 
it.  Thus, it also recalls the Greek term for literary embellishment or ornamentation, kosmos. 
Kosmos has been discussed by Angus Fletcher in his work Allegory, who notes ‘this buried term 
[is] familiar to us in somewhat disguised and certainly debased form in its Latin derivatives, 
ornatus and decoratio.’42  These Latin cognates fail to convey the idea (conveyed by kosmos) that 
the poet or orator ‘seeks to organize nature into a … system’.43  Concurrently, kosmos allows us 
to see ornatus as a concept that (at least initially) covered both ‘adornment’, and ‘arrangement’, 
or rearrangement.  We would tend to think of these as separate projects: one to do with the 
‘outside’ of the work; the other to do with the ‘inside’.  The term kosmos referred to the text’s 
organisation, and – or as – its covering.  It reveals how a text’s system inhered in its surface: 
adjusting the appearance of one’s materia was not a finishing touch; it was what made the materia 
intelligible.  The Chartrians’ use of the word ‘integument’ for the allegorical ornatus could be 
seen as signalling a desire to restore this ancient, poietic vocabulary and with it a whole conception 
of composition. 
 
                                                        
40 Above, p. 62, n. 29.  
41 The notion of integument has a considerable literature and is often a byword for the ‘scientific and grammatical 
humanism’ of Chartres (so-called by Jeauneau, cited in the Introduction above, p. 10, n. 47).  See discussions in 
Peter Dronke, Fabula: Explorations into the Uses of Myth in Medieval Platonism (Leiden 1974), pp. 13–78, esp. 
25–32; Gregory, ‘The Platonic Inheritance’; Édouard Jeauneau, ‘L’usage de la notion d’integumentum à travers les 
gloses de Guillaume de Conches’, Archives d’Histoire Doctrinale Et Litteraire du Moyen Âge 24 (1957), pp. 35–
100; and J. A. Dane, ‘Integumentum as Interpretation: a note on William of Conches’ commentary on Macrobius’, 
Classical Folia 32 (1978), pp. 201–215.  
42 Angus Fletcher, Allegory: The Theory of a Symbolic Mode (Princeton 2012; first publ. Ithaca, NY 1964), pp. 
108–109. 
43 Ibid., p. 121.  Without referring to its antecedent kosmos, Umberto Eco has noted that the term ornatus seemed 
to refer, within medieval ‘cosmological theory’, to ‘an individuating structure in things’ – in Art and Beauty in the 
Middle Ages, trans. by Hugh Bredin (New Haven, 1986) p. 34. (Originally published as a single chapter in a four-
volume handbook to medieval aesthetics, ‘Sviluppo dell’estetica medievale’, in Momenti e problemi di storia 
dell’estetica, 4 vols, 1: pp. 115–230, Milan 1959). For the meaning of kosmos in antiquity see Grand-Clément, 
‘Poikilia’, pp. 409–410; and Sandywell, The Beginnings of European Theorizing, p. 28. 
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Indeed, as several modern commentators have noted, Bernard would appear to see the process 
of composing under an integumentum (which he attributes to Virgil) as in some way modelling 
or exemplifying the structure and process of learning suggested by narrative.44  This 
correspondence between Virgil’s poetic procedure and his philosophical lessons, has been 
inferred for example by Earl G. Schreiber and Thomas E. Maresca – who write in their 
introduction to the English translation that the Aeneid is, for Bernard, ‘a poem about the 
acquisition of wisdom which re-creates in itself the form of the process it describes.’45  They go 
on that ‘the process depicted in the epic poem and the process enacted by the narrative itself is 
centroversion: the raising to consciousness of what had previously been latent, unknown, or 
unappreciated.’46  In other words (according to the translators), Bernard seems to see the Aeneid, 
particularly in his emphasis on poetry in the preface, as being both ‘about’ the soul’s discovery 
of wisdom, through the body, nature, and sense perception – and as demonstrative and 
encouraging of that process of discovery, or ‘sense-making’, by virtue of its presentation of truths 
under the cover of fiction.47  On this line of interpretation, we might go so far as to suggest that 
as Bernard inserts the mechanical arts within the story of Aeneas, as a stage in the protagonists’ 
coming to terms with nature, he might also think of them as metaphors for the kind of kosmic 
‘craft’ involved in poetic composition and interpretation, undertaken by Virgil and post facto by 
the reader. 
 
The extent of Bernard’s thinking about the reflexivity of Virgil’s text – about where and how its 
poetic ‘making’ mirrors the process of learning it seems to espouse – has to remain a subject of 
scholarly conjecture.   While its basic tenets are implied throughout the commentary (and 
particularly in the emphasis on the interaction of poetry and philosophy in the preface), at no 
                                                        
44 This has been noted by the commentary’s modern translators, Earl G. Schreiber and Thomas E. Maresca (see 
subsequent two notes, 45 and 46).  That poetry does not just ‘represent the pleasant voice of eloquence’ but has ‘a 
special moralizing quality of its own’ for Bernard, in both his commentaries and the Cosmographia, has also been 
discussed by Willemien Otten, From Paradise to Paradigm: A Study of Twelfth-Century Humanism (Leiden 2004), 
p. 238.  See also the comments of James Simpson on Alan of Lille and John Gower’s use of poetic form, cited 
below, note 47. 
45 Schreiber and Maresca, ‘Introduction’ to Commentary on the First Six Books, pp. xxviii. 
46 Ibid., p. xxxi.  My emphases. 
47 One could refer at this point to the insightful comments of James Simpson on the moral action of poetic form in 
the works of Alan of Lille and John Gower, both successors to Bernard Silvestris.  Simpson argues that form and 
content work in harmony in these poems: ‘because the poem aims at human fulfilment through an educative process, 
so too is the poem’s shape controlled by that end.’  The poem’s pedagogical ends are written into its fictional shape, 
which as it is read, ‘informs’ the soul of the listener or reader.  Sciences and the Self, pp. 6–7 (quotation is at p. 7).  
Simpson is not discussing Bernard Silvestris at this point, though he addresses the influence of the Aeneid 
commentary on Alan’s poetics at pp. 58–59. 
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point does Bernard dissect, in analytic terms, how the overlap between form and content works 
(hence the effort by more recent scholars to articulate it). 
 
However, a reflexive allegorical system had been identified more explicitly by Bernard’s 
predecessors in commentaries on the Timaeus.48  It was ultimately this ‘menacingly’ multi-layered 
cosmogony by Plato, as discussed by cathedral schoolmen in the first half of the twelfth century, 
that influenced Bernard’s ‘integumental’ readings of Martianus and Virgil.49  As we have seen, 
Plato prefaced his myth of creation (through the mouthpiece of Timaeus) as a mediocris 
explanatio, an ‘ordinary explanation’: the best that could be imagined about God by (limited) 
human minds.  And he gestured, within his ‘explanation’ of God, to the very act of composing 
that explanation.  This was discerned by Bernard’s contemporary William of Conches, who 
noted, in his commentary on the Timeaus (thought to date from the 1140s), that Plato’s story of 
cosmic creation was also a story about the formation of the soul through philosophy and poetry.  
He called the story ‘encyclopaedic’.50  Its fictional structure was indicative of the poetic and 
imitative structure of thought.  The craft (‘poiesis’) of the divine demiurge becomes an image for 
the poet-craft of the writer, coming to terms with creation and the Creator in his own, limited 
way.   
 
As I have argued, it was arguably the centrality of craft in Plato’s text, to describe our conjectural 
and artificial ‘sense-making’, which inspired the inclusion of the artes mechanicae as the tools of 
eloquence in Eriugena’s De nuptiis commentary.  Hugh of Saint-Victor recognised this heritage 
in his Didascalicon, in his evocations of the mechanical artist as an exemplum for the ‘conjoint’ 
work of the ‘trivial’ imagination.  In Bernard’s mythological commentaries, this take on 
mechanical art – as illustrative of mental and verbal fictio, ‘fashioning’ – is perhaps more keenly 
                                                        
48 In his gloss on the Timaeus, William of Conches wrote that Plato himself had spoken in integumenta: i.e. that 
what he described (in this instance, the demiurge’s creation of the cosmos) actually told of something else (the 
author’s creation of the poem).  ‘Si quis tamen non verba tantum sed sensum Platonis cognoscat, non tantum non 
inveniet haeresim sed profundissimam philosophiam integumentis verborum tectam.’  (‘If, however, one were to 
recognise not only the words but the sense of Plato, one would find not only heresy, but profound truth covered by 
the integument of words’).  William of Conches, Glosae super Platonem 119.8–11, ed. by Édouard Jeauneau 
(Turnhout 2006), pp. 213–214. My translation.  For a commentary on William’s gloss and identification of Plato’s 
‘integument’, see Willemien Otten, ‘Plato and the Fabulous Cosmogony of William of Conches’ in The Winged 
Chariot: Collected Essays on Plato and Platonism in Honour of L.M. de Rijk, ed. by Maria Kardaun and Joke 
Spruyt (Leiden 2000), pp. 185–204, at 196–198. 
49 Grabowski, ‘Plato: The Timaeus’ (above, p. 11, n. 56).  To clarify my terminology: the Timaeus, and the 
Cosmographia, are technically ‘cosmogonies’ – i.e. models of the creation of the cosmos.  ‘Cosmology’ refers to the 
study of the universe more generally.  Thus, as individuals, Plato and the Chartrians could be called ‘cosmologists’, 
but their works are more specifically cosmogonies.  This distinction is explained by Fletcher, Allegory, p. 155. 
50 Gregory, ‘The Platonic Inheritance’, p. 57. 
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felt.  The mechanical arts, now addressed precisely as components within an allegorical story and 
scheme, seem at some level to be representative of the descent to earthly contemplation 
undertaken by Mercury and Aeneas.  At the same time, if we accept that Bernard was interested 
in how the poetic procedure of the author redoubles the philosophical lessons ‘within’ the text, 
we might even say that mechanical art (standing in for our earthly descent) is implicated as a 
metaphor for the making of the text itself, for the integumental ‘craft’ of the author.  But these 
are only inferences drawn from Bernard’s somewhat brief comments in the commentaries.  It 
was ultimately in Bernard’s Cosmographia, directly modelled on the demonstrative 
‘encyclopaedia’ of the Timaeus, that the identity of mechanica and poiesis, the view of 
‘mechanical art’ as a way of expressing poetic ‘sense making’, was restored to its ancient fullness. 
 
II.    The Cosmographia 
 
The Cosmographia is divided into two books: the Megacosmus and Microcosmus.  As their titles 
suggest, the first of these describes the formation of the universe at large, and the second, the 
formation of man – in soul and body – who will inhabit, and complete, the megacosmos.   
 
What has not yet been mentioned, but which must preface our analysis (and any reading of 
Bernard’s poem) is the etymology of its title: a compound of cosmos + graphia, ‘writing’.  This 
initiates the attentive reader into Bernard’s Platonic conceit: that his text is a text, and the cosmos 
to be described is just that: a cosmos described.  This prefatory act of ‘self-criticism’ is in direct 
imitation of Timaeus’ self-critical claim, that his account of the divine craftsman is an eikos 
mythos, or mediocris explanatio – a product and a reflection of the ‘limited’ means of human 
reasoning and imagining about the world.51   
 
As suggested by his title, Bernard developed this ultimate reference to human ‘making’ with a 
new confidence and playfulness.  His new-fangled demiurges have an overtly ‘encyclopaedic’ 
function.  They are intended as personifications of his own ‘making sense’ of matter and the 
divine, the ‘mechanical psychology of knowing’ proper to the liberal arts. 
 
Megacosmus 
                                                        
51 Above, Introduction, p. 11, n. 55. 
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The Megacosmus opens with the universe in a state of chaos.  It is ‘unwritten’, Bernard suggests, 
requiring the order of the mind, and pen.  This is explained by Natura, who appeals to her 
superior, Noys (‘the divine mind’ or ‘divine idea’), over the state of primordial matter, which 
Bernard names Silva: 
 
Oh Noys, image of unfailing life, firstborn of God, yourself God, essential truth … 
Silva, an unyielding, formless chaos [informe chaos], a hostile coalescence, the 
motley aspect of substance, a mass discordant with itself, longs [optat] in her 
turbulence for a tempering power; in her crudity [rudis] for form [formam]; in her 
rankness [hispida] for cultivation [cultum]; yearning to emerge from her ancient 
confusion, she demands formative number and bonds of harmony.52 
 
As Silva longs (optat) for form, Bernard’s description of her seems to crave representation.  
While no surviving copies of the Cosmographia include an ‘iconography’ to accompany the 
narrative, an illumination from a work by Honorius Augustodunensis (c. 1080–1154), the Clavis 
Physicae, includes a drawing of cosmic chaos that – with its muddled eyes and mouths – might 
as well be a drawing of Bernard’s personification (figure 10).  It helps us to visualise Bernard’s 
most complex and allusive character, and the source for his posthumous name ‘Silvestris’. 
 
The term silva translates literally as ‘forest’ or ‘wood’.  So far, we have seen it used to describe 
the ‘sylvan shelters’ or wooded places, tectis silvestribus of Cicero’s De Inventione – where men 
were scattered before being ‘civilized’ by eloquence.  In his more practical passages, Cicero had 
used it for the author’s written ‘draft’.  In De Oratore, for example, he advised that, ‘One has to 
begin by accumulating a supply of matter [silva] … but that matter has to receive shape from the 
general texture and style of the speech, and to be embellished by the diction and given variety by 
reflexions.’53  Cicero’s use of silva – again taken from a natural lexicon – betrays once again his 
essentially poietic view of rhetorical composition, as an organisation of sense materials.  It makes 
                                                        
52 ‘“Vitae viventis imago, prima, Noys, Deus, orta Deo, substantia veri …” Silva rigens, informe chaos, concretio 
pugnax, discolor usiae vultus, sibi dissona massa, turbida temperiem, formam rudis, hispida cultum optat, et a veteri 
cupiens exire tumultu artifices numeros et musica vincla requirit.’  Bernard Silvestris, Cosmographia: Megacosmus 
1.18–23, ed. and trans. by Winthrop Wetherbee, Bernardus Silvestris: Poetic Works (Cambridge, MA 2015), pp. 
8–9.   
53 ‘Quare, ut ante dixi, primum silva rerum comparanda est … haec formanda filo ipso et genere orationis, illuminanda 
verbis, varianda sententiis.’ De Oratore 3.103, ed. and trans. by E.W. Sutton and H. Rackham, LCL 349 (Cambridge, 
MA 1942), pp. 82–83.  
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us alert to the ‘kosmic’ undertones of this (otherwise rather conventional) passage on verbal 
decorum or ornatus.54 
 
Bernard is drawing more directly, however, on Calcidius’ own use of silva to translate Plato’s 
Greek term for primordial matter, hylê.55  Calcidius was probably influenced by Cicero’s use of 
the term: his choice shows he appreciated the reflexive system of Plato’s dialogue.  Through silva 
he is able to suggest cosmic matter is ‘also’ the raw material or ‘draft’ of the author, and therefore 
that the demiurge is ‘also’ the poet-speaker, Timaeus.  Bernard takes this further in his 
Cosmographia.  He relishes the ambiguity of silva, using it to unlock and to test the (ancient) 
synonymy of rhetoric and cosmology.  He forces us, almost teasingly, to pursue two readings 
simultaneously: the physical work of Natura and Noys on Silva relentlessly implicates the work 
of the author, his effort to rationalise the cosmos verbally.  Bernard describes their cosmic craft 
using language we would consider proper to a manual on rhetoric and the arts.  For example, 
Natura concludes her request to Noys by asking her to: 
 
Apply your hand, divide the mass, show forth its components and set them in their 
stations; they will appear more pleasing when thus disposed.  Quicken what moves 
at random, impose shape [ascribe figuram] and bestow splendor: let the work [opus] 
declare the author [auctor] who has made it [fecerit]!56   
 
The auctor in this final line refers, ‘within’ the myth, to Noys, or God.  But at another level 
Bernard is clearly pointing towards himself, the student of rhetoric.  As Linda Lomperis suggests, 
‘we cannot be sure whether Bernard’s writing serves to establish the “reality” of the divinely 
written cosmic order or whether it simply sets forth a kind of rhetorical parody of that order.’57  
                                                        
54 Following Cicero, Quintilian used silva for the writer’s ‘draft’ in his Institutio Oratoria.  Writers ‘… make a draft of 
the whole subject as rapidly as possible, and write impromptu, following the heat and impulse of the moment. They 
call this draft their “raw material” [hanc silvam vocant]. They then revise their effusions and give them rhythmical 
structure. The words and the rhythms are thus corrected, but the original triviality of the hastily accumulated material 
is still there. The better practice will be to exercise care from the start, and shape the work from the first stages in such 
a way that it needs only to be chiselled into shape, not begun again from scratch’. (‘Diversum est huic eorum vitium 
qui primo decurrere per materiam stilo quam velocissimo volunt, et sequentes calorem atque impetum ex tempore 
scribunt: hanc silvam vocant. Repetunt deinde et componunt quae effuderant: sed verba emendantur et numeri, manet 
in rebus temere congestis quae fuit levitas. Protinus ergo adhibere curam rectius erit, atque ab initio sic opus ducere ut 
caelandum, non ex integro fabricandum sit.’)  Quintilian, Institutio Oratoria 10.3.17–18, ed. and trans. by Donald A. 
Russell, LCL 124 (Cambridge, MA 2001), pp. 344–345.  
55 Calcidius, Commentary 13; Magee, pp. 544–545. 
56 ‘Adde manum, rescinde globum, partesque resigna et distingue locis; melius distincta placebunt.  Pigra move, 
moderare vagis, ascribe figuram, adde iubar: fateatur opus quis fecerit auctor!’  Megacosmus 1.60–65; Wetherbee, 
pp. 11–13. 
57 Lomperis, ‘From God’s Book’, p. 56. 
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Once Noys agrees to help Natura, she reflects on her task in a ‘voice’ which seems also to belong 
to Bernard – to express his own feelings about the labour of poetic (poietic) ornamentation: 
 
I recognise that this rough perversity cannot be made to disappear, or be completely 
transformed; for it is too abundant, and, being sustained by the native properties of 
the matter in which it has established itself, does not readily give way.  However, so 
that it does not impede my work or resist my ordering, I will refine away the greater 
part of the evil and grossness of Silva.58 
 
It is at points such as this, when Bernard’s narration is overtly ‘an aesthetic counterpart to the 
coherent ordering he describes’, that, as Wetherbee puts it, he ‘seems to strain the resources of 
language.’59  The refinement of Silva in the Megacosmus (the division of the mass, the disposition 
of its parts, the imposition of shape) refers ultimately to Bernard’s poetic and philosophical 
labour, of bringing the universe into the ‘likeness’, or ‘integument’ of the Cosmographia itself 
(the opus in the passage).  Noys is, by extension, a figment of the imagination.  Her cultivation 
of Silva signifies the very act of sensation and imagination, the inner reassembly of sense 
materials, that gives rise to her.  Following the reflexive logic of the Timaeus, her craft is a 
projection of the limited or ‘ordinary craft’ of human conjecture about the world’s origins.  
 
In the context of twelfth-century encyclopaedism, Bernard blurs the boundaries of mechanical 
and liberal or theoretical art.  The artes mechanicae may not be present by name, but they have 
an implied dramatic and exemplary expedience in this narrative – which is in keeping with the 
implications of the Didascalicon, and Bernard’s view of mechanica in the commentaries.  Noys’ 
manual division and disposition of Silva (restated throughout the Megacosmus) strongly echoes 
Hugh’s characterisation of the mechanical artist, putting together things disjoined, and disjoining 
those put together.  We have seen how this had poietic overtones in the Didascalicon, in tune 
with Hugh’s own profound appreciation of the lessons of the Timaeus (and De nuptiis) – and 
how Bernard himself registered the relationship between mechanica and the trivial arts ‘making 
sense’ of nature in his commentaries.  In the Megacosmus, this implicit relationship becomes 
explicit.  The trials and tribulations of mechanical artistry, attributed to Natura and Noys, are 
manifestly illustrations of the philosophico-poetic process, of the soul trying to fashion a 
reasonable account of the cosmos within itself.  At the same time, the very pursuit of wisdom – 
                                                        
58 ‘Silvestris, video, obsolescere demutarique malignitas non poterit ad perfectum; abundantior enim, et, nativis erecta 
potentiis, quibus insedit sedibus, facile non recedit.  Verum ego, quo non operi, quo non meis officiat disciplinis, 
malum Silvae pro parte plurima Silvaeque grossitiem elimabo.’ Megacosmus 2.2; Wetherbee, pp. 14–15. 
59 Wetherbee, ‘Philosophy, Cosmology’, p. 45. 
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the soteriological mission of discovering the divine likeness itself – is framed as a mechanical 
enterprise.  Bernard’s unique effort to show us the ‘psychology of knowing’, as opposed to an 
outward ‘structure of knowledge’ means there can be no strict division between ‘taking thought 
for necessity’ and the ascent to extramundana.  In this twelfth-century Timaeus, the one 
necessarily becomes the other.  Ascent is a descent to sense and experience, and the liberation 
of the soul lies in its craft, the perfection of a mechanical psychology. 
 
Microcosmus 
 
While, as I have shown, this claim to the importance of the mechanical arts in the Cosmographia 
is essentially new, it has a single (if underdeveloped) precedent in Brian Stock’s Myth and Science 
in the Twelfth Century.60  Stock raises the topic of the artes mechanicae in his analysis of the 
second part of the Cosmographia, entitled the Microcosmus, which narrates the formation of 
man. 
 
The Megacosmus concludes with Noys’ celebration of her ‘art’.  The beginning of the 
Microcosmus heralds the arrival of Providentia, who declares the final wish of the Godhead: 
‘since it befits the careful craftsman to make the final portions of his work worthy of 
consummation, I have decided to complete the success and dignity of my creation with Man.’61  
Natura is once again the supervisor of events, who has to seek out two artisans: Physis and Urania, 
who will craft man in body and soul respectively.  Their efforts are more or less representative 
of man’s intellectual development. 
 
Urania is the first to be sought.  She is named after the eighth Muse of Hesiod’s Theogony, 
ourania, ‘heavenly one’.  Bernard calls her ‘queen of the stars’, or ‘starry queen’, regina siderea.62  
After a long journey itinieris longissimi, Natura finds her gazing attentively at the heavens.63  She 
already knows, by foresight, God’s will and Natura’s request – and forestalls Natura’s attempt to 
speak with her own assessment of what needs to be done: 
 
                                                        
60 See above, p. 55 and the Introduction, p. 13. 
61 ‘Sed quoniam par est diligentem opificem claudentes partes operis digna consummatione finire, visum est mihi in 
Homine fortunam honoremque operis terminare.’ Microcosmus 3.1; Wetherbee, pp. 84–85. 
62 Ibid. 3.5; pp. 86–87. 
63 Ibid. 3.6; pp. 88–89 and 3.11; pp. 92–93. 
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Man, of earthly nature, is to be made [fabricabitur] a sojourner on earth [in 
terris…hospes], and the descent thither [descensus eo] is not easy for me.  The dank 
impurity that surrounds the base earth will quickly mar my brilliance.  But since this 
creature owes his form to the archetypal patterns, it is useless to plead the journey as 
an excuse.  In accordance with the sacred purpose of the divine and most high Mind 
I will execute the work of the office assigned me.  In the following form and manner 
of this noble model I shall produce nothing random or worthless.  The human soul 
[mens humana] must be guided by me through all the regions of heaven, that she 
may learn wisdom [ut sit prudentior]: the laws of the Fates and inexorable Destiny, 
and the shiftings of unstable Fortune; what matters are open [libera] to our 
judgement, what is determined by necessity [necesse], and what is subject to 
uncertain accident.  By the practice of reflection [more recordantis] she will recall as 
much as she can of that which she discerns, being not wholly without memory.64 
 
Urania thus says she will create a ‘memory’ of wisdom in man’s soul (mens humana).  Man will 
ultimately be a sojourner on earth (in terres hospes).  For her, such a descent would be no light 
matter (non levis).  But she can instil in him a knowledge of the heavens, of destiny and fortune, 
that he can then recall in his earthly life, by the practice of reflection, more recordantis. Thus 
Natura follows Urania on a journey through the ethereal regions, accumulating (it seems) the 
wise soul of the new man.  Once this has been accomplished, she has to make that descensus to 
the earth to recruit the maker of the new man’s body.  This is Physis, roughly translatable as ‘the 
study of nature’.65  Natura finds her seated in the lap of the earth, closely attended by her 
daughters, Practica and Theorica (fictional incarnations of Hugh’s encyclopaedic categories in 
the Didascalicon). 
 
While Bernard suggests that the human soul was formed by Urania, he also centralises the work 
of Physis and her daughters in a way which suggests he sees the soul as a by-product, almost, of 
their work on the body.66  For Bernard, our intellectual development proceeds from the 
apprehension of earthly things, to heavenly things.  He is able to suggest this in the figure of 
Physis, whose work almost overwrites Urania’s production of the soul.  Physis and her daughters’ 
labours could be said to stand for the more recordantis, the ‘practice of recollection’ by which 
                                                        
64 ‘In terris Homo terrenus fabricabitur hospes, et descensus eo mihi non levis.  Umida colluvies, humili contermina 
terrae, laeserit e facili nostrum iubar.  Sed quod ab archetypis ea res decorata figuris, excusare viam minus expedit.  
Iuxta divinae summaeque sacraria Mentis exsequar iniuncti rem muneris.  Principis exempli formam modumque 
secuta, inducam temere vacum nihil.  Mens humana mihi tractus ducenda per omnes aethereos ut sit prudentior: 
Parcarum leges et ineluctabile Fatum Fortunaeque vices variabilis; quae sit in arbitrio res libera, quidve necesse, 
quid cadat ambiguis sub casibus.  More recordantis quam multa reducet eorum quae cernet, penitus non immemor.’  
Ibid. 4.21–39; pp. 94–95. 
65 For further analysis of this definition see Mark Kauntze’s chapter on ‘The Science of the Cosmographia’ in 
Authority and Imitation, pp. 50–89, at 63–66.   
66 Wetherbee also notes that ‘as the creation of man goes forward, only the work of Physis is described’.  Bernardus 
Silvestris, p. xxiii. 
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the wisdom in the soul is recovered.  Bernard describes Physis daunted by her assignment and 
her recalcitrant materials – the ‘leftovers’ of Silva from the Megacosmus: 
 
Physis was appalled at the instability which hindered her project, and cursed this 
unbridled lawlessness.  She took pains and labored mightily to check its fluctuation 
and contain its flowing away as far as Nature would admit.  Besides, she realized that 
not the elements themselves, but the remains of the elements had been given her to 
build with, scraps and leavings from the forming of the Universe [de mundana] which 
she had found [invenisset] here and there.  Thus it was beyond even a skilled 
craftsman to perform this task or bring it to completion with imperfect materials.  
Physis applied her ingenuity [ingenium] to these stubborn difficulties.67 
 
Previous scholars have noted that in these passages Physis ‘deploys learning of a new, practical 
kind’.68  But Stock went further in proposing that ‘Physis is predominantly interested in the 
mechanical arts’.69  And that, ‘in a period when the mechanical arts were, by and large, considered 
“adulterine”, Bernard appears to have a more positive evaluation of their role’.70  Yet Stock did 
not tie this observation back to Bernard’s larger metaphorical agenda – and the ultimate 
reference of Physis to philosophy itself (in both its ‘practical’ and ‘theoretical’ dimensions).   
 
Physis, while she is a ‘mechanical artist’, is also, ostensibly, a figure for the ingenium of the author 
and rhetorician.  As the ‘maker’ of man, she restates and amplifies the rhetorical and 
philosophical allusions of the Megacosmus on the narrative level.  Her reassembly of Noys’ 
‘scraps and leavings’ tallies with references in the first half of the Cosmographia to the imitative 
poietic craft of the philosopher, attempting to ‘make sense’ of the divine through myth and 
integument.  Note Bernard’s use of the word inventio (invenisset) to describe her ‘discovery’ of 
materials from the universe, de mundana.  She is the (closest) personification of the author’s 
‘recollective’ and ‘excogitative’ philosophical and verbal craft, his effort to shape the world to the 
mind through language.  Physis brings to the foreground Bernard’s ‘unusual’ appreciation of the 
                                                        
67 ‘Obviam propositis inconstantiam Physis exhorruit, effrenemque licentiam exsecravit.  Curat, agit et promovet 
quantam Natura patitur, lubricantem detineat, coerceat effluentem.  Praeterea non elementa, sed elementorum 
reliquias aedificationi suae traditas recognoscit, quas utique de mundana concretione extremas et superstites 
invenisset.  Non igitur esse in opifice, vel perito, de minus integris corporibus vel opus facere vel absolvere 
consummatum.  Ad tantas tamque importunas difficultates ingenium Physis circumducit argutum.’ Microcosmus 
13.4; Wetherbee, pp. 158–159.  Wetherbee translates ingenium as ‘keen understanding’, which I have replaced 
with the more direct ‘ingenuity’. 
68 Wetherbee, Bernardus Silvestris, p. xxii. 
69 Stock, Myth and Science, p. 197.  
70 Ibid., p. 225.   
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mechanical arts – to run with Stock’s observation – as the psychological modus operandi of the 
liberal. 
 
The Microcosmus ends with a song of praise for man as a finished product – ‘formed with 
masterly and prudent skill’.71  Bernard describes, step by step, the perfect co-ordination of his 
faculties and limbs achieved by Physis, and therefore (under the ‘integument’) by man’s 
philosophical education.  He starts with the interaction of the senses and the mind, effectively 
the power of imagination, ingenium, or ‘judgement of sense perception’ (on which the whole 
Cosmographia is a commentary).  He then accounts for the ears and sound, the tongue and taste, 
the nose and smell: all relationships which evince ingenium or ‘sense making’ – the translation, 
or imitation, of the world in and by the mind.72  Thus he prioritises man’s ‘poietic’ faculties.  
These final pages reassert that the essence of our humanity is the ability (and struggle) to ‘make 
intelligible’ the silva of experience.  In his very last lines, Bernard says that ‘in creating man it was 
necessary [illa necesse est] that Physis bestow limbs of which the universe [mundus] has no need: 
eyes to keep watch in the head, ears for varying sound, sure feet to bear him, and all-capable 
hands [omnificasque manus].’73   
 
This seems to make a simple enough point: the universe or mundus is self-sufficient.  Man is 
not: he needs his senses to ‘get on’ in the world, to see, to hear, to move, and to make use of its 
resources.  At the same time, however, given the reflexive conceit of the Cosmographia as a 
whole, this final passage, which emphasises the attributes of man that allow him to engage with 
what is outside of himself by contrast to the autonomous universe, could be seen to suggest the 
dependence of the mundus on man, and his physical awareness.  Man is the central inhabitant 
of the universe in the narrative, but in the terms of the literary experiment, man is also its creator, 
its auctor.  In keeping with his reflexive conceit, pervasive throughout the poem, Bernard can be 
seen playfully making us question, in these last lines, whether the self-sufficient cosmos is in fact 
self-sufficient in the human senses, ‘as far as’ the eyes, the ears, and the feet and hands ‘show’ us.  
He reminds us that the cosmos he is speaking about is in fact – or is also – the cosmos put 
together by his human craft, the kosmos of the text.  
 
                                                        
71 ‘… cuditur artifici circumspectoque politu …’ Microcosmus 14.1-2; Wetherbee, pp. 168–169. 
72 Ibid. 14.16–108; pp. 168–177. 
73 ‘Membra quibus mundus non indigent, illa necesse est Physis in humana conditione daret: excubias capitis oculos, 
modulaminis aures, ductoresque pedes omnificasque manus.’  Ibid. 14.179–182; Wetherbee, pp. 180–181.  
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Indeed, Bernard closes the Cosmographia by stressing the necessity of the ‘all-capable’ or ‘all-
creative’ hands (omnificae manus) – encapsulating the reflexive lesson I have tried to draw out 
here.  On one level, Bernard can be seen to refer to man’s practical need of hands, to tackle the 
necessity of this world – the hands of man as a ‘mechanical artist’.  But this remark also seems 
to bring us full circle with the title of the myth, Cosmo-graphia.  The ‘all-capable hands’ are 
simultaneously, perhaps, the hands of the philosopher-poet, who has put together this ‘likely 
account’ from the scraps and leavings of his perceptions.  This final ‘mechanical’ image could be 
seen to dignify man – not as a manipulator of nature, but as a poietes, or ‘sense maker’ – typified, 
of course, by Bernard himself.   
 
Thus, the Cosmographia ends with a (typically subtle and allusive) confirmation of man’s 
‘inwardly mechanical’ philosophical mission.  In this parting shot, Bernard can be seen to affirm 
there is no liberation, no wisdom, that is not also ‘taking thought for necessity’ – as he has implied 
throughout the ‘making’ of his divine myth, or ‘likeness’.  This remarkable work, which has been 
analysed by a number of literary historians, for a multitude of reasons, has not been considered 
for this innovative encyclopaedic move: the overwriting of ‘liberal’ art as an inwardly ‘mechanical’ 
enterprise.  Here I hope to have corrected that omission, by drawing out the reversal or fusion 
of the ‘liberal’ and ‘mechanical’ sustained by the Cosmographia, and implicit in his mythological 
commentaries.  Put together, these works bring to full resonance the poetic, and ‘Orphic’, 
overtones of Hugh’s introduction of the artes mechanicae to philosophy some two decades 
earlier – and (by extension) their allegorical significance in the De nuptiis.   
 
In the following chapter, we see how this allegorical significance was exploited again, and turned 
to polemical effect, by Alan of Lille.  Alan, a student of Chartres, who probably encountered 
Bernard there or at Tours, is widely regarded as Bernard’s literary successor.  Wetherbee states 
that his ‘career as a poet was largely defined by a sustained dialogue with the Cosmographia.’74  
Yet what should be observed, within this ‘sustained dialogue’, is his lively updating of the 
mechanical-demiurgic action of the Cosmographia – which in Alan’s opus works to caution a 
new breed of students, increasing in number from the 1160s, less concerned (to the alarm of 
Chartrians) to become cultus, than to be made doctus.75 
                                                        
74 Winthrop Wetherbee, Alan of Lille: Literary Works (Cambridge, MA 2013), p. xi. 
75 Gillian R. Evans, Old Arts and New Theology: The Beginnings of Theology as an Academic Discipline (Oxford 
1980), pp. 3 and 5. 
 76 
 
 
 
III. 
 
The Mechanical Arts in the De Planctu Naturae and Anticlaudianus of Alan of 
Lille 
Alan of Lille’s two major allegories are the De Planctu Naturae (‘Complaint of Nature’), and 
Anticlaudianus, completed in the 1160s and 1180s respectively.1  Like the Cosmographia, both 
can be described as ‘allegorical encyclopaedias’.  Alan (figure 11) seized on Bernard’s method 
of dramatising the process of learning – as a ‘re-making’ of nature – based ultimately on Plato’s 
Timaeus.  In doing so, he, like Bernard, deployed the language of the crafts in order to dramatise 
the ‘action’ of the liberal, or trivial arts.  His use of craft imagery is not unfamiliar to scholars.  
But, as with Bernard’s, it has not been a critical priority.2  It is yet to be recognised as an 
epistemological or encyclopaedic statement in its own right.  In this chapter, I argue it points to 
a preoccupation of this author with the allegorical and ‘poietic’ potential of the artes mechanicae, 
established for him in the Cosmographia, and implicit in the arts’ introduction to philosophy in 
the Didascalicon and commentary on the De nuptiis. 
 
In Alan’s works, however, the allegorical creation of the ‘mechanical’ liberal arts also acquires a 
new polemical tone and function, that sets it apart from these earlier iterations.  Writing around 
twenty years later than Bernard, Alan was apparently concerned not only to cast philosophy in 
its poietic guise, to envisage the ‘art’ required of the soul in philosophy – as Bernard had done – 
but also to admonish the student-reader who would ignore that paiedeic and ascetic model.  He 
was addressing a new breed of ‘professional’ schoolmen, growing in number in the second half 
of the twelfth century, who were less attuned to philosophy as a lifelong process, and 
soteriological enterprise, than they were to philosophy as an academic pursuit and ‘product’, split 
up into various ‘marketable’ specialisms, and oriented around qualifications.  Together, his 
allegories are a homage to the Cosmographia, but also an elaborate (at times entertaining) defense 
of the whole Platonic-Ciceronian view of learning, the cultura animi, that the Cosmographia had 
inscribed – now under threat from this new set of academic doctores.  To appreciate his 
                                                        
1 For Alan’s biography (of which we know little), see Gillian R. Evans, Alan of Lille: The Frontiers of Theology in 
the Later Twelfth Century (Cambridge, UK 1983) and Wetherbee’s ‘Introduction’ to Alan of Lille, pp. vii–x. 
2 The exception in Bernard’s case are the brief comments made by Brian Stock in Myth and Science.  There is no 
equivalent mention of the mechanical arts in the existing scholarship on Alan. 
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particular recruitment and reliance on the imagery of mechanica we have first to address his 
encounter with this new social type, and the less nuanced, more ends-oriented view of philosophy 
they had begun to promulgate. 
 
I. Trivial education from c. 1160 and John of Salisbury’s Metalogicon 
 
In this we are greatly assisted by the contemporaneous work of John of Salisbury – who seems 
to have studied alongside Alan of Lille at the School of Chartres in the 1140s.3  His Metalogicon, 
written in c. 1159 and addressed to Thomas Becket (whom John would later serve as secretary), 
is a treatise on education as then offered in the higher educational institutions of northern 
France.4  Charles Sears Baldwin called it ‘the cardinal treatise of medieval pedagogy’.5  Its chief 
and urgent aim was to refute the professionalisation of the arts gaining momentum from the 
1150s.  For John – as for Alan – the central and troubling issue, at the heart of this development, 
was the demotion of grammatical in favour of dialectical study.   
 
The title Metalogicon is of Greek derivation, ‘in accordance with a fad for Greek titles prevalent 
among twelfth-century writers’ (as we have already witnessed with the Didascalicon and 
Cosmographia).6  John invents a synthesis of μετα, (in this case) ‘about’ or ‘for’ and λογικων, 
‘logic’ or ‘logical studies’.7  ‘For, in it,’ he explains, ‘I undertake to defend logic’.8  As in the 
Didascalicon, ‘logic’ designates all three arts of the trivium – grammar, rhetoric, and dialectic 
(and is synonymous with ‘eloquence’).9  It is John’s goal to convince readers that the three trivial 
arts have to be taken together, and studied rigorously in succession.  Through them, and through 
them only, is one able to cultivate the psychological ‘method’ or methodon necessary for the 
                                                        
3 That John and Alan were ‘fellow-students’ is described as a ‘strong possibility’ by Gillian Evans in Alan of Lille, p. 
2. 
4 John was recalled to his native England from France in 1154, where he became secretary to Theobald, Archbishop 
of Canterbury. He dispatched his Metalogicon, along with his (better-known) book on political science, the 
Policraticus, to Becket (then chancellor to Henry II) in 1159.  Becket succeeded Theobald as Archbishop in 1161, 
and kept John on in his role of secretary.  John also became Becket’s closest counsellor. He returned to France later 
in life and became bishop of Chartres in 1176. 
5 Charles Sears Baldwin, Medieval Rhetoric and Poetic (to 1400) Interpreted from Representative Works (New 
York 1928), p. 155. 
6 Daniel D. McGarry, ‘Introduction’ to John of Salisbury, The Metalogicon: A Twelfth-Century Defense of the 
Verbal and Logical Arts of the Trivium (Philadelphia 2009), p. xxi.  I use McGarry’s translation throughout unless 
otherwise stated.  
7 Ibid.   
8 ‘Et quia logicae suscepi patrocinium, metalogicon inscriptus est liber…’. John of Salisbury, Metalogicon, Prologue, 
ed. Hall and Keats-Rohan, p. 10; trans. McGarry, p. 5. 
9 Above, p. 21.  John defends this designation at 1.10, Hall and Keats-Rohan, pp. 28–29; McGarry, pp. 32–33. 
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discovery of wisdom.10  Like Bernard, John is primarily concerned with the ‘psychological aspect 
of the philosopher’s experience’.11   
 
John establishes his argument, at the opening to the Metalogicon, by drawing on the ‘sacred 
theme’ of wisdom and eloquence: 
 
Just as eloquence, unenlightened by reason, is rash and blind, so wisdom, without 
the power of expression, is feeble and maimed … Reason, the mother, nurse, and 
guardian of knowledge would remain utterly barren, or at least would fail to yield a 
plenteous harvest, if the faculty of speech did not bring to light its feeble conceptions 
and communicate the perceptions of the prudent exercise of the human mind.12  
 
He explains how his own teachers at Chartres trained students to perfect and ‘oil’ this partnership 
of inner thought and outward expression.  He recalls, nostalgically, taking grammar under 
William of Conches, and rhetoric under Richard l’Evêque – classes he is likely to have shared 
with Alan.13  William and Richard each followed the methods of the ‘greatest font of literary 
learning in Gaul’, Bernard of Chartres – who had his students ‘compose prose and poetry every 
day, and exercise their faculties in mutual conferences [se mutuis exercebant collationibus]’, 
establishing a smooth path, as it were, between articulation and intellection (and back again).14   
 
But by the 1150s, this kind of rigorous trivial education had come under threat: 
 
But later, when popular opinion veered away from the truth, when men preferred to 
seem rather than to be philosophers, and when professors of the arts were promising 
to impart the whole of philosophy in less than three or even two years, William and 
Richard were overwhelmed by the onslaught of the ignorant mob, and retired.15 
                                                        
10 McGarry emphasises the importance of ‘psychological method’ to John of Salisbury in his introduction to the 
translation, p. xxii.  John also defines ars as methodon at 1.11, Hall and Keats-Rohan, p. 29; McGarry, p. 33. 
11 Wetherbee, Platonism and Poetry, p. 92.  Also cited in the Introduction, p. 10, and at p. 57. 
12 ‘Sicut enim eloquentia non modo temeraria est sed etiam caeca quam ratio non illustrat, sic et sapientia quae usu 
uerbi non proficit, non modo debilis est … Nam ratio scientiae uirtutumque parens, altrix et custos … aut omnino 
sterilis permaneret, aut quidem infecunda, si non conceptionis eius fructum in lucem ederet usus eloquii, et inuicem 
quod sentit prudens agitatio mentis hominibus publicaret.’  Metalogicon 1.1, Hall and Keats-Rohan, p. 13; McGarry, 
pp. 10–11. 
13 Metalogicon 1.24, Hall and Keats-Rohan, p. 54; McGarry, p. 71. 
14 ‘Bernardus Carnotensis, exundantissimus modernis temporibus fons litterarum in Gallia.’  Ibid. 1.24, Hall and 
Keats-Rohan, p. 52; McGarry, p. 67; ‘Et quia in toto praeexercitamine erudiendorum nihil utilius est quam ei quod 
fieri ex arte oportet assuescere, prosas et poemata cotidie scriptitabant, et se mutuis exercebant collationibus …’.  
Ibid. 1.24, Hall and Keats-Rohan, p. 54; McGarry, p. 70.   
15 ‘Sed postmodum ex quo opinio ueritati praeiudicium fecit, et homines uideri quam esse philosophi maluerunt, 
professoresque artium se totam philosophiam breuius quam triennio aut biennio transfusuros auditoribus 
pollicebantur, impetu multitudinis imperitae iucti cesserunt.’  Ibid.; McGarry, p. 71.   
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Since then, ‘less time and attention have been given to the study of grammar … without which it 
is futile [frustra] to go on to the others.  While other studies may contribute to “letters”, grammar 
alone has the unique privilege of making [facere] one “lettered”.’16   
 
Keeping to the sacred theme of wisdom and eloquence, but now adopting the dramatic, more 
affecting terms of Martianus’ De nuptiis, John imagines these professores artium, who ignore 
grammar and so the holistic study of eloquence, ‘thrusting asunder what God has joined 
together’.17  It is worth saying that while John is not an ‘allegorist’ like Bernard and Alan, as a 
student of Chartres, he moves easily in and out of such allegorical terms:18 
 
One who would eliminate the teaching of eloquence from philosophical studies, 
begrudges Mercury his possession of Philology, and wrests from Philology’s arms 
her beloved Mercury.  Although he may seem to attack eloquence alone, he 
undermines and uproots all liberal studies, assails the whole structure of philosophy, 
tears to shreds humanity’s social contract, and destroys the means of brotherly 
charity.’19 
 
The ‘one’ who would eliminate eloquence from philosophy, wrest Mercury from Philology, and 
in doing so tear down ‘the whole structure of philosophy’, is identified later by the pseudonym 
‘Cornificius’.20  John explains how Cornificius and his followers (the ‘Cornificians’) offer ‘crash 
courses’ in dialectic, which they market as an alternative to the holistic and laborious study of the 
                                                        
16 ‘Exinde autem minus temporis et diligentiae in grammaticae studio impensum est … sine qua frustra quis 
progredietur ad reliquas. Licet autem et aliae disciplinae ad litteraturam proficiant, haec tamen priuilegio singulari 
facere dicitur litteratum.’  Ibid. 
17 ‘… quod ad utilitatem omnium Deus coniunxit, nititur separare.’  Metalogicon 1.1, Hall and Keats-Rohan, p. 13; 
McGarry, p. 11.  An anonymous poem of the mid-twelfth century, thought to be by a Chartrian, and known as the 
Metamorphosis Goliae Episcopi, redramatised the wedding ceremony of the De nuptiis as though it was taking place 
in the milieu of the twelfth-century schools.  In the poem, Philology cannot find her groom, who has been ‘wrenched 
away’ (the author suggests) by abusers of language.  The poem is included in Latin Poems Attributed to Walter 
Mapes, ed. by Thomas Wright (London 1841), pp. 21-30.  For an analysis (which I was unable to offer here), see 
Wetherbee Platonism and Poetry, pp. 127–134.  
18 Where Hugh of Saint-Victor was perhaps more hesitant. 
19 ‘Mercurio Philologiam inuidet, et ab amplexu Philologiae Mercurium auellit qui eloquentiae praeceptionem a 
studiis philosophiae eliminat.  Et quamuis solam uideatur eloquentiam persequi, omnia liberalia studia conuellit, 
omnem totius philosophiae impugnat operam, societatis humanae foedus distrahit, et nullum caritati aut uicissitudini 
officiorum relinquit locum.’  Metalogicon 1.1, Hall and Keats-Rohan, p. 13; McGarry, p. 11. 
20 John blames the demise of grammar, and thus logic as a whole, on the puffed-up teaching of a so-called 
‘Cornificius’.  This is a pseudonym taken from Donatus’ Life of Vergil (since ‘I am restrained by reverence for his 
Christian name’, John says at 1.2).  However, historians have been unable to identify a single person to whom 
‘Cornificius’ might refer.  It seems more likely that John created this straw man for rhetorical reasons: ‘Cornificius’ 
and the ‘Cornificians’ can be read as referring to the (looser) group of new masters and logicians – ‘professional 
disputants’ – flourishing at Paris at the time of writing.  See Rosemary Barton Tobin’s article, ‘The Cornifician motif 
in John of Salisbury’s Metalogicon’, History of Education 13 (1984), pp. 1–6.  
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three verbal arts – and a surer, faster way into careers in academia, law, and medicine.  They 
produce ‘“fresh-baked” doctors’, he says, who ‘[have] spent more hours sleeping than awake in 
their study of philosophy, and [have] been educated with less expenditure of effort than those 
who, according to mythology, after sleeping on mount Parnassus immediately became 
prophets.’21  Now students, despising the traditional trivium, ‘speak only of “consistence” and 
“reason”, and the word “argument” [is] on the lips of all.’22   
 
The whole idea of mental exercise, of ‘making’ oneself wise or ‘lettered’ (facere litteratum) – an 
ideal enshrined in the marriage of wisdom and eloquence – is unfamiliar to this new type of 
scholar.  John sees in the decline of this ultimately paideic model a growing negligence of the 
natural world: ‘Can the secret and hidden recesses of nature be charted by one who is utterly 
ignorant of all philosophy?  Can they be understood by one who knows neither how to speak 
correctly, nor to comprehend what is written or spoken?’23  The Cornifician obsession with the 
terminology of argumentation means that ‘to mention any of the works of nature [operum 
naturae] is considered a crime, or improper, crude, and alien to a philosopher.’24  The exclusive 
(and distorted) practice of dialectic was dangerous largely because it bred a misconception that 
man had some ‘direct line’ to God.  Masters taught syllogistic reasoning as a means for 
ascertaining incontestable ‘truths’ about the essence and substance of the Trinity – totally 
bypassing the imaginative investigatio of the cosmos and domain of natura that had been the crux 
of philosophy in previous centuries.  Indeed, it was due to the rise of dialectic in this period that 
Theology would, eventually, emerge as an ars or discipline alongside the liberal arts within the 
medieval university – a development unimaginable in earlier medieval asceticism.25 
 
John’s defence of the grammatical basis of logic (and of philosophy) was also – inherently – an 
attempt to bring the arts ‘back down’, away from cavalier intervention into divine matters, to the 
                                                        
21 ‘Sed quid docebant noui doctores, et qui plus somniorum quam uigiliarum in scrutinio philosophiae 
consumpserant, et facilius institute quam illi iuxta narrationes fabulosas qui somniantes in Parnaso repente uates 
progrediebantur ...’.  Metalogicon 1.3, Hall and Keats-Rohan, p. 17; McGarry, p. 15. 
22 ‘Solam conuenientiam siue rationem loquebantur, argumentum sonabat in ore omnium.’  Ibid; McGarry, p. 16. 
23 ‘Nunquid enim naturae secretos latentesque cuniculos deprehendet homo totius philosophiae ignarus et qui nec 
recte loqui nouit, nec recte intelligere quae scripta sunt, aut quae dicuntur…?’  Ibid. 1.4, Hall and Keats-Rohan, p. 
19; McGarry, pp. 18–19. 
24 ‘… nominare … aut aliquid operum naturae, instar criminis erat, aut ineptum nimis aut rude, et a philosopho 
alienum …’.  Ibid. 1.3, Hall and Keats-Rohan, p. 17; McGarry, p. 16. 
25 This complex development, which I cannot unpack in depth here, is the subject of Gillian R. Evans’ Old Arts and 
New Theology.  I have also referred to the studies of Stephen Ferruolo, The Origins; Alexander Murray, Reason 
and Society in the Middle Ages (Oxford 1978); and Ian P. Wei, Intellectual Culture in Medieval Paris: Theologians 
and the University c. 1100–1330 (Cambridge, UK 2012).  
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articulation and imitation (the ‘excogitation’) of creation.  Grammar, John says, ‘While [it is] an 
invention of man, still it imitates nature [imitator naturam]’; through this art, ‘the devices of 
reason may cleave [cohaereat] even more closely to nature’.26  The language John uses here to 
describe the ‘attachment’ of language to nature recalls (perhaps deliberately) Bernard Silvestris’ 
emphasis on Mercury’s sensory wanderings through nature, and Aeneas’ descensus ad inferos, 
or ‘descent to earthly things through thought’ as the prerequisite to ‘marrying’ wisdom. 
 
John never makes explicit reference to the ‘mechanical arts’ in this defence.  Yet he seems to 
have recognised, like his forbears, their potential for describing the ‘mundane’ work of 
eloquence.  In elaborating on the ‘imitative’ character of grammar, he uses the language – and 
persona – of Hugh’s ‘mechanic’, joining and disjoining matter, precisely to picture the ideal, 
poietic activity of the grammarian (emboldened, of course, by the precedent set in the 
Cosmographia).  ‘In accordance with the divine plan, and in order to provide verbal intercourse 
in human society’, he writes,  
 
Man first of all named those things which lay before him, formed and fashioned by 
nature’s hand, and which she had joined and separated [compegerat et distinxerat] 
from the four elements or from matter and form, so that they could be discerned by 
the senses [sensibus] of rational creatures and have their diversity designated by 
names as well as by properties.27 
 
This passage implies a simultaneity between the ‘naming’ carried out by man, and the joining 
and disjoining which nature carries out.  Grammar, John suggests, continues the ‘fashioning’, the 
‘joining and separating’, ‘distinguens et compingens’ which nature begins.28  It discerns the order 
to her own workings, and ‘straightens out her circuitous wanderings’ (as he says earlier).29  John 
(drawing inevitably on Bernard) realises and naturalises the poietic implications of Hugh’s earlier 
description of the mechanical artist, ‘making sense’ of the opera of nature and God.  He 
computes mechanical art almost automatically as a figure for verbal art – for bringing out its 
                                                        
26 ‘Sed licet haec aliquatenus immo ex maxima parte ab hominum institutione processerit, naturam tamen imitatur 
…’. Metalogicon 1.14, Hall and Keats-Rohan, p. 33; McGarry, pp. 38–39; ‘Et ut familiarius rationis institutio naturae 
cohaereat…’ Ibid., Hall and Keats-Rohan, p. 34; McGarry, p. 40. 
27 ‘Homo enim ad exequendum diuinae dispensationis effectum, et ad instituendum inter homines uerbi 
commercium, rebus his primo uocabula indidit quae praeiacebant naturae manu formatae, et quas illa uel ex 
quattuor elementis uel ex materia et forma compegerat, et distinxerat, ut rationalis creaturae possent sensibus obici, 
earumque diuersitas sicut proprietatibus, sic et uocabulis insigniri.’  Ibid., Hall and Keats-Rohan, p. 33.  In this case 
the translation is my own. 
28 Hugh had used the latter verb compingere himself to describe the soul ‘put together’ from the parts of nature, 
compactam partibus naturae: above, p. 40 (Didascalicon 1.1, Buttimer, p. 4; Taylor, p. 46). 
29 ‘… et anfractuosum eius circuitum dirigat …’.  Metalogicon 1.11, Hall and Keats-Rohan, p. 29; McGarry, p. 33. 
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transformative and civilizing function.  For him, as for Bernard, the mechanical arts are a way of 
elaborating an ‘Orphic’ attitude to nature, exemplifying how we come to terms with nature 
through language and perception.   
 
However, in the wider context of his apologia, this exemplary use of mechanica is a rarity.  To 
find it systematically developed in response to the ‘half-baked’ Cornificians, we must turn to the 
works of his contemporary, and a closer follower of Bernard Silvestris, Alan of Lille.   
 
II. The De Planctu Naturae 
 
Alan’s De Planctu Naturae, or ‘Complaint of Nature’, postdates the Metalogicon by just a few 
years.  It is, in many ways, a sequel to the Cosmographia (as the Anticlaudianus is a sequel to the 
De Planctu).30  The setting is a cosmic one, and the principal character is Natura.  Whereas in 
the Cosmographia, Natura headed a team of artisans to order the cosmos (exemplifying the work 
of the soul, or author), in the De Planctu – as its title suggests – Natura complains of the demise 
of the cosmos, which, it emerges, can be interpreted as the fault of dialecticians’ failure to ‘order’ 
her.  Thus, the idea of the cosmos being ‘written’, implied in a reflexive way by the Cosmographia 
(following the Timaeus), is largely subsumed into the substance of the allegorical plot (and 
lament).31  Alan creates a drama, richer in narrative detail (if less subtle about its own poetic 
‘making’) of poiesis-gone-wrong.  The De Planctu is an eccentric fiction – exploitative of 
Bernard’s inventiveness – of what happens when the liberal or trivial artist does not ‘make sense’ 
of nature, when he fails to practise a ‘mechanical psychology’.  In this brief discussion, I attempt 
to show this by working chronologically, though far from exhaustively, through the metaphors 
which drive its (somewhat convoluted) narrative.32 
 
                                                        
30 Like the Cosmographia it takes the form of a prosimetrum.   
31 At the same time as Alan’s works imitate the poetic cosmologies, they predict the more plot-centred vernacular 
allegories of the thirteenth century.  In particular, the Roman de la Rose as extended by Jean de Meun (1270–1275) 
– which restaged Nature’s complaint at the same time as inaugurating a new literary tradition.  The De Planctu is 
almost ubiquitously included as a major influence in scholarship on the Roman – for example, in Jonathan Morton’s 
recent monograph The Roman de la Rose in its Philosophical Context (Oxford 2018), pp. 44–45 (and passim). For 
a broader introduction to the relationship between the traditions of Alan and Jean, see C. S. Lewis, The Allegory of 
Love: A Study in Medieval Tradition (Cambridge, UK 2013; first publ. 1936), pp. 55–194. 
32 Alan’s convoluted style is widely noted by scholars: for C. S. Lewis (previous note), it made him a writer ‘much 
more to blame than to praise’.  The Allegory of Love, p. 124.  In his more level-headed analysis, which cautions 
against Lewis’ rhetoric, Wetherbee also submits that Alan was overwhelmingly concerned with ‘stylistic ingenuity’ 
which often makes his works ‘conventional, devoid of the sense of mystery that pervades Bernardus’ cosmology’.  
Wetherbee, Alan of Lille, p. xxxv. 
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One of the poem’s distinguishing elements – which enables the more explicit references to 
education – is the inclusion of a human narrator, to whom Natura directs her complaint, and 
gives her verdict and penalty (the allegory’s end and climax).  The text itself opens in this 
narrator’s voice, essentially a mouthpiece for Alan, as he blames the apparent disappearance of 
Natura (in the vein of John of Salisbury) on man who is ‘too much the logician’.33  This is evoked 
through the imagery of the artes mechanicae: the logician (meaning the ‘limited’ dialectician), the 
narrator says, ‘strikes an anvil that mints no seed; the very hammer detests its anvil.  No idea sets 
its seal on the matter of the womb; instead the plow makes furrows in barren ground.’34   
 
Importantly, throughout the De Planctu, Natura invokes mechanical art – plowing, forging – in 
a way that is more concrete and quotidian than anything found in the Cosmographia.  We would 
never come across a blacksmith in the Cosmographia: the verbal art of man was implicated purely 
in the cosmic ‘craft’ of demiurgic personifications.  In his less tightly reflexive sequel, Alan plays 
more daringly with the whole idea that nature is realised in – and subject to – ‘ordinary craft’.  
Natura becomes the plaything of manifestly human arts, open to human slippage and misuse.35  
Indeed later, Natura corroborates the narrator’s complaint, lamenting that, 
 
The human race, fallen away from its noble origin, is barbarous in its construction 
of gender and practices a most irregular metaplasm … he [man] shows himself a 
writer of sophistic falsehood … He works my destruction by such constructions, and 
his combinations threaten to divide me.36 
 
This final line, ‘he works my destruction by such constructions’ and ‘his combinations threaten 
to divide me’, is a knowing and clever reversal of the idealising language of the mechanical artist 
‘joining and disjoining’ natural materials used by Hugh, and metaphorically for the 
writer/grammarian by both Bernard and John.  It makes a dramatic set-piece of John’s reproach 
that the Cornificians fail to ‘cleave to nature’, to straighten her out (or make her intelligible).   
                                                        
33 ‘Hic nimis est logicus …’ Alan of Lille, De Planctu Naturae 1.26; Wetherbee, Alan of Lille, pp. 24–25.  All 
subsequent page references for Alan’s works refer to this edition. 
34 ‘… cudit in incude quae semina nulla monetat; horret et incudem malleus ipse suam.  Nullam materiem matricis 
signat idea, sed magis in sterili litore vomer alat.’  Ibid. 1.26–31. 
35 Alan’s transformation of Natura into a human construct (meant polemically in the De Planctu) had far-reaching 
implications for her characterisation in later thirteenth-century allegories (see just above, n. 31).  For these later 
‘Natures’ which are beyond the scope of this thesis see Kellie Robertson, Nature Speaks: Medieval Literature and 
Aristotelian Philosophy (Philadelphia 2017). 
36 ‘Humanum namque genus a sua generositate degenerans, in constructione generum barbarizans … irregulari utitur 
metaplasmo…sophista falsigraphus invenitur … Dumque in tali constructione me destruit, in sua synaeresi mei 
themesim machinatur.’  De Planctu Naturae 8.8; Wetherbee, pp. 92–95.  This passage comes later in the text, but 
it helps to introduce the meaning of the drama here. 
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In addition, both these descriptions of botched mechanical art (by the narrator, and then by 
Natura) allude to sexual transgression (the ‘hammer detests the anvil’; ‘the human race is 
barbarous in its construction of gender’) – epitomised, for Alan, by homosexual intercourse.  A 
sexual metaphor for the trivium runs throughout the De Planctu, alongside and through the 
mechanical metaphor (while it is abandoned in the Anticlaudianus).37  Broadly, this metaphor 
serves to reinforce how ‘ethics and grammar commingle’.38  More specifically, it can be seen as a 
second, and interrelated, way of dramatising the verbal arts as poietic arts, that should imitate and 
perpetuate nature’s creativity.  It allows Alan to illustrate the practice of the trivium veering from 
a ‘natural’ and ‘imitative’ reproductive course, to an unproductive one (that ‘mints no seed’).  
 
The poietic lesson is developed, on Natura’s arrival, through an extended mechanical metaphor 
for verbal artistry – as weaving, or fabric making.  The narrator, struck by the ‘joyous effect of 
her beauty’, details Natura’s exquisite appearance and ornamentation, with emphasis on her 
various, subtly-woven robes, showing the full varietas of creation.39  He does so in a distinctly 
‘writerly’ way: the narrator’s description of Natura describes the verbal integumentum the 
narrator, or Alan himself, is ‘weaving’ – teasing the reader that the ‘Nature’ of the fiction is a 
fiction, sewn together by the poet in the process of writing.  The passage is also an elaboration of 
Heraclitus’ ancient aphorism, at the centre of Pierre Hadot’s study, that ‘nature loves to hide’ or 
‘wrap herself up’ in fictions (a view which in many ways anticipated the Timaeus).40  In Alan’s 
allegory, the robes serve to idealise the narrator (and philosopher generally) as a poietes, imitating 
and transforming nature – as an ‘Orphic’ mechanical artist.  But there is also, predictably, a 
problem with the robes – caused by the un-imitative, unmechanical art of dialecticians. 
 
Her outer two garments depict the creatures of the air and sea – described with an amplified 
realism that harks back to Homeric ekphrases.41  The narrator marvels at length at the subtle 
                                                        
37 Exclusive analysis of this metaphor and its sources can be found elsewhere.  I am particularly indebted to the 
discussion of its Stoic roots by Jeffrey Bardzell, Speculative Grammar and Stoic Language Theory in Medieval 
Allegorical Narrative: From Prudentius to Alan of Lille (New York 2009), while the most extensive study is Jan 
Ziolkowski’s Alan of Lille’s Grammar of Sex: The Meaning of Grammar to a Twelfth-Century Intellectual 
(Cambridge, MA 1985).  More recently, the theme has been taken up by Jonathan Morton, in ‘Ingenious Genius: 
Invention, Creation, Reproduction in the High Middle Ages’, L’Esprit Créateur 55, 2 (Summer 2015), pp. 4–19. 
38 Bardzell, Speculative Grammar, p. 97. 
39De Planctu Naturae 2.5; Wetherbee, pp. 30–31. 
40 Above, Introduction, p. 16.   
41 For example, the cosmos-within-a-cosmos of Achilles’ shield, Iliad 18.478–608 – one of the earliest expressions 
of the idea of writing as world-making, poiesis, that Plato would systematise in the Timaeus. 
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construction of these garments, almost miraculously ‘without seam’, inconsutiliter.42  Beneath 
them, closest to the maiden’s body, is a damask tunic, which ‘sought to represent [faciem 
aspirabat] the appearance of earthly life’.43   
 
On the most prominent part of this garment Man, casting off [deponens] the dulling 
effect of sensuality [sensualitas], probed into the mysteries of heaven [caeli 
penetrabat archana], borne along a straight path by his rational faculty [directa 
ratiocinationis aurigatione].  But in this part the tunic had been torn apart 
[discidium], and clearly revealed the abuse it had suffered.  Elsewhere, however, its 
parts were joined in elegant and unbroken harmony [eleganti continuatione 
concordes], and suffered from no divisive misalignment.44 
 
The Man shown on the tunic seems intended as a kind of Adam-figure.  According to one 
reading, he might be prelapsarian Man, looking directly to the skies without need of his senses.  
The tear represents the loss of this privileged relationship.45  But Alan is also alluding, of course, 
to a second Fall – the Fall from grammar and poiesis – which man had developed precisely to 
bridge relations after the Fall of Genesis.  This Man, who casts off sense and tries to penetrate 
the secrets of heaven, can also be read as one of the new, misguided dialecticians, who assume a 
‘direct line’ to God (like Adam), unsatisfied with the more arduous reworking of materia the 
trivial arts demand.  Indeed, in a later speech addressed to the narrator, which echoes this image, 
the goddess says that ‘the course of [men’s] thinking strays too freely when it dares to raise [its] 
discourse to the ineffable mysteries of the divine.’46  Those who do so, ‘compel me, me whom 
they should invest with honour and reverence, to present myself, bereft of clothing, in the lewd 
fashion of a prostitute.’47  This language of rapacity and fracture echoes John of Salisbury’s 
                                                        
42 De Planctu Naturae 2.25; Wetherbee, pp. 44–45. 
43 ‘… in terrestris elementi faciem aspirabat.’  Ibid. 2.28; Wetherbee, pp. 48–49. 
44 ‘In huius vestis parte primaria homo, sensualitatis deponens segnitiem, directa ratiocinationis aurigatione caeli 
penetrabat archana. In qua parte tunica, suarum partium passa discidium, suarum iniuriarum contumelias 
demonstrabat. In reliquis tamen locis partes, eleganti continuatione concordes, nullam divisionis in se sustinebant 
discordiam.’  Ibid. 
45 Alan is drawing (and elaborating) on the tear motif in Boethius’ Consolatio Philosophiae.  As the narrator of this 
allegory encountered the figure Philosophia – and her gowns showing the ‘ladder’ of the arts ‘which one might climb 
from lower to upper’ (see figure 4) – he also observed that ‘some ruffians had done violence to her elegant dress, 
and clearly bits of the fabric had been torn away’.  Boethius, The Consolation of Philosophy, trans. by David R. 
Slavitt (Cambridge, MA 2008), p. 3.  Later in Book 1, Prose 3, Philosophy explains the meaning of this image: 
certain people have ill-used philosophy in the past, trying to make it theirs by force and claiming they are 
philosophers without the proper training.  The problem of ‘false philosophers’ and reckless grammarians was clearly 
a problem throughout the centuries, and Alan as well as John had a stock of polemical imagery which they could 
develop (in this case, for example, Alan uses the robe motif simultaneously to illustrate Heraclitus’ aphorism and 
the Chartrian concept of integumentum). 
46 ‘… iam nimis nostrae ratiocinationis series evagatur quae ad ineffabile deitatis archanum tractatum audit attolere.’ 
Ibid. 6.9; Wetherbee, pp. 74–75.  
47 ‘… et quam reverentiae deberunt honore vestire, me vestibus orphantam quantum in ipsis est cogunt meretricaliter 
lupanare.’  Ibid. 8.24; Wetherbee, pp. 104–105. 
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language for the ‘wrenching’ of Mercury from Philology, eloquence from wisdom.  It is, of course, 
the same (impossible) divorce, of ‘outer’ word and ‘inner’ idea, which Alan is picturing.  Natura’s 
‘secret recesses’ (her sapientia) demand the ‘fabulations’, fabulosis, of eloquence, which she calls 
later, ‘a sort of elegant stitching’, quadam eleganti sutura.48  Without such ‘fabulations’, she 
dissolves into nothingness.  There is no kernel of truth ‘beneath’ her woven robes, Alan stresses 
(and teases).  The tear reveals nothing except disorder.  Natura’s ‘truth’ – and ultimately the truth 
of the Creator – lies in coming to terms with her surface through sense and language.   
 
Indeed, when the narrator finally gets to the most intimate equipment of her feet and 
underclothing, he acknowledges his ignorance, using almost exactly the ‘apophatic’ words used 
by Plato’s Timaeus at the opening to his demiurgic account of nature.49  ‘Since my knowledge of 
the plan of these images is only slippery conjecture [probabilitatis lubrico] not confident certainty 
[non certitudinis fide]’, he says, ‘I leave the matter to rest in quiet peace.’50  The virtuous 
philosopher acknowledges his limitation to imaginative explanations of divine things – to crafting 
an eikos mythos, (or mediocris explanatio) from his sensations.51  He realises the truthfulness of 
his conjecture. 
 
Once the ‘incantation’ of her robes is over, Natura introduces herself to the narrator, and explains 
she has ‘descended to the darkness of this perishable earthly world’: ‘to deliver to you, as my 
intimate confidant, my lamentation and plaint, and determine with you what sort of penalty ought 
to be assigned in response to so many criminal charges’ (i.e. the ‘perversion’ of the trivium).52  
The laxities and transgressions of the contemporary student are framed, as before, in the terms 
of metalworking, or minting, we encountered briefly in the narrator’s opening criticisms.   
 
To determine and justify her penalty, Natura gives a kind of autobiography – explaining how she 
was appointed by God as his ‘vice-regent’, ‘to stamp out the images of things, each on its own 
                                                        
48 Ibid. 8.18; Wetherbee, pp. 100–101. 
49 Above, p. 11. 
50 ‘… sed quoniam solius probabilitatis lubrico, non certitudinis fide, huius seriem picturationis agnovi, hanc sub 
silentii pace sepultam praetereo.’ Ibid. 2.34; Wetherbee, pp. 52–53.  
51 For these references to Plato and Calcidius, see above, p. 11. 
52 ‘… ideo enim a supernis caelestis regiae secretariis egrediens, ad huius caducae terrenitatis occusum deveni, ut de 
execrabilibus hominum excessibus tecum, quasi cum familiari et secretario meo, querimoniale lamentum 
deponerem, tecumque decernerem tali criminum oppositioni qualis debeat poenae dari responsio …’.  De Planctu 
Naturae 8.13; Wetherbee, pp. 98–99. 
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anvil.’53  She explains she was never ‘to allow what was formed to deviate from the form impressed 
at the forge.’54  ‘Assimilating similar to similar’, she ‘rendered the aspects of individual creatures 
according to their exemplars’.55  The metallic material Natura impresses at her anvil echoes 
Bernard’s Silva in the Cosmographia.  Alan’s language recalls, specifically, the language Calcidius 
had used for silva (his translation for hyle)– which ‘changes in accordance with the different, even 
contrary, species and forms of what it receives within itself’.56  And as with the concept of silva, 
Natura’s metal stands simultaneously for the materia (the ‘draft’) of the text, being moulded by 
the writer.  This meaning becomes clear as Natura shifts to the language of verbal art: despite her 
best efforts at the ‘forge’, ‘the pen with which I write would veer into sudden transgressions were 
it not guided by the finger of the supreme governor’.57  This risk of transgression can be read as 
a risk posed by man: as with the torn robe, Alan is characterising Natura through the lens of 
human malpractice.  The threat of her ‘veering’ from the path set her by the finger of God 
represents the threat of dialecticians veering in their ‘crafting’ of her.   
 
Dramatising further her slip into idle hands, Natura goes on to describe how she took on a vice-
vice-regent, so that she might herself ‘sojourn in the delightful palace of the ethereal region’.58  
This assistant is Venus, who – as the goddess of romantic love, and wife of Vulcan – should be 
‘well versed in the art of the forge’.59  Natura passes on to Venus the rules of all the trivial arts 
which must govern her fashioning.60  First, ‘in her connections [constructionem], she should 
follow the canonical constructions of the art of grammar’, only ever joining masculine to 
feminine, hammer to anvil.61  Innovation is firmly prohibited.  Here we come, essentially, full 
circle back to the narrator’s initial complaint of man’s descent into bad verbal practice (imagined 
as bad sexual practice).  Venus represents man’s charge – from the beginning of time – to study 
                                                        
53 ‘… propriis incudibus rerum effigies commonetans …’.  Ibid. 13.29; Wetherbee, pp. 108–109.  Alan could be seen 
to be elaborating here on Hugh of Saint-Victor’s use of minting as an image for the maturation of the soul, at 
Didascalicon 1.1 (Taylor p. 47; and above, Chapter One, p. 43).   
54 ‘… ab incudis forma formatum deviare non sinerem …’. Ibid. 
55 ‘ex conformibus conformando conformia, singularum rerum vultus reddidi sigillatis.’ Ibid. 8.30; Wetherbee, pp. 
110–111. 
56 ‘… diversis tamen et contrariis speciebus eorum quae intra se recipit formisque variatur.’  Calcidius, On Plato’s 
Timaeus, Commentary 13.268, Magee, pp. 544–545. 
57 ‘… quia meae scripturae calamus exorbitatione subita deviaret.’ De Planctu Naturae 8.30; Wetherbee, pp. 110–
111. 
58 ‘… meque in aethereae regionis amoenante palatio placuit commorari’.  Ibid. 8.31. 
59 ‘… in fabrili scientia conpertam…’.  (I follow Wetherbee’s translation; a more literal translation would be ‘versed 
in the discipline of the artificer’).  Ibid.  Alan’s characterisation of Venus is a play on her mythical role as the (only 
partly faithful) wife of Vulcan, god of fire and metalwork – from whom she presumably learned her (dubious) skill. 
60 Ibid. 10.3–10; Wetherbee, pp. 123–131. 
61 ‘… ut in suis connectionibus artis gramaticae constructiones canonicas observaret …’.  Ibid. 10.3; Wetherbee, pp. 
122–123. 
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language and philosophy reproductively and poietically.   She also represents, of course, his 
failure to do so:   
 
Ennobled by this distinctive equipment, Venus entered into possession of her earthly 
domain.  Labouring strenuously [desudando laborans] with the aid of these 
instruments to continue the sequence of human generation, she carefully rejoined 
[renodabat] what had been severed [intersecta] … But since the mind, wearied by 
sameness … grows disdainful … the effect of continual work took away her desire to 
work.  Preferring, then, an effete life of sterile idleness to the exertion of fruitful labor 
[fructuosis exerceri laboribus], ignoring her responsibility for the work of maintaining 
the continuity of life … she lapsed into childish indiscretion.62   
 
This description – particularly its latter half – would not be out of place in the Metalogicon.  
Venus’ lapse is clearly intended as an allegory for those doctores of argumentation criticised by 
John for spending ‘more hours sleeping than awake in their study of philosophy’ and being 
educated with almost no ‘expenditure of effort’.  Alan's word for mechanical exertion (or lack of 
it) is exercitium, recalling the refusal of students to ‘exercise the faculties in mutual conferences’, 
‘mutuis exercebant collationibus’, that was a hallmark of the classes of Bernard of Chartres.   
 
Once her biography is over, we move towards a resolution of the problem, and the (slightly 
hesitant) promise of a return to earlier, paideic practice. Natura concludes her speech with the 
verdict of excommunication for dialecticians (the followers of Venus).  For this she requires the 
help of Genius, her alter ego, alter sibi, and ‘priest’.63  He is presented as Venus’ flipside – the 
more reproductive aspect of Natura’s creativity (or of man’s creativity, in ‘making sense’ of her).  
He appears working as a ‘good demiurge’, rather like Bernard’s Physis (who ‘applied her 
ingenium’ to Silva), bringing the forms of creatures into being from mere ‘shadow’ to ‘the truth 
of their essential nature’.64  He does so with a pen, working on vellum – yet another of Alan’s 
characteristically blatant references to writing and the verbal arts.  Genius is, of course, ‘making 
sense’ of creation as man should.  In the context of the story, he represents the potential of man 
to turn away from the example of Venus, back to an imitative, poietic way of life and relationship 
with nature. (His use of ‘vellum’ may even be a way of signalling his ‘integumental’ practice).    
                                                        
62 ‘Hiis apparatuum nobilitata praesignibus Venus terrestris incolatus cessit in patriam.  Quae cum suis suffraganeis 
instrumentis ad humanae geneseos seriem contexendam desudando laborans … intersecta … renodabat … Sed 
quoniam … idemptitate fastiditus animus indignatur … continuataeque laborationis effectus laborandi seclusit 
affectum. Illa igitur magis appetens otiis effeminari sterilibus quam fructuosis exerceri laboribus, serialis operationis 
exercitatione negotiali postposita, nimiae otiositas enervata desidiis coepit infantiliter iuvenari.’  Ibid. 10.10; 
Wetherbee, pp. 130–131. 
63 Ibid. 16.25; Wetherbee; pp. 194–195.  
64 ‘... ab umbra … ad veritatem suae essentiae transmigrantes …’.  Ibid. 18.7; Wetherbee, pp. 206–207.   
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However, where Physis personified an ideal of intellectual craft, the mind successfully shaping 
itself to nature, Alan’s Genius is not – after all – entirely free of the influence of Venus.  When 
his left hand takes over from his right, he strays into falsigraphia (a perversion of his earlier 
‘cosmographia’).  It takes Natura’s ‘personal’ and instructive presence to remind him of his 
imitative responsibility, for him to experience ‘the newborn day of his eloquence’.65  With this 
recovered eloquence, he pens the excommunication, against those who ‘seek to render our laws 
obsolete’.66  And on that note the allegory ends.   
 
Through the figure of Genius, Alan places the final onus on the psychology and willpower of his 
reader.  The restoration of a poietic and ‘mechanical’ approach to the trivium will rest, ultimately, 
on individuals’ power to resist idle argumentation, and to recollect – through the exercise of their 
own ingenium – their duty to the goddess Natura. 
 
III. The Anticlaudianus  
 
Alan’s Anticlaudianus, written around twenty years later, allegorises this very endeavour.  In that 
sense it is a sequel to the De Planctu, or an extended, ‘alternative ending’ to that work’s rather 
ambivalent resolution in the act of excommunication.  It describes the convening of a sacred 
council, headed again by Natura, to discuss ‘a unique means of relief from so great a plague’ – 
this plague being the current state of humanity.67  This time the council decides, following 
Natura’s suggestion, on the creation of a wholly New Man, homo novus, to right the wrongs of 
his predecessors.68  The formation of this man becomes a metaphor for intellectual formation, 
                                                        
65 ‘… suae excalamationis quasi aurora nascente …’.  Ibid. 18.14; Wetherbee, pp. 212–213. 
66 ‘… nostras leges obsoletas reddere ...’.  Ibid. 18.13. 
67 Natura announces to a congregation of personifications, ‘I have conceived a unique means of relief from so great 
a plague, but I will not speak of its implementation before our thought is tested by the standard of your judgement.’ 
(‘Unica coniecto tantae solatia pestis, quae tamen effectu describere nolo, priusquam norma iudicii vestri mens 
nostra probetur.’)  Anticlaudianus 1.225–227; Wetherbee, pp. 242–243. 
68 The title Anticlaudianus is a reference to the In rufinum of the fourth-century poet Claudian.  This told the story 
of infernal powers inflicting the terrible Rufinus on the world – who after much suffering, is cast deep into hell.  The 
Anticlaudianus (as its prefix implies) is a reversal of Claudian’s tale, describing heavenly powers’ creation of a new 
and perfect man who will restore peace to the world.  For further analysis of Alan’s use of Claudian and Rufinus, 
see Linda E. Marshall, ‘The Identity of the “New Man” in the “Anticlaudianus” of Alan of Lille, Viator 10 (1979), 
pp. 77–94, at 77.  Marshall’s article is otherwise concerned with the possibility Alan’s ‘New Man’ was conceived not 
only as an ideal but living man, Philip II Augustus of France (crowned in 1180) – come to correct the mistakes of 
the Plantagenets and their supporters.  Without claiming an exact identity for the New Man, James Simpson notes 
that he is both a student of philosophy and a ‘ruler very definitely in, and governing, a society’ (Simpson, Sciences 
and the Self, p. 59).  
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or intellectual pilgrimage: it can be read as a realisation of the intellectual onus set on man by 
Genius in the De Planctu.69  The drama of the Anticlaudianus is more straightforwardly 
‘encyclopaedic’ and edificatory than the De Planctu.  Its vision is more optimistic, and in this 
sense closer to the works of Hugh and Bernard, and particularly Martianus Capella.70  It also 
involves – in its narration of the intellectual ‘correction’ of man – the most spectacular and 
assured allegorisation of the ‘mechanical’ liberal arts in the literature covered by this study.   
 
The work begins with a Prose Prologue, in which Alan gives a self-conscious account of the 
crafted nature of the work – ‘the failings of the artefact’ – and warns off those without the 
willpower and ingenium to interpret it accordingly, as an act of poiesis, or allegoresis.71  ‘Mysteries 
are dishonoured’, he warns, ‘if their majesty is revealed to the unworthy’.72  The reader must work 
past the ‘sensory appeal of imagery’ with his own ‘file of correction’, lima correctionis.73  This is 
another play on Timaeus’ caveat, that the demiurge represents his own conjectural craft.  And as 
in the Timaeus, where the story dramatises or ‘enacts’ the poietic approach of the speaker, Alan’s 
story of the formation of man, which takes place over the first half of the Anticlaudianus, can be 
read as an image for the correct approach to the arts demanded in its opening.74  The careful 
reader will find that in this story ‘may be heard the rules of grammar, the terms of dialectic, the 
commonplaces of rhetoric, the paradoxes of arithmetic, the harmonies of music, the axioms of 
geometry, the linear theorems, the surpassing dignity of astronomy, the maxims of divine 
theophany.’75   
                                                        
69 Wetherbee concludes his analysis of the De Planctu in roughly similar terms, suggesting that ‘the restoration of 
man to his original dignity, his proprius status, is the work performed, theoretically at least, in the Anticlaudianus.’ 
‘Introduction’ to Alan of Lille, p. xxviii. 
70 Its optimism might reflect Alan’s state of mind at an older age, both more nostalgic for the past and more hopeful 
for the future.  Its more instructive character also ensured it enormous success (far greater than the success of the 
De Planctu).  It was quick to receive commentaries in the thirteenth century, by Alan’s own pupil Ralph of 
Longchamps (c. 1212–1213), and by William of Auxerre.  The fullest accounts of these commentaries are given in 
Christel Meier’s ‘Die Rezeption des Anticlaudianus Alans von Lille in Textkommentierung und Illustration’, in Text 
und Bild: Aspekte des Zusammenwirkens zweier Kiinste in Mittelalter undfruher Neuzeit, ed. by Chistel Meier 
(Wiesbaden 1980), pp. 408–549; and Marc-René Jung, ‘Études sur le poème allégorique en France au moyen âge’, 
Romanica Helvetica 82 (Bern 1971).  See also Robert Earl Kaske, Medieval Christian Literary Imagery: A Guide 
to Interpretation, Toronto Medieval Bibliographies 11 (Toronto 1988), pp. 89–113. 
71 ‘... sed quamvis artificii enormitas imperitiam accuset artificis ...’.  Anticlaudianus Prose Prologue 2; Wetherbee, 
pp. 220–221. 
72 ‘... ne derogetur secretis si eorum maiestas divulgetur indignis.’  Ibid. 4; Wetherbee, pp. 222–223. 
73 ‘... sensualitatis … imaginem …’.  Ibid.  Accordingly, in the earliest commentary on the Anticlaudianus by Ralph 
de Lonchamps (above, note 70), the author says his gloss has two motivations: first, to render Alan’s allegory ‘easier 
of access’, and second, to exercise his own ingenium.  Noted by Simpson, Sciences and the Self, p. 22. 
74 See, for example, Wetherbee’s ‘Introduction’ to Alan of Lille, p. xxxi: ‘the first half of the Anticlaudianus depicts 
the intellectual perfection attainable through the liberal arts and the origin of the soul’.   
75 ‘Quoniam igitur in hoc opera resultat grammaticae syntaseos regula, dialecticae lexeos maxima, oratoriae reseos 
communis sententia, arismeticae matheseos paradoxa, musicae melos, anxioma geometriae, gramatis theorema, 
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The narrative which promises to demonstrate these principles of the arts (trivial and quadrivial), 
begins with Natura convening her celestial council.  She advises, as a means of relief from the 
‘great plague’: ‘Let a man who does not reek of earthly foulness, a man not material but divine, 
dwell on earth through our efforts, and console us for our injuries.’76  But there is a hitch: ‘our 
hands lack the strength for so great a work’, she says.  The New Man’s soul must be the work of 
God Himself.  Wisdom, or Sapientia (often also called Providence), is the only one present who 
is fit to seek His help.77  Only she ‘no multitude of labours can make weary’.78  Further, ‘so that 
her feet may encounter no stumbling block – in short, that she may accomplish quickly the 
impending mission, Wisdom decreed that a chariot be fashioned [currum … excudi], in which 
she may traverse the heavens, the sea, the stars.’79   
 
The Latin for ‘chariot’, currus, is a pun on ‘curriculum’.  It is built by the Seven Liberal Arts and 
driven by Reason.  Its construction and journey are the events I wish to focus on here.  But 
before doing so, we should note this episode does not form the ‘end’ of the Anticlaudianus.80  At 
the outer reaches of heaven – as we will see – the chariot is left behind, and Providence, or 
Sapientia, is forced to continue alone on foot.  After much trepidation, she reaches the divine 
court, aided by Faith and Theology, and retrieves the soul from God.  She descends back to 
earth, the New Man is created, and after a battle in which the Virtues defeat the Vices, the New 
Man inherits the earth.81   
                                                        
astronomicae ebdomadis excellentia, theophaniae caelestis emblema …’.  Anticlaudianus 5; Wetherbee, pp. 224–
225. 
76 ‘… unica coniecto tantae solatia pestis … Non terrae faecem redolens, non materialis sed divinus homo nostro 
molimine terras incolat et nostris donet solatia damnis.’  Ibid. 1.225–237; Wetherbee, pp. 242–243. 
77 She is called by both names, Providentia and Sapientia – as well as by Fronesis, and occasionally Sophia and 
Minerva.  See Wetherbee’s note for lines 270–271, p. 587, where he notes that, despite her ‘disconcerting’ multitude 
of names, ‘she is above all the personification of a human wisdom which encompasses not only the universal 
knowledge represented by the Liberal Arts but also theology.’  For this reason, I use Sapientia to refer to her, which 
also helps emphasise her relationship to the Philology (also known as wisdom) of De nuptiis. 
78 ‘Prudentia, cuius debellare nequit virtutem turba laborum ...’. Anticlaudianus 2.96–98; Wetherbee, pp. 266–267.  
79 That is, Wisdom or Providence.  ‘Utque minus possit gressus vexare viantis limitis asperitas, pes scandala nesciat, 
immo ut citius possit munus complere quod instat, in quo percurrant caelum mare sidera, currum imperat excudi 
Sapientia.’  Ibid. 2.317–321; Wetherbee, pp. 282–283.  
80 The ultimate source for the chariot metaphor is the Phaedrus of Plato (c. 370 BC), which imagined the pre-
incarnate soul being shown the Eternal Ideas from a chariot (which it then recollects once ‘living’ in a body).  Alan 
had no direct access to this dialogue, but seems to have known it through other conduits, primarily perhaps through 
references in Boethius’ Consolatio Philosophiae (e.g. 246a; 247b).  It would interrupt the present argument to 
compare and contrast Plato’s ‘original’ with Alan’s hyperbolic reworking.  For this, readers can refer to the study of 
the chariot – its classical, biblical, and medieval incarnations – by Karlfried Froehlich, with the collaboration of Mark 
S. Burrows, Sensing the Scriptures: Aminadab’s Chariot and the Predicament of Biblical Interpretation (Grand 
Rapids, MI 2014), pp. 14 and 22 (and passim). 
81 My summary is based roughly on Wetherbee’s: ‘Introduction’ to Alan of Lille, p. xxviii. 
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Despite the number of events which follow the chariot’s ascent, its construction and journey are 
often thought of as the allegory’s centrepiece – even its climax.  Wetherbee has observed that 
‘Alan has clearly devoted far more care to the voyage of Providence, and what follows can seem 
mechanical, a separate poem robbed of dramatic energy’.82  Similarly, James Simpson has seen 
this first part of the poem, the ascent of Providence (which receives six books’ description in 
total, where the descent and battle receive three) as containing the allegory’s central lesson – even 
going so far as to suggest ‘we should read the poem in reversed order’ so that the chariot and 
ascent become the allegory’s conclusion.83  My focus on this part of the text can thus be seen to 
be in keeping with its privileging by previous expert readers. 
 
To begin at the chariot’s construction: the seven Liberal Arts charged with this task appear as if 
revived from their earlier, canonical personification in De nuptiis.84  As the Liberal Arts prepared 
Philology for immortality in Martianus’ text, here they prepare Sapientia for immortality by 
constructing her currus.  They are again positioned as propaedeutic to salvation.  Only now, they 
are personified, it is possible to argue, as mechanical artists, charged with manual work.  The 
metaphorical significance of Eriugena’s artes mechanicae, added to Martianus’ marriage, 
arguably as a way of glossing the ‘human devising’ proper to eloquence and the liberal arts, is 
allegorically ‘accomplished’ here in Alan’s allegory.  The chariot can be read I think, from one 
perspective, as the culminative expression of the psychological crossover of the mechanical and 
liberal (or trivial), which draws on and combines the lessons of Eriugena, Hugh, Bernard, and 
the De Planctu. 
 
The construction alone lasts nearly eight hundred lines, over two books (of a total of nine).  Alan 
describes, in minute detail, the separate efforts of the individual Arts, as they come forward to 
compose their assigned component.  In each case, ‘there is no disharmony between thought and 
action, nor between mind and hand’ (‘Non mens discordat ab actu, non a mente manus.’).85  The 
Arts thus follow the model of Genius over Venus, and, more distantly, Bernard’s Physis.  Like 
both Genius and Physis, they idealise the growth of the soul (the chariot will ‘carry’) from material 
reworking – the dependence of the mind on the ‘all-creative hands’ of sense.  Alan hammers 
                                                        
82 Wetherbee, ‘Introduction’ to Alan of Lille, p. xxxi. 
83 Simpson, Sciences and the Self, p. 66.  This argument is laid out across three chapters of his book (two to four), 
pp. 22–91. 
84 I capitalise the Liberal Arts to distinguish the personifications (from the disciplines). 
85 Anticlaudianus 2.376–377; Wetherbee, pp. 284–285. 
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home this point in his description of Grammar – naturally the first of the sisters to confront her 
materia: 
 
Untroubled by any fear of her burden, she goes vigorously to work, and at length her 
material, though very resistant [multumque rebellis], is conquered and obeys her will 
… Now playing the role of artisan [mentita fabrum], she employs the artisan’s 
weapons [fabrilibus utitur armis], conquers her unformed material, and compels 
unwilling matter to obey her [servire sibi]; she tames the stubbornness of wood and 
endows a log with the form of a beam.86 
 
Grammar crafts the most basic part of the chariot – the beam that will support the axle – just as 
she teaches the basic uses of language to infants.  The ‘wood’, lignum, she transforms is (again) 
a relative of Silva: it behaves with the stubbornness of Bernard’s personification, or like the 
resistant metal of Natura’s forge.  Indeed, Alan’s characterisation of Grammar, ‘taking up the 
artisan’s weapons’, is generally reminiscent of many of the allegorical protagonists we have 
encountered already – particularly Physis, Venus, and Genius (all of whom Alan relies on heavily 
for all the Liberal Arts of the Anticlaudianus).  One might also note in this depiction John of 
Salisbury’s pseudo-allegorical portrayal of grammar, naming nature’s components as the 
mechanical artist ‘joins and disjoins’ her parts in the Metalogicon.  Here Grammar behaves 
exactly as she ‘should’ in the ‘philosophico-poetic’ project, reconfiguring the impressions of sense 
into words and sentences.  Her work is immortalised by figures of the ‘practitioners of Grammar’, 
artifices Grammaticae, carved into the beam.87  ‘Here Donatus, guide, patron, and master’ teaches 
its precepts and trims away barbarism.88   
 
This last bit of allegorical embroidery takes us (and Alan) no further in terms of meaning, but it 
does deserve mention for its likely reference to the south portal of the west façade of Chartres 
Cathedral, erected sometime between 1145 and 1155 (figures 12–14 and 17).  Here, Donatus (a 
fourth-century Roman) is found in precisely the practical posture described – along with the 
founding practitioners of the other seven liberal arts (Aristotle, Cicero, Pythagoras, and so on), 
who find their own way on to the chariot of the Anticlaudianus in the work of the successive 
                                                        
86 ‘… non oneris concussa metu, non fracta labore, ad proprium desudat opus multumque rebellis materies tandem 
sequitur superata volentem … Mentita fabrum, fabrilibus utitur armis, materiae fluxum superat cogitque negantem 
materiam servire sibi lignique rigorem edomat et lignum themonis ymagine vestit.’ Ibid. 2.477–484; Wetherbee, pp. 
292–293. 
87 ‘Hic ortu sculptura novo vitaque recenti Grammaticae locat artífices et vivere cogit.’  Ibid. 3.487. 
88 ‘Illic Donatus rector patronus et heres, Grammaticae precepta docens vitiumque recidens …’.  Ibid. 3.488–489. 
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ancillae.89  One might argue (though it would require a separate study) that in its depiction of 
liberal practitioners, the Chartres portal visually emphasises the practice, or ‘mechanics’ of the 
liberal arts, expressed verbally in the works of its native authors: Alan, Bernard, and John of 
Salisbury.90  Certainly Alan could have found its organisation and iconography complementary 
to his take on the arts in the Anticlaudianus.   
 
Once he has exhausted the graphic possibilities of Grammar, Alan introduces Logica (or 
dialectic).91  ‘Her hand rouses her mind, stirs her ingenuity [ingenium], musters her faculties to 
model the form of an axle’.92  Logic’s material is iron (ferrum), not wood.  As Alan advances 
through the Liberal Arts’ materials, they become more valuable as well as more malleable, 
suggesting the increasing refinement or intelligibility of ‘matter’ on the course of its assimilation 
by the soul (which the chariot represents).  ‘Now the fire makes it hotter, then the hammer bends 
it, and both strive to mold the metal.  Thus iron struggles with iron in an attempt to work it, so 
that by honouring its comrade it may thereby do honor to itself.’93  Unlike Venus, who found it 
too great an effort to match hammer to anvil, ‘healthy’ Logic brings the two into harmony.  Alan’s 
phrase for the hammer and anvil’s struggle, ferrum ferro contendit, seems to adapt the image of 
the forge used in the De Planctu to refer to the art of the syllogism.  The way ‘iron struggles with 
iron’ could be seen to visualise how, in a syllogism, a conclusion is drawn from setting two 
assumed premises against one another, in ‘contention’.94  Logic uses this method not for pleasure 
                                                        
89 Occasionally, this figure is identified as the fifth-century grammarian, Priscian, rather than Donatus (see notes for 
figure 12).  Jeauneau gives both options in Rethinking the School of Chartres, p. 96. 
90 This has to remain a tentative suggestion in the present study.  One can note, however, that the sculptures of the 
Liberal Arts at Chartres were a peculiarity in the period.  When the theme was repeated – notably on the central 
portal of the west façade at Sens, in c. 1200 – it was without the seven practitioners.  Further iconographical analysis 
and comparison might allow a more concrete connection to be made between its practical schema and allegorical 
(‘mechanical’) representation of the arts by Chartrian poets.  For an up-to-date analysis of the portal in the context 
of other depictions of the Liberal Arts (e.g. at Sens) – though not to this end – see Cleaver, Education in Twelfth-
Century Art and Architecture, pp. 8–16; and Katzenellenbogen’s ‘The Representation of the Seven Liberal Arts’.  
Other studies on the iconography of the liberal arts include Michael W. Evans, ‘Personifications of the Artes from 
Martianus Capella up to the End of the Fourteenth Century’ (Unpublished PhD thesis, University of London 1970); 
Jutta Tezmen-Siegel, Die Darstellungen der septem artes liberales in der Bildenden Kunst als Rezeption der 
Lehrplangeschichte (Munich 1985); and Marie-Thérèse d’Alverny, Etudes sur le symbolisme de la Sagesse et sur 
l’iconographie, ed. by Charles Burnett (Aldershot 1993). 
91 As in the De Planctu, Alan chooses the term logica rather than dialectica for the second/third art of the trivium.  
By contrast, Hugh of Saint-Victor and John of Salisbury stressed that logica was the term for the three arts all 
together.  Alan’s terminology may be a sign of its ascension in the second half of the twelfth century, to an equivalent 
for ‘eloquence’ as a whole (as feared by John, and by Alan himself). 
92 ‘Mentem manus excitat, urget ingenium, sensus proprios invitat, ut axis effigiet speciem …’.  Anticlaudianus 3.3–
5; Wetherbee, pp. 294–295. 
93 ‘… nunc ignis demollit eam, nunc malleus ipsam flectit et ad cultum ferri suspirat uterque; sic ferrum ferro 
contendit, ut excolat illud, ut socium venerans sese veneretur in illo.’  Ibid. 3.95–98; Wetherbee, pp. 300–301.   
94 As in the ‘contention’ of the two premises ‘all men are mortal’ and ‘Socrates is a man’, yielding the conclusion 
‘Socrates is mortal’.   
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but watchfully, ‘lest any sophist fashion false arguments for himself by hidden fraud’.95  As the 
beam boasted the image of Donatus, Logic’s axle is adorned with the founding fathers of her 
discipline. Primary amongst them is Aristotle, whose skill is such that he ‘practices logic in such 
a way that he seems not to be doing so’. 96  He, too, is shown hunched over his tablet on the portal 
at Chartres (figure 14). 
 
Next comes Rhetoric, this time with her practitioners (including Cicero, as shown on the portal) 
embroidered on her dress.97  Rather than crafting a new element, this maiden ‘brings to the 
highest degree of perfection work that had been accomplished to a positive degree’ by her sisters, 
but not finished.98  ‘She makes the shining surface of the beam flash with gems, and coats it here 
and there with silver; this outer dignity enhances [succurrit] its wooden substance, which is of a 
lesser dignity, and redeems its lowliness.’99  Rhetoric then exercises the colores and varietas of 
her discipline.  Alan emphasises that these ‘surface’ (and ‘fabulous’) qualities are not simply 
plastered on.  Rather, they are the product of ‘enhancing’, succurrens, an order already latent in 
the natural material.  Succurro comes from sub + curro: ‘to run beneath’.  Rhetoric’s ornatus is 
both decorative, and organising, or realising.  It evokes the Greek ancestor of ornatus, kosmos – 
which emphasised how the author ‘seeks to organize nature into a system’ – and which seemed 
to influence the Chartrians’ conception of the integumentum.100  Rhetoric essentially crafts an 
‘integument’ for the work of Grammar and Logic here.  Her mechanical refinements represent 
the final transformation – her rhetorical ‘persuasion’ – of the cosmos into an intelligible ‘image’ 
by verbal art. 
 
Together then, the three maidens of the trivium seem to complete the metaphorical work 
performed by the demiurge of the Timaeus.  But in order for this to be a fully encyclopaedic 
allegory, like De nuptiis, Alan has to make room for the Arts of the quadrivium, who craft the 
chariot’s four wheels.  These maidens work with noticeably greater ease than the trivial Arts.  
Their materials are less brittle, and they manipulate them not only with the hand, but by a kind 
of ‘force of mind’ (mente virili).101  This contrast becomes starker the further we move through 
                                                        
95 ‘… ne falsa monetet argumenta sibi furtiva fraude sophista.’  Anticlaudianus 3.79–80; Wetherbee, pp. 300–301. 
96 ‘Sic Logicam tractat, quod non tractasse videtur…’  Ibid. 3.116; Wetherbee, pp. 302–303. 
97 Ibid. 3.225–249; Wetherbee, pp. 310–311. 
98 ‘Excolit illa gradu supremo quae positive facta gradu fuerant.’  Ibid. 3.143–154; Wetherbee, pp. 304–305. 
99 ‘Gemmis stellatum speciem themonis inignit, argento sparsim theomonem vestit et ipsi ligni materiae, quae 
pollet honore minori, externus succurrit honor redimitque minorem.’ Ibid. 3.250–254; Wetherbee, pp. 310–311. 
100 Fletcher, Allegory, p. 121 (cited above, p. 64). 
101 Anticlaudianus 3.282; Wetherbee, pp. 312–313. 
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(or ‘up’) the mathematical Arts.  Arithmetic (the first of the four), still exerts ‘painstaking effort’, 
operas operose, but she also preconceives her product in a way the trivial arts did not: she ‘does 
not reveal by any sudden action the plan she has conceived; she does not begin abruptly to enact 
what her mind has produced.’102  Rather, she ‘fashions it mentally in the chamber of her mind 
before the task brings it into material existence.’103  Similarly, Geometry, draws on ‘thought, hand, 
and purpose’, mente manu studiis (in that order) to ‘reshape her leaden material with many 
hammer blows [into] the desired form’.104  
 
The kind of ‘mental’ mechanical art practised by the quadrivial Arts, which proceeds from mind 
to hand, is a novelty in the context of the literature discussed so far.  It might indicate an interest, 
on Alan’s part, in elements of Aristotle’s epistemology, being recovered into the French schools 
towards the end of the twelfth century.105  As we go on to see in the next chapter, in several works 
made newly accessible around this time, Aristotle had defined the human crafts as intrinsically 
rational, ends-oriented (teleological) pursuits.  They were re-cast as what we more traditionally 
associate with the Greek term techne – as master-arts, or technologies – losing their association 
with poiesis, or sensory ‘making’.  I consider the impact of this development on the metaphorical 
use of the mechanical arts, after 1200, momentarily.  Presently (and in order not to digress), I 
want only to point out that Alan, while primarily committed to, and dependent on, the sensory, 
poietic model and allegorical potential of the mechanical arts (traditional to Hugh and Bernard), 
betrays the first glimmerings of this shift in his characterisation of the quadrivial arts.  He could 
be said to incorporate ‘old’ and ‘new’ conceptions of the mechanical arts – the ‘poetic’, and the 
‘abstract’ – to differentiate the work of his two sets of ancillae, and particularly to set apart the 
latter, for whom there was no ‘demiurgic’ precedent. 
 
Once the chariot is complete, five horses are yoked to it by Reason, the charioteer.  Each of the 
horses represents one of the five senses – sight, hearing, smell, taste, and touch.106  Alan is possibly 
depending, again, on Bernard – who ended the Cosmographia with the creation of man’s same 
senses, to locate human understanding (his ‘reality’) in his acts of perception.  Alan’s ‘horses of 
                                                        
102 Ibid. 3.274–275; ‘Nec motu subito quod concipit exprimit actu, nec quod mens gignit subitos deducit in actos 
…’.   3.341–342; Wetherbee, pp. 316–317. 
103 ‘Fabricat in thalamo mentis mentale priusquam materiale foras opus evocet’.  Ibid. 3.353–355; Wetherbee, pp. 
318–319. 
104 ‘Mente manu studiis invadit, corrigit ipsam materiem plumbi, quam crebro malleus urget, imprimit ad placitum 
formam.’  Ibid. 3.516–518; Wetherbee, pp. 328–329. 
105 Details of this ‘recovery’ are given in Chapter Four (especially p. 113, n. 39). 
106 Anticlaudianus 4.95–210; Wetherbee, pp. 336–345. 
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sense’ appear to reiterate this lesson.  They elaborate on the chariot as an image for intellectual 
ascent through ‘sense making’ (thus also returning us to the poietic dynamic of the trivial arts, 
briefly flouted for the arts of the quadrivium).   
 
This same poietic dynamic is then imaginatively and persuasively developed by Alan in his 
account of the chariot’s journey.  This can be seen exquisitely condensed in a fifteenth-century 
drawing (proof of the enormous success of the work) from a German or Southern Bohemian 
manuscript, now at the Wellcome Collection in London (figure 15).107  As the drawing shows to 
its left, the journey begins as planned, with Wisdom (labelled Prudentia) carefully examining the 
moon, the stars, and the planets of the sublunary sphere from the carriage – represented by the 
artist in concentric rings.108  But when in the Anticlaudianus the chariot reaches the furthest edge 
of the sublunary sphere, and the beginning of the superlunary sphere – illustrated by the great 
golden door – the mission is thrown into doubt, and Wisdom becomes fearful of the road ahead.  
Noys (borrowed from the Cosmographia) comes forward and demands, ‘that she abandon the 
chariot [ut currum deserat], leave the horses in the celestial region and leave her companion 
behind as well.’109  ‘For … the heavenly path would not deign to accept such travelers, having 
known only journeys of another kind.’110  The drawing seems to simultaneously capture the 
chariot at a halt, and something of its earlier swiftness and intent.  Wisdom (labelled Prudentia) 
can be seen continuing alone on horseback beyond the divine threshold.  
 
This is a plot-move which, hermeneutically, keeps on giving.  It was presumably key to the text’s 
success with later commentators.111  Clearly, it suggests the limited remit of the Liberal Arts who 
built the chariot with so much effort.  Wisdom has to proceed alone, without their help (Alan 
suggests) and the help of Reason.  In their place, she meets with the ‘superior’ personifications 
Faith and Theology, who guide her to God enthroned, where she submits her request for the 
soul (before returning to earth).112  The arts are shown to be unprepared for the path to God, 
knowing ‘only journeys of another kind’ as Alan puts it: that is, journeys or ‘wanderings’ through 
mundana.   At the same time, however, it is possible to argue that their abandonment (suggested 
                                                        
107 For the work’s enduring and widespread popularity, to which the Wellcome manuscript attests, see above, p. 90 
n. 70; and Wetherbee’s overview of Alan’s ‘Fortunae’ in Alan of Lille, pp. xxxviii–xliii. 
108 Anticlaudianus 5.245–483; Wetherbee, pp. 346–363. 
109 ‘… ut currum deserat, ipsos in caelo deponat equos comitemque relinquat …’.  Ibid. 5.249–250; Wetherbee, pp. 
378–379. 
110 ‘… nec talem dignetur habere viantem semita caelestis, alios experta meatus.’  Ibid. 5.254–256. 
111 Above, p. 90, n. 70. 
112 Anticlaudianus 6; Wetherbee, pp. 399–432. 
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by the abandonment of the chariot) does not simply deny their preparedness and relevance to 
divine knowledge.  This moment in the story can also be seen as a way of paradoxically – 
apophatically – affirming the sapiential ‘reach’ of the arts.   
 
This has been suggested by Eileen Sweeney, in a book that examines Alan’s theology alongside 
that of Boethius and Abelard.113  Sweeney argues that where previous readers of the 
Anticlaudianus (and she cites specifically Marie-Thérèse D’Alverny) have argued that the 
abandonment of the chariot shows the arts as ‘“servants of God in the world, whose nature is to 
prepare man for the perfect knowledge which only faith can attain”’ – what this reading ‘does not 
quite bring out is that for Alan what this means is that the arts work toward their own 
obsolescence’.114  Sweeney persuasively suggests that Alan, who was deeply informed by the 
negative theological tradition of Pseudo-Dionysius, while he insists on the progress of Wisdom 
beyond the chariot, can also be seen to insist that this progress into divine matters is an 
‘apophatic’ or negative by-product of the work of the Liberal Arts and Reason (represented by 
the chariot).115   The apprehension and sighting of the divine which Wisdom experiences can be 
read as the recognition of what we cannot know rationally – and thus, in some sense, as generated 
by the very failure of Reason and the Arts to embark on the second stage of the journey. 
 
Sweeney draws attention, in explicating this more nuanced reading of the chariot’s abandonment, 
to the emphasis on Wisdom’s disorientation and uncertainty having dismounted.  As soon as she 
is without her companions, Alan positions her in a space of un-knowing.  He plunges her into a 
state of aporia, so that we are unsure of what she herself is actively or ‘positively’ comprehending.  
In the starry realms, Wisdom realises the questions she might ask are ‘wholly beyond her sphere; 
before such questions the mind fails, intellect is at a loss, reason grows dull, wisdom nods…’.116  
Once inside the heavenly halls, this emphasis on incomprehension only intensifies: 
 
                                                        
113 Eileen C. Sweeney, Logic, Theology and Poetry in Boethius, Anselm, Abelard and Alan of Lille (New York 
2006). 
114 Ibid., p. 129. 
115 Sweeney discusses the influence of Pseudo-Dionysius at p. 129.  See also Evans’ discussion of the via negativa in 
Alan’s theology in Alan of Lille, pp. 21–63, at 32–38. 
116 ‘…quod eius exsuperant cursus, ad quae mens deficit, haeret intellectus, hebet ratio, sapientia nutat…’.  
Anticlaudianus 5.368–370; Wetherbee, pp. 386–387. The remainder of Book Five is an account of the heavenly 
court and its citizens, though – interestingly – Alan does not describe the court through Wisdom’s eyes.  This 
description is given in an objective voice with Wisdom temporarily out of the picture.  For her to see the court as 
clearly as Alan wishes to picture it would (perhaps) be out of keeping with her dizzied cognitive state at this stage in 
the narrative. 
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When the maiden, entering the heavenly halls and approaching the throne of God, 
wished to sample these new wonders by gazing, their splendour troubled her sight 
and their novelty stunned her mind.  Her sight failed before them, and her thoughts 
within were clouded as she pondered them.  A dullness came over the watchful mind 
of Fronesis, a strange sleep weighed on her spirit, a trance of stupefying drowsiness 
compelled her to fall asleep.117   
 
It is at this moment, when Wisdom (or Fronesis) has actually fallen unconscious, that Faith 
arrives to support and to guide her, perhaps in an altered state of wakefulness, to the throne of 
God.118  Alan makes it his task, throughout Wisdom’s journey beyond the chariot, ‘to create 
disequilibrium instead of a sense of sure-footed progress.’119  For Sweeney, Alan ‘does not portray 
the “perfect knowledge” of faith but rather the failure of the arts in theology, both their failure to 
comprehend the subject of theology and to portray whatever it is faith knows.’120  The 
abandonment of the chariot and continuation of Wisdom on foot, with the assistance of Faith 
and Theology, tells us of course that the Arts are superseded by Faith and Theology.  But Alan 
could also be seen to demonstrate in his plot construction, and emphasis on Wisdom’s 
incomprehension, the subsistence of Faith and Theology within the abandonment of the 
disciplines, in the acknowledgement of their failure.  That is, Faith and Theology are to be 
understood not as separate skills, (indeed, Alan’s aim is to show dialecticians there is no such 
thing as an ‘Art of Theology’), but as the breakdown of reason and the Liberal Arts.  What Alan’s 
plot-twist suggests, as Sweeney eloquently summarises, is that ‘without reason and education in 
the arts, we can have no sense of how reason and the arts are brought up short by theology.  Only 
reason, in other words, can show what reason cannot know.’121  The Arts have a negative 
theological agency – they ‘work toward their own obsolescence’, which is itself the discovery of 
the divine.  One could argue that Alan even wants us to read the salvific vision of Wisdom as if 
from the abandoned chariot.  As an aside, this is another reason why we might find the synoptic 
fourteenth-century drawing so compelling.  Its arrangement, holding the ‘before’ and ‘after’ of 
                                                        
117 ‘Postquam virgo Dei solium sedesque supernas ingrediens voluit nova praelibare videndo, offendit splendor 
oculos mentemque stupore percussit rerum novitas.  Defecit in illis visus et interior mens caligavit ad illas.  Sic sopor 
invasit vigilem, sic somnus adulter oppressit Fronesis animum, somnoque soporans exstasis ipsa suo, mentem 
dormire coegit.’  Anticlaudianus 6.1–8; Wetherbee, pp. 398–399. 
118 Alan has just said, in the passage cited, that Wisdom’s drowsiness compelled her to fall asleep (dormire coegit).  
Then Faith rushes in to alleviate her faintness (6.14), apparently waking her up.  However, Alan continues to stress 
Wisdom is acting in a trance, or somnus (6.94), which is compared at 6.95–100 to death itself (pp. 404–405).  Alan 
needs to keep wisdom as the central actor and receiver of man’s soul, but also to stress she acts in an altered and 
unconscious state (a state of ‘negative’ knowing, I suggest), opposite to (and in a sense the by-product of) the highly 
concentrated, rational work of the Liberal Arts. 
119 Ibid., p. 130. 
120 Ibid. 
121 Ibid., p. 142. My emphasis.   
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the chariot’s journey in suspension, accommodates (intentionally or not) the apophatic reading 
arguably implied by the text: that the vision of God (to the right) is in some way generated by, as 
well as consecutive to, the ‘approach’ of the chariot (to the left).   
 
Eileen Sweeney does not refer to the influence of the Timaeus, nor to the notion of poiesis in 
her study, which – as I argued in my analysis of the De Planctu – can be seen as central to Alan’s 
particular blend of apophatic thinking.  In this first part of his Anticlaudianus, I would add, Alan 
offers an ‘apophatic-poietic’ lesson, not unlike the lessons of his earlier major allegory.  Recall 
how in the incantation of Natura’s robes in the De Planctu, Alan (or the narrator), used words 
not unlike those of the speaker of the Timaeus to stress his limited, poetic understanding of her 
secrets: ‘Since my knowledge of the plan of these images is only slippery conjecture [probabilitatis 
lubrico] not confident certainty [non certitudinis fide], I leave the matter to rest in quiet peace.’122  
We saw how, for Alan, this limited knowledge was the only knowledge available to man.  Those 
(dialecticians) who dared to raise their discourse to the divine (as Natura put it) would find only 
disorder.123  Truth (in the terms of this allegory) was discoverable only in imitative, imaginative 
explanation – visualised by the narrator’s verbal weaving of Natura’s robes.   
 
Given what has been argued so far with regard to the ‘negative theological agency’ of the Liberal 
Arts in the Anticlaudianus, we could identify a similar poietic message at play here.  If we accept 
Wisdom’s meeting with God can be read as a ‘byproduct’ of the liberal arts’  ‘work toward their 
own obsolescence’, it is also possible to see this meeting, this moment of divine insight, more 
specifically as a ‘poietic’ (or ‘apophatic-poietic’) byproduct: an outcome of the reshaping and 
rejoining of sylvan materia that actually constitutes the work of the seven Liberal Arts in Books 
Two to Four.  In terms of authorial register, the instant Wisdom dismounts, Alan announces 
that: ‘Wholly abandoning the role of poet, I presume to claim for myself the new voice of a 
prophet.’124  He imagines this promotion to a voice which gives voice to the Deity by comparing 
himself to devices or tools, being moved by a power beyond them.  ‘Of this song I will be the 
mere pen, not the scribe or author, a sounding brass, the writer’s silent page, the singer’s pipe, 
                                                        
122 ‘… sed quoniam solius probabilitatis lubrico, non certitudinis fide, huius seriem picturationis agnovi, hanc sub 
silentii pace sepultam praetereo.’ Ibid. 2.34; Wetherbee, pp. 52–53.  
123 Above, p. 87. 
124 ‘… totumque poetam deponens, usurpo mihi nova verba prophetae.’  Anticlaudianus 5.268–269; Wetherbee, pp. 
380–381. 
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the sculptor’s chisel.’125  As Wisdom loses her own powers of thought beyond the reach of the 
chariot, so the narrator loses his.  The narrator’s diminished consciousness or intentionality at 
this pivotal point in the narrative could be seen to redouble the negative-poietic lesson that seems 
to emerge in Wisdom’s trajectory.  Alan (or his alterego) sees himself here in what might well be 
called a ‘mechanical’ guise, working subrationally (but also suprarationally) – like the pen, a brass, 
a page, a chisel.  Higher knowledge is emphatically ‘made’ or crafted here.  While the tools Alan 
identifies are to be considered acting under God’s influence, which differentiates them from the 
‘mechanical’ action of the Liberal Arts on the chariot – we might also note there is a basic 
resonance between this later language of craft, used to imagine the ‘unthinking’ role of the 
prophet,  and the earlier manual crafting of Grammar and the arts of the trivium.  Perhaps Alan’s 
overtly mechanical imagery for divine knowledge be seen as a further gesture to the notion that 
such divine knowledge – ostensibly beyond the Arts’ work – at some other, apophatic (or 
‘aporetic’) level of the allegory, subsists in their work.  Alan’s flash of self-awareness here – his 
demeaning of himself to mere operative instruments that generate but do not intend divine 
knowledge (just as Wisdom perceives unconsciously) – arguably encourages us to look back on 
the humble, artisanal demeanor of the Liberal Arts as in some way generative of the higher, 
prophetic levels of truth that come ‘after’ their abandonment in the story.  Liberation from earthly 
concerns is technically ‘above’ mundane making and craft, but Alan can also be seen to imply it 
is tied up with those processes – that it arises out of the imagined ‘mechanical’ disposition and 
behaviours of the mind or soul. 
 
I noted earlier that while the episode of the chariot’s voyage and frustration is not technically the 
end of the Anticlaudianus, it can or should be read as its climax.126  It certainly rounds out this 
argument: not only to the place of mechanica in the works of Alan of Lille, but to its allegorical 
deployment in the twelfth century generally.  In the first place, the allegory of the chariot can be 
seen to epitomise Alan’s dependence on Bernard’s inventiveness with the language and imagery 
of the mechanical arts, set out by Hugh, to dramatise education and philosophy as an act of inner 
world-making, or poiesis.  The chariot is the finest example of how Alan – in both his 
Anticlaudianus, and the earlier De Planctu – transformed Bernard’s achievement into an 
allegorical (and narrative) strategy to denounce, and to try to restore to the fold, those neglecters 
of Grammar and the trivium, John of Salisbury’s ‘Cornificians’.   
                                                        
125 ‘Carminis huius ero calamus non scriba vel auctor, aes resonans, reticens scriptoris carta, canentis fistula, sculptoris 
scalprum ...’.  Ibid. 5.272–276. 
126  See above, p. 92. 
 102 
 
 
 
 
The Anticlaudianus is also a terminal point in the use of the mechanical arts to visualise a 
philosophical, educational psychology informed by poiesis.  From the end of the century, a range 
of new concerns came to dominate teaching, study, and writing about the liberal arts – as both 
Alan and John had feared.  New doctores specialising in the arts of the trivium continued to read 
the Anticlaudianus, along with the De Planctu and Cosmographia – but more for their striking 
compositional imagery than for their philosophical ‘lessons’.  In the final chapter of this thesis I 
show how later generations took up the imagery of the mechanical arts found in these twelfth-
century ‘masterpieces’, while using that imagery to paint a radically new picture of the creative 
psychology proper to the writer or poet: directly opposed to the poietic picture that Hugh, 
Bernard, John, and Alan had used it to preserve in the first place.127 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                        
127 Douglas Kelly says this group of allegories attained the status of ‘masterpieces’ by the end of the twelfth century 
in The Arts of Poetry and Prose (Turnhout 1991), pp. 57–64. 
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IV. 
 
Deferring the hand: Geoffrey of Vinsauf’s Poetria nova and the ‘Liberal’ 
Mechanical Arts 
 
As both Alan of Lille and John of Salisbury’s works had anticipated, by the turn of the thirteenth 
century in northern France, it was no longer scholars’ priority to assert the alignment of soul and 
cosmos through the holistic study of the liberal arts and eloquence.  The educational or 
philosophical literature produced by the Schools (and faculties) became, on the whole, more 
specialised.  Just as dialectic came to be studied on more exclusive terms, so did the ‘art of 
poetry’.  A range of new treatises began to emerge, designed to guide the student in the 
composition of verse.  The Artes Poetriae, as they were known, have been described as the fullest 
answer ‘to the comprehensive needs of compositional training’ from the late twelfth century.1  
Indeed, while versification is their subject, they draw heavily on ‘grammatical and rhetorical 
precept’.2   James J. Murphy has called them ‘preceptive grammars’, since they direct the would-
be writer, through the principles of both grammar and rhetoric, to the construction of a ‘future 
poem’.3   
 
To the same extent that the ‘modern’ nature of these manuals is noted by scholars, it is widely 
understood that they owed a great debt to the poetic cosmogonies, or ‘allegorical encyclopaedias’ 
of Bernard Silvestris and Alan of Lille.  The best-known of the new works is Geoffrey of Vinsauf’s 
appositely titled ‘New Poetry’, or Poetria nova, begun around 1200, and completed in around 
1215.  It was preceded by (and perfected much of the advice set out in) Matthew of Vendôme’s 
Ars versificatoria (c. 1175).4  Both Matthew and Geoffrey are thought to have known either 
Bernard or Alan personally.  Before he became a teacher in Paris (where he may have met Alan), 
                                                        
1 Copeland and Sluiter, Medieval Grammar and Rhetoric, p. 547. 
2 Ibid., pp. 544–545. 
3 James J. Murphy, Rhetoric in the Middle Ages: A History of Rhetorical Theory from Saint Augustine to the 
Renaissance (Berkeley 1974), p. 169.  Murphy takes the term ‘future poem’ from Douglas Kelly, ‘The Scope of the 
Treatment of Composition in the Twelfth and Thirteenth-Century Arts of Poetry’, Speculum 41 (1966), pp. 261–
78, at 273. 
4 The Poetria nova and Ars versificatoria are the earliest of a total of six Artes Poetriae identified by James Murphy.  
They were succeeded (in Murphy’s identification) by Geoffrey’s own Documentum de modo arte dictandi et 
versificandi (after 1213); Gervase of Melkley’s Ars versificaria (c. 1215); John of Garland’s Parisiana poetria de arte 
prosayca, metrica, et rithmica (c. 1220; revised c. 1231-5); and Eberhard the German’s Laborintus (after 1213).  
Murphy, ‘The arts of poetry and prose’ in The Cambridge History of Literary Criticism, Volume II: The Middle 
Ages, ed. by Alastair Minnis and Ian Johnson (Cambridge, UK 2008), pp. 42–67, at 43. 
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Matthew had been a student of Bernard at Tours, probably in the 1150s.5  Less is known about 
Geoffrey’s life, but he seems to have been an Englishman, who received much of his schooling 
in Paris from around the 1160s, where he may have encountered Alan of Lille (as well as 
Matthew).6   
 
Matthew and Geoffrey took naturally, and abundantly, from their ‘mentor’s’ imagery for poetic 
composition.  Winthrop Wetherbee has made this connection a number of times in his work on 
the earlier authors – writing in the 1973 edition of his translation of the Cosmographia, for 
example, that ‘the Ars versificatoria of Matthew of Vendôme reveals in many points of detail the 
influence of the poems of Bernardus and Alain’; while Geoffrey of Vinsauf used terms ‘borrowed 
from Bernardus and Alain’ to describe the poet as ‘taming unruly words, reducing them to order 
so that their outer ornatus corresponds to an ideal model.’7  Wetherbee says elsewhere that the 
Cosmographia was perhaps the ultimate ‘model for Geoffrey of Vinsauf’s account of the 
imposition of order on one’s literary subject matter’.8 
 
The present chapter seeks to interrogate this inheritance more carefully.  Specifically, I want to 
suggest that the Artes Poetriae – focussing on Geoffrey’s Poetria nova – drew on the language of 
the ‘mechanical arts’ found in the Cosmographia, De Planctu, and Anticlaudianus in their 
depiction of ‘taming unruly words’ and ‘imposing order’ on materia.  Importantly, I am not the 
first to suggest Geoffrey was interested in the mechanical arts: Mary Carruthers recently proposed 
in a study of medieval aesthetics that he deployed a ‘a lexicon of medieval mechanical arts’ to 
picture his poetic practice.9  She also footnoted Hugh of Saint-Victor’s account of the category in 
his Didascalicon, written eighty or so years earlier.10   
 
                                                        
5 See above p. 54, n. 2.  Matthew also taught at Orléans, a renowned centre for grammatical study in the twelfth 
century.  For his biography, see Edmund Faral, Les arts poétiques du XIIe et du XIIIe siècle (Paris 1923; reprinted 
Paris 1958), pp. 1–14. 
6 His encounter with Alan is suggested by Woods, Classroom Commentaries, p. 1, n. 3.  For a summary of his 
teaching career (or what we know of it) see Martin Camargo’s ‘Introduction to the revised edition’ of Margaret F. 
Nims’ translation, Geoffrey of Vinsauf: Poetria nova (Toronto 2010), pp. 8–9.  I use Nims’ translation throughout. 
7 Winthrop Wetherbee, The Cosmographia of Bernardus Silvestris (New York 1973), p. 57.   
8 Wetherbee, ‘Philosophy, Commentary, and Mythic Narrative’, p. 225.  Wetherbee has also noted the influence of 
Bernard’s descriptions of ‘disciplining recalcitrant words’ on Matthew of Vendôme, in Platonism and Poetry, pp. 
150–151.  Wetherbee has drawn attention to the ‘debt’ owed by the authors of the ‘Arts of Poetry’ to Bernard and 
Alan perhaps more thoroughly than any other scholar – while the basic fact of this influence has been noted widely 
(in the most general terms): e.g. Medieval Literary Criticism: Translations and Interpretations, ed. by Alex 
Preminger, O. B. Hardison and Kevin Kerrane (New York 1974), p. 30 
9 Carruthers, The Experience of Beauty, pp. 87–88. 
10 Ibid. 
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Unlike Wetherbee, however, Carruthers is unconcerned with the influence of twelfth-century 
allegorists on Geoffrey and his contemporaries.11  Here we can contextualise her observation.  It 
was on the example of the twelfth-century allegorists, I show, that Geoffrey referred to the lexicon 
of the Didascalicon to illustrate and define his ‘Art of Poetry’.  Restoring this twelfth-century 
‘lineage’ (second nature to literary historians, like Wetherbee) allows us to make an instantly 
more nuanced and historicised analysis of his metaphors.  For while his imagery is ‘borrowed 
from Bernardus and Alain’, and built on their ‘Orphic’ appropriation of mechanica, it also signals 
a radical departure from their example.  Instead of picturing liberal or trivial study as a ‘hands-
first’ or ‘sense-first’ endeavour, which ‘makes sense’ of nature, Geoffrey’s mechanical imagery 
defines verbal art as a specialised intellectual practice defined by ‘practical interior vision’.12  In 
the words of Rita Copeland and Ineke Sluiter, 
 
The arts of poetry set out to grasp the literary text in its formal or structural entirety 
… They chart the progress [of composition] from an interpretive stance … to a 
generative stance, encompassing the conceptual process of invention and the inner 
formal logic of the text which the writer will bring into being.13 
 
James Murphy notes that ‘the term “art” or ars when applied to such a treatise [‘Art of Poetry’] 
indicates a discussion of what the ancient Greeks would have called techne – “technique” or 
“craft”’.14  But the Arts of Poetry also provide – as Copeland and Sluiter imply (and Umberto 
Eco has separately stated) – ‘a theory of the art of poetry’.15  They want to create designer-poets 
and professionals, originators of ideas, who come to their materials from the heights of 
preconception and according to a set of precepts.  The genre – as it depended on the precedents 
of Bernard and Alan – was also tied up with the recovery of Aristotle’s writings on techne, 
accompanied by its application in the Ars Poetria of Horace.  It is these works which supply the 
‘Greek’ conception designated by Murphy.  The imagery of the artes mechanicae deployed in 
the Poetria nova navigates – and exposes – the recovery of this conception.  It expresses an 
evolved, or evolving, understanding of craft as just as much (if not more) to do with mental work, 
as handiwork (hinted at in Alan’s personification of the quadrivial arts’ ‘force of mind’, mente 
virili).16   
                                                        
11 (See below, p. 107, n. 20). 
12 Summers, The Judgement of Sense, p. 262. 
13 Copeland and Sluiter, Medieval Grammar and Rhetoric, p. 548 (my emphases). 
14 Murphy, ‘The arts of poetry and prose’, p. 44. 
15 Umberto Eco, Art and Beauty, p. 102. 
16 Above, p. 96. 
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The following discussion attempts to elucidate this evolution and transformation of the 
mechanical arts’ efficacy implied by the Poetria nova.  It does so across three main sections.  The 
first of these considers Geoffrey’s mechanical imagery in direct comparison and contrast to that 
of the cosmologists – attempting to draw out in more detail his emphasis on forethought and 
‘interior vision’ by contrast to their emphases on poietic ‘making’.17  The second part seeks to 
establish the historical and ‘bibliographical’ context for this shift – turning to the Aristotelian 
corpus of works, recovered from the late 1100s that discuss the crafts or technai in very different 
terms to those available in earlier medieval intellectual culture.  Finally, in the third section, I 
look ahead of Geoffrey, to the middle of the thirteenth century.  I argue that, in mingling the 
mechanical imagery of the allegorists with a new notion of techne, his work helped shape a long-
term scholastic understanding of the ‘craft of invention’ which was fundamentally at odds with 
the humanistic and poietic incarnation of this theme that preceded it, and which has often 
prevented the latter from receiving the attention it deserves. 
 
I. From the Arts as Poiesis to the Art of Poetria 
 
Copeland and Sluiter remark that the Artes Poetriae take an ‘interpretive’ and a ‘generative 
stance’ towards the text ‘the writer will bring into being’ – and the structure of the Poetria nova 
faithfully reflects these stances.  It is divided into five main sections, which chart the 
compositional process through 1) the ordering of the material; 2) the amplification and 
abbreviation of parts; 3) stylistic ornamentation; 4) memorisation of the material; and 5) its 
delivery.18  The best-known passage of the entire text comes in Geoffrey’s preface, or ‘general 
remarks about poetry’, and involves a comparison of the poet to the architect, whose example 
teaches the student to plan his work in advance of setting pen to paper:  
 
If a man has a house to build, his impetuous hand does not rush into action.  The 
measuring line of his mind first lays out the work [praemetitur opus], and he mentally 
outlines the successive steps in a definite order.  The mind’s hand shapes the entire 
house [praescribit] before the body’s hand builds it.  Its mode of being is archetypal 
                                                        
17 Ibid., p. 109. 
18 These reflect Cicero’s five canons or tenets of rhetoric, set out in the De Inventione 1.7; De Oratore 1.31.142; 
and in Quintilian’s Institutio Oratoria 3.3.  While Geoffrey’s closest classical model is Horace’s Ars Poetica, this 
was written in the form of an epistle, and had no clear or adoptable structure – thus (perhaps) his recourse to 
traditional rhetorical divisions.  He was also following behind Matthew of Vendôme – whose Ars Versificatoria was 
divided into roughly similar sections, on: 1) inner meaning; 2) elegance of diction; 3) schemata, tropes, and colours 
of rhetoric; 4) the treatment of the material.  Copeland and Sluiter, Medieval Grammar and Rhetoric, p. 559. 
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before it is actual [prius archetypes quam sensilis].  Poetic art may see in this analogy 
[speculo] the law to be given to poets: let the poet’s hand not be swift to take up the 
pen, nor his tongue be impatient to speak; trust neither hand nor tongue to the 
guidance of fortune.  To ensure greater success for the work, let the discriminating 
mind [mens discrete], as a prelude to action [praeambula facti], defer the operation 
of hand and tongue, and ponder long on the subject matter.  Let the mind’s interior 
compass first circle the whole extent of the material … As a prudent workman, 
construct the whole fabric within the mind’s citadel before it is on the lips.  When 
due order has arranged the material in the hidden chamber of the mind, let poetic 
art come forward to clothe the matter with words.19 
 
This is the first and most extended (as well as most representative) metaphor of the Poetria nova. 
It is passages like it which Wetherbee sees as suggestive of Geoffrey’s reliance on Bernard and 
Alan’s descriptions of the ‘imposition of order’ on unruly materia.  But it is not in the remit of 
his analysis to interrogate that relationship further, or to highlight potential divergences between 
it and the descriptions of the cosmologists.  Similarly, for Carruthers this passage suggests the 
potential relevance of the artes mechanicae to Geoffrey, but she does not compare and contrast 
it with the ‘mechanical’ imagery of his literary predecessors.20   
 
For one who is familiar with the latter, the cause-and-effect dynamic in Geoffrey’s opening is a 
noticeably new development.  Hugh of Saint-Victor had defined the artes mechanicae – building 
included – as imitative, wholly manual activities.  It was Hugh’s experiential characterisation of 
                                                        
19 ‘Si quis habet fundare domum, non currit ad actum Impetuosa manus: intrinseca linea cordis praemetitur opus, 
seriemque sub ordine certo interior praescribit homo, totamque figurat ante manus cordis quam corporis; et status 
ejus est prius archetypus quam sensilis.  Ipsa poesis spectet in hoc speculo quae lex sit danda poetis.  Non manus 
ad calamum praeceps, non lingua sit ardens ad verbum: neutram manibus committe regendam fortunae; sed mens 
discrete praeambula facti, ut Melius fortunet opus, suspendat earum officium, tractetque diu de themate secum.  
Circinus interior mentis praecircinet omne Materiae spatium.  Certus praelimitet ordo unde praearripiat cursum 
stylus, at ubi Gades figat.  Opus totum prudens in pectoris arcem contrahe, sitque prius in pectore quam sit in ore.  
Mentis in arcano cum rem digesserit ordo, Materiam verbis veniat vestire poesis.’ Geoffrey of Vinsauf, Poetria nova 
43–61; Nims, p. 20.  The Latin text is Ernest Gallo’s, in The Poetria nova and its Sources in Early Rhetorical 
Doctrine (Paris 1971), pp. 14–129, itself based on Edmond Faral’s edition, Les artes poétiques du XIIe et du XIIIe 
siècle (Paris 1923), pp. 197–262.  The line numbers in this and all subsequent references refer to those as marked 
in Gallo’s Latin edition. 
20 Carruthers, The Experience of Beauty, p. 204.  One of Carruthers’ special areas of expertise is Chaucer – who 
called Geoffrey his ‘deere maister soverayn’ (in The Nun’s Priest’s Tale, 4537).  Her portrayal of Geoffrey as an 
innovator and galvaniser (rather than re-worker) of medieval ideas about poet-craft, perhaps reflects a Chaucerian 
perspective.  For the importance of Geoffrey to Chaucer’s language of craft see Peter J. Fields, Craft and Anti-Craft 
in Chaucer’s Canterbury Tales (Lewiston, NY 2001).  For other, broadly similar, references to Geoffrey of Vinsauf 
in the works of Carruthers, see ‘The Poet as Master Builder: Composition and Locational Memory in the Middle 
Ages’, New Literary History 24, 4 (1993), pp. 881–904, at 889.  She also prioritises Geoffrey’s example in ‘The 
Concept of Ductus, or, Journeying through a Work of Art’’, Rhetoric Beyond Words, ed. by Mary Carruthers, pp. 
190–213.  Perhaps for similar reasons to Carruthers (i.e. a prior familiarity with Chaucer and vernacular tradition), 
Geoffrey’s example is privileged by Lisa Cooper’s Artisans and Narrative Craft, pp. 9–10.  For the popularity of the 
analogy to building (after Geoffrey) more generally, see David Cowling, Building as Text: Architecture as Metaphor 
in Late Medieval and Early Modern France (Oxford 1998). 
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the arts, and the denial of their dependence on the kind of rational pre-calculation found in the 
higher arts, on which their earlier exemplary power was built.  Bernard and Alan adopted their 
lexicon, we have seen, to frame the liberal arts in the terms of the senses and sense-making.  The 
mechanical artistry of Noys and Physis in the Cosmographia; Natura and Venus in the De 
Planctu; and the Artes Liberales in the Anticlaudianus, all served to figure (in differing ways) the 
author-student’s ‘poietic’ mission to re-create the cosmos in and through language. 
 
The mechanical artistry of Geoffrey’s architect-poet is clearly (or at least partly) inspired by these 
‘Orphic’ dramatis personae.  But it creates an entirely different picture of trivial invention – that 
is not poietic, or interpretive, but autonomous, and ends-directed (echoing only Alan’s arts of 
the quadrivium).  It gives a ‘face’ to Matthew of Vendôme’s neat summary of ‘the performance 
of poetic ability’ (‘poetice facultatis exercitio’), in his Ars Versificatoria: ‘imagination precedes 
[precedit] the senses, speech follows [sequitur] as the interpreter of thought, and then comes 
arrangement in the quality of expression.’21  ‘Prior to the idea is the conception’, and only later, 
‘appended’ or ‘annexed’ to the conception, subiungitur, comes ‘the character of the subject 
matter or the arrangement of the treatment.’22   
 
Geoffrey’s architect encapsulates this new, preceptive ‘psychology’ of poetic invention.  As 
Carruthers says, it teaches how the poet ‘must first shape his work in his mind before he gives it 
any material form, fashioning it mentally before doing so materially’.23  It reflects how the text’s 
‘mode of being’ should be ‘archetypal before it is actual’, or ‘sensed’, Geoffrey says, ‘prius 
archetypus quam sensilis’.  In the image, the discriminating mind, mens discrete, directs and 
defers the (less discriminating) hand: a message reinforced by the repeated use of the prefix prae- 
for all the verbs of making: praemetere, praescribere, praeambulare.  Here Geoffrey then uses 
the example of a mechanical art to postpone ‘making’, to push back the locus of creation from 
the hand (and ‘sense’) to the mind and intellect.   
 
The architect planning his composition, ‘fashioning it mentally before doing so materially’, sets 
the tone for the mechanical metaphors which run throughout the Poetria nova.  It is fair to say 
that these can become repetitive: it would be unproductive to detail every one of them here.  
                                                        
21 ‘… in poetice facultatis exercitio precedit ymaginatio sensus, sequitur sermo interpres intellectus, deinde ordinatio 
in qualitate tractatus …’.  Matthew of Vendôme, Ars Versificatoria 3.51, Munari, p. 191; trans. by Roger P. Parr 
(Milwaukee 1981), p. 92.   
22 ‘… prior est sententie conceptio … subiungitur qualitas, scilicet materie sive tractatus dispositio.’  Ibid. 
23 Carruthers, The Experience of Beauty, p. 204.   
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Instead of moving through the treatise part by part, I want to draw together a picture of his 
interests from just several of particular note.  Alongside the architect, Geoffrey is especially keen, 
for example, on the figure of the medic, or physician.  He uses this other ‘mechanical artist’ in 
section three of the Poetria, to dramatise the writer’s generation of ‘stylistic ornament’ – or 
ornatus.  We have encountered this term already in the discussions of Bernard and Alan – who 
thought of ornatus in the terms of ‘integument’, and by extension of its Greek antecedent, 
kosmos.  For them, a text’s ornatus was related to the discovery of cosmic meaning – it manifested 
the author’s poietic work of improving nature, transforming mundana into an intelligible or 
‘reasonable picture’.   Bernard used language generic to the mechanical artist or artificer in the 
Didascalicon to picture this poietic work; while in Alan its most obvious expression was perhaps 
the robe of Natura the poet-philosopher has to keep on weaving, ‘making sense of’ in order to 
‘know’.   
 
This set of associations breaks down in Geoffrey.  He still uses mechanical artistry to dramatise 
treatment of surface – like his forebears – but his use of the medic stresses that ornatus is to do 
with authorial intentio: the prior knowledge possessed by the student.  The physician improves 
the demeanour of his patients because he knows in advance the cause of their illness.  Like the 
physician, the poet should, 
 
First examine the mind of a word, and only then its face; do not trust the adornment 
of its face alone ... Adorning the face of a word is painting a worthless picture: it is a 
false thing, a fictitious form [ficta forma].  That all may be guided by precept [ut 
omnia lege regantur]: let rich meaning be honoured by rich diction … If a word is 
old, be its physician, and give to the old a new vigour … if you provide this remedy, 
you will give to the word’s face a new youth.24   
 
Mixed in with the exemplum of the medic, Geoffrey alludes here to a topos found in Cicero, 
Quintilian, and Isidore – of the text having a healthy blush.  This appeared in the Roman works 
to imagine the orator able to convey the ‘vigour’ of his intentio throughout a long speech.25  
                                                        
24 ‘Verbi prius inspice mentem et demum faciem, cujus ne crede colori … faciem depingere verbi est pictura luti, res 
est falsaria, ficta forma … ut omnia lege regantur, dives honoretur sententia divite verbo … Si vetus est verbum, sis 
physicus et veteranum resse novum … Si conficis istud Antidotum, verbi facies iuvenescere vultum.’  Ibid., 743–769, 
p. 41.  Nims translates ficta forma as ‘its beauty fictitious’, which I have substituted for ‘fictitious form’ (a compromise 
with Ernest Gallo’s translation, ‘faked form’, p. 53) 
25 Cicero’s De Oratore (3.199) and Quintillian’s, Institutio oratoria (8.5.34).  This topos has been discussed in depth 
by Carruthers in the Experience of Beauty, pp. 181–187.  She shows the ideal of the text or speech as a ‘blushed’ 
face became so well-known that Isidore connected stylistic venustas (meaning simply ‘beautiful’) to venis, ‘blood’, in 
the Etymologiae 10.277.  She also discusses the case of Magister Gregorius, an Englishman in Rome in the first part 
of the thirteenth century, who records his encounter with a statue of Venus, saying she seems to ‘blush in her 
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Geoffrey uses it to the same end – to suggest the ornatus of the poem should be the effect of 
inner goodness, rather than applied externally, like paint.  The medic is recruited as the 
practitioner of this exemplary, predetermined course of (poetic) treatment.   
 
This passage also implies we should not trust painting, which makes ‘fictitious forms’ (fictae 
formae).  The painter, it seems, unlike the medic, is not ‘guided by precept’, lege regantur.  At 
this point we can turn to Horace’s Ars Poetica, which Geoffrey seems to be drawing on more or 
less directly.26   This manual – the first guide to the ‘poet’s vocation’ – opens with a famous, 
jocular invocation of a painter whose ‘piecemeal’ production images what the poet (once he has 
studied this treatise) will not be replicating.27  Horace asks, (rhetorically), ‘If a painter chose to join 
[iungere] a human head to the neck of a horse, and to spread feathers of many a hue over limbs 
picked up now here now there [undique collatis] … could you, my friends … refrain from 
laughing?’28  Some lines later this image is extended with reference to the sculptor, who Horace 
mocks for working (like the painter) by joining bits part by part (iungens).  The following 
anecdote, like the opening, is intended to remind the reader his own, poetic craft is a higher 
calling, demanding a stylistic unity these purely manual activities often fail to achieve: 
 
Near the Aemelian School, at the bottom of the row, there is a craftsman who in 
bronze will mould nails and imitative waving locks, but is unhappy with the total 
result [operis summa], because he cannot represent the whole [ponere totum 
nesciet].  Now if I wanted to write something, I should no more wish to be like him 
than to live with my nose askew … [Thus] choose a subject that is suited to your 
abilities, you who aspire to be writers; give long thought to what you are capable of 
achieving, and what is beyond you.  A man who chooses a subject within his powers 
will never be at a loss for words, and his thoughts will be clear and orderly.29   
                                                        
nakedness, a reddish tinge colouring her face’ – apparently drawing on the rhetorical commonplace (at pp. 194–
199). For her discussion of rhetorical intentio see pp. 167–172. 
26 For the renewed attention given to the Ars Poetica in Geoffrey’s lifetime see Copeland and Sluiter’s chapter, 
‘Prologues to Twelfth-Century School Commentaries on Horace’s Ars Poetica ca. 1150’, in their Medieval 
Grammar and Rhetoric, pp. 551–558.  Vincent Gillespe suggests Matthew of Vendôme’s Ars Versificatoria may 
have started life as school lectures on Horace’s text, in his essay on the study of the classical authors ‘From the 
twelfth century to c. 1450’ in The Cambridge History of Literary Criticism, Volume II: The Middle Ages, ed. by 
Alastair Minnis and Ian Johnson, pp. 145–235, at 163. 
27 In her introduction to Horace’s Ars Poetica, Penelope Murray states he produced ‘his own idiosyncratic picture 
of the poet’s vocation … which is unique in the history of criticism’.  Penelope Murray, Classical Literary Criticism 
(London 2000; first publ. 1965), p. xliv.   
28 ‘Humano capiti cervicem pictor equinam iungere si velit, et varias inducere plumas undique collatis membris … 
spectatum admissi risum teneatis, amici?’  Horace, Ars Poetica 1–5; Fairclough, pp. 450–451. 
29 ‘Aemelium circa ludum faber imus et unguis exprimet et mollis imitabitur aere capillos, infelix operis summa, quia 
ponere totum nesciet.  Hunc ego me, si quid componere curem, non magis esse velim, quam naso vivere parvo ...  
Sumite materiam vestris, qui scribitis, aequam viribus et versate diu, quid ferre recusent, quid valeant umeri.  Cui 
lecta potenter erit res, nec facundia deseret hunc nec lucidus ordo.’  Ibid. 32–38; Fairclough, pp. 452–453.  I have 
modified Fairclough’s translation of this passage with reference to the (more literal) translation given by Murray in 
 111 
 
 
 
 
Because the sculptor fails to give long thought – versate diu – to his composition, to ‘intend’ it 
properly, his total product is indecorous.  It lacks an organicity which Horace sees as the raison 
d’être of the poet’s craft.  As Penelope Murray states, ‘decorum runs as a leitmotif throughout’ 
his text.30  ‘He stresses the need for organic unity in any work of art, emphasizing that every part 
and every aspect of that work must be appropriate to the nature of the work as whole.’31  This is, 
for him, the whole motive and objective of the ‘the skill, craftsmanship, and sheer hard work 
involved in the composition of poetry.’32 
 
The influence of his metaphors for ‘skill’ and ‘craftsmanship’ is blatant in Geoffrey, but it is also 
found in Matthew’s Ars versificatoria, where the sculptor is given again as a kind of anti-
exemplum – unless, that is, he might be thought of as polishing his work, smoothing over the 
joints which give away its artifice: 
 
Just as, in material things, the material of a statue is crude and stamped with no value 
until the zealous polishing of the craftsman makes it more pleasing, so too in a poem 
is the verbal material crude and inelegant until decorated by the artful setting of 
some schemata, tropes, or rhetorical colors.33  
 
Such excerpts thus signify a new interest in the crafts, based on their power to reaffirm (either 
positively, or by contradistinction) the continued shaping power of an a priori ‘idea’.  The final 
excerpt I want to cite here restates this ideal again, in terms which show Geoffrey’s reorientation 
of Hugh and the Chartrians’ ideals from a slightly different angle.  This excerpt comes from part 
two of the Poetria nova, on the ‘amplification and abbreviation of parts’, and it instructs the 
student on how to create a ‘hidden comparison’, (corresponding roughly to our ‘simile’).34  A 
comparison should appear within the text, Geoffrey says,   
                                                        
Classical Literary Criticism, p. 99.  Murray’s translation is based, in turn, on that of D. Russell and W. Winterbottom, 
eds, Ancient Literary Criticism (Oxford 1982). 
30 Murray, Classical Literary Criticism, p. xl. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Ibid., p. xli. 
33 ‘Siquidem, sicut in rebus materialibus materia statue rudis est et nullo precio insignita donec sedulitate artificis 
melius placeat expolita, similiter in metro verborum materia rudis est et inconcinna donec artificiali appositione 
alicuius scematis vel tropi sive coloris rethorici depingatur.’  Ars Versificatoria 3.2, Munari, p. 166; translation in this 
case from the excerpts given in Copeland and Sluiter’s Medieval Grammar and Rhetoric, p. 568.  Copeland and 
Sluiter note that Matthew is also drawing heavily at this point on book three of Donatus’ Ars maior 
(the Barbarismus), and from Isidore of Seville, Etymologiae 1.36–7 (at p. 568, n. 53). 
34 For the closeness of Geoffrey’s ‘hidden comparison’ to the modern ‘simile’, see Peter Dronke, The Medieval Poet 
and His World (Rome 1984), p. 24. 
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[As a] marvellously ingrafted transplantation, where something assumes its place so 
surely in the design [serie] as if it were born of the theme itself [themate nata] – yet 
it is taken from elsewhere, though it seems to be from there … ; it is a form subtly 
conjoined [formula subtilis iuncturae], there the things joined [res iunctae] so unite 
[coeunt] and touch [contingunt] as if [quasi] they were not touching, as continuous 
as if [quasi] Natura’s hand, not that of art, had joined them.35 
 
This description could be said to bring to mind the image of the artificer ‘joining and disjoining’ 
nature’s parts set out in the Didascalicon.  It seems possible that Geoffrey is drawing (consciously 
or not) on this Hugonian topos, and its numerous applications by Bernard, John, and Alan of 
Lille to imagine the ‘poietic’ practice proper to the trivium.  If we take this for granted, it is clear 
that he also revises its meaning – engendering, through its imagery, a very different picture of the 
poet’s practice, and interaction with nature.  In the Metalogicon, John of Salisbury, following 
Hugh and Bernard, used the hierarchical topos to describe how the student discerns with his 
senses and with the ‘grasp’ of his language, what was ‘formed and fashioned by nature’s hand’.36  
Here that relationship of servility – of ‘sense making’ – is gone.  The acts of ‘taking things from 
elsewhere’, conjoining it in a new place, and so on – do not designate the artificer-poet’s ‘poietic’ 
or interpretive imitation of nature, but imitation in the sense of mimicry.  The poet is to make 
elements ‘unite and touch’ so continuously that it seems ‘as if Natura’s hand, not that of art, had 
joined them’, ‘quasi non manus artis iunxerit, immo manus Naturae’.37  An image that had been 
used to persuade of the sensory labour and ‘descent’ proper to the trivium, becomes an image 
for persuading of the poet’s competition with natural causality.  This passage implies that Nature 
knows her purpose, she can grow her compositions, in a way the poet can himself aspire to if he 
hones his preceptive craft. 
 
In doing so it signals – just as much, if not more so – a rewriting of the metaphorical currency of 
‘mechanical art’ implied by Geoffrey’s positive comparisons to the architect and medic (and 
negative comparisons to the sculptor and painter).  It repeats the new emphasis, at play in these 
analogies, on working ‘thought-down’ or ‘thought-through’ and the related vice of piecemeal, 
purely manual composition (the very principle which drew authors to mechanica earlier).  The 
                                                        
35 ‘… insita mirifice transsumptio, res ubi caute sic sedet in serie quasi sit de themate nata: Sumpta tamen res est 
aliunde, sed esse videtur inde … hic est formula subtilis iuncturae, res ubi iunctae sic coeunt et sic se contingunt 
quasi non sint contiguae, sed continuae quasi non manus artis iunxerit, immo manus Naturae.’ Poetria nova 250–
263.  I cite the translation made by Dronke here, in The Medieval Poet, pp. 24–25. 
36 Above, p. 81. 
37 (Emphases added). 
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invocation of nature as a kind of ‘standard’ for this preceptive mechanical artistry, also suggests 
his ‘theory’ of poet-craft may have been founded on more than a mixture of Hugh, the 
Chartrians, and Horace – and taken in writings on craft, or techne, being re-read in northern 
Europe towards the end of the twelfth century. 
 
II. Aristotle’s view of techne  
 
Horace’s depiction of the ‘Art of Poetry’, which dates to around 19 BC, was itself deeply 
informed by the works of Aristotle: particularly the Rhetoric and Poetics, both written sometime 
in the fourth century BC.  Some of Geoffrey of Vinsauf’s own ‘Aristotelianism’ is therefore a 
product of his reading and imitatio of Horace.  Aristotle’s Poetics and Rhetoric would not 
themselves become available to medieval schoolmen until the later thirteenth century.38  At the 
same time, however, the picture of craft he elucidates in the Poetria nova seems to imply a more 
direct ‘Aristotelianism’, made possible by the recovery of Aristotle’s Physics, Metaphysics, and 
Nicomachean Ethics, which Geoffrey is likely to have encountered during his schooling in Paris.   
An engagement with the discussions of craft found in these works would explain his appreciation 
and augmentation of Horace’s metaphors – and the extent of his deviation from the Chartrians’ 
poietic interpretation of the mechanical arts.39   
 
So far in this thesis we have considered the domain of craft – and by extension of the mechanical 
arts – in this latter formulation: under the auspices of poiesis, ‘making’.  In Plato’s Timaeus 
(which in many ways consolidated pre-existing, pre-Socratic epistemology), craft exemplified a 
                                                        
38 The gradual (and apparently undramatic) reintroduction of the Poetics and Rhetoric to the West, from the mid-
1200s to the fourteenth century, has been discussed by James J. Murphy, ‘Aristotle’s Rhetoric in the Middle Ages’, 
Quarterly Journal of Speech 52, 2 (1966), pp. 109–115.   
39 As Christophe Erismann says, the ‘natural writings’ of Aristotle had begun to be translated during the second half 
of the twelfth century, but entered widespread use only in the period from about 1200. Christophe Erismann, ‘Latin 
Philosophy to 1200’, in The Oxford Handbook of Medieval Philosophy, ed. John Marenbon (Oxford 2012), pp. 
167–191.  The Physics was translated by James of Venice in the middle of the twelfth century; the first four books 
of the Metaphysics were available in what is known as the Metaphysica Vetustissima, also ascribed to James of Venice 
– from the same time, but only became fully available in the Latin West in Michael Scot’s translation (the 
Metaphysica Nova) in the 1220s.  The earliest Latin translation of the Nicomachean Ethics was the so-called ethica 
vetus, translated anonymously in the twelfth century.  Like the Metaphysics, the Ethics only became the subject of 
serious study in the universities from the 1230s (the complete new translation was made by Robert Grosseteste).  
See Russell Friedman, ‘Latin Philosophy 1200–1350’, in The Oxford Handbook (as above), pp. 192–219 – who 
like Erismann says that despite the existence of translations before 1200, it was really ‘in the first fifty years of the 
thirteenth century that [Aristotle’s] thought begins to be utilised’ (at p. 196).  Cary J. Nederman also describes the 
reintroduction of these specific works in ‘Aristotelian Ethics before the Nicomachean Ethics: Alternate Sources of 
Aristotle's Concept of Virtue in the Twelfth Century’, Parergon 7 (1989), pp. 55–75, at 58.  
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‘coming to terms’ with nature.  It modelled how man thinks, and writes – hence its etymological 
relationship with what would become our English ‘poetry’.40 
 
Aristotle’s conception of craft – the ‘Greek’ conception James Murphy talks about – was built on 
a new premise.41  First of all, for Aristotle, often considered the first ‘scientist’, nature was not 
something to be interpreted in the poietic fashion suggested by the Timaeus or the earlier 
cosmogonic songs.  It possessed its own internal logic, which man could take apart and analyse.  
Instead of regarding natural ‘making’ and human ‘making’ as in some way co-dependent and 
complementary, Aristotle regarded them as ontologically discrete domains, to be examined 
soberly, on their own terms.    At the same time, he continued to line them up against one another 
– now in an analytical, rather than imaginative, way – to ascertain procedural similarities and 
differences between man and nature. 
 
This method has been called by David Sedley Aristotle’s ‘craft analogy’ for nature.42  Aristotle 
was fascinated – specifically – by the way in which nature seems always seems to be working 
towards ‘ends’, or teloi.  Nature never digresses or makes mistakes: it unfolds in a certain and 
regular way (think of the blossoming of a tree, or the gestation of a foetus).  Thus, the greatest 
medieval Aristotelian Thomas Aquinas would write, towards the end of the thirteenth century, 
‘everything in nature has a certain end, and a fixed rule of size and growth’.43  The procedures of 
the human crafts, Aristotle thought, likewise tended towards the achievement of definite ‘ends’ 
(as the carpenter’s process is governed by a goal, or telos, to produce a chair).  It was this 
procedural or causal proximity with natural teleology which governed Aristotle’s interest and 
interrogation of the nature of craft.  The latter might not proceed as perfectly as nature does – 
for the carpenter can easily make mistakes of measurement, and so on – but it is our best and 
most accessible illustration of the operations apparent in the natural world.  As Sedley explains: 
for Aristotle the ‘causal processes of nature are of a higher teleological order than craft, but craft 
helps us to make sense of them’.44 
 
                                                        
40 See above, Introduction, pp. 7–8. 
41 Above, p. 105. 
42 David Sedley, Creationism and its Critics in Antiquity (Berkeley 2008), pp. 173–177. 
43 ‘Manifestum est autem, quod in omnibus quae sunt secundum naturam, est certus terminus, et determinata ratio 
magnitudinis et augmenti’.  Thomas Aquinas, Sentencia libri De anima 2.8, 9, ed. by Enrique Alarćon for the 
Corpus Thomisticum Project (at 80615).  Cited and translated by Eco, Art and Beauty, p. 78.  
44 Sedley, Creationism, p. 174. 
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The key discussions of the so-called ‘craft analogy’ can be found in the Physics (2.3) and 
Metaphysics (5.2) – both works Geoffrey may himself have studied.  In these, Aristotle used the 
example of sculpture to draw out the ‘four causes’ (aitiai) at play in nature (to make ‘a rough 
classification of the causal determinants [aitiai] of things’).45  A statue, he explains, is the outcome 
of 1) the material (bronze) out of which it is made; 2) the form which the material receives; 3) 
the initiator of the process of change (the smith); and 4) the purpose (or logos), ‘that for the sake 
of which a thing is.’46  This is roughly, he said, how the causes ‘come within the range of Nature’.47   
 
Yet nature also complicates this fourfold system: often in the natural world the ‘becauses’ (or 
causes), which are distinct in the craft of sculpting, coincide.48  Specifically, natural organisms 
appear to ‘have the principle of motion [the efficient cause] within themselves’.49  For instance, a 
tree in blossom, or a foetus in the womb, seem to reason themselves out: they require no external 
‘hand’ to bring them into shape.  Furthermore, they make no reference to an external final cause.  
Nature seems to be ‘aware’ of her telos from the outset.  She is, in all things, a superior artist, to 
which the human craftsman can only aspire. 
 
Indeed, Aristotle’s causal comparison of techne and nature – in which nature comes out ‘on top’ 
– led him to privilege, in his discussions of techne, those elements or types of craft that best 
imitate nature’s seamlessly rational ‘making’.  As David Summers puts it, for Aristotle ‘the arts 
imitate nature by adapting forms to ends’.50  Here lies a crucial distinction between Aristotle’s 
view of imitation and the view of imitation put forward in earlier Greek and Platonic works: as 
Erwin Panofsky puts it, ‘Art [as it was seen by Aristotle] … does not imitate what nature creates, 
but it works in the same way as nature creates, achieving definite ends through definite means, 
realizing definite forms in definite materials, etc.’51  Or, otherwise put (for present purposes), for 
Aristotle art does not imitate nature in a collaborative and improving manner; it follows her in a 
way that impacts neither party, the two (craftsman and nature) are locked in a kind of 
dispassionate parallelism. 
                                                        
45 Aristotle, Physics 2.3 195a9–10, trans. by F.M. Cornford and F. Wicksteed, LCL 228 (Cambridge, MA 1957), pp. 
130–131. 
46 Aristotle, Metaphysics 5.2 1013a32–33, ed. by Jonathan Barnes, The Revised Oxford Translation, Bollingen 
Series LXXI: 2, 2 vols (Princeton 1984), 2: p. 1600.  
47 Ibid: Physics 2.7 198a35; Cornford and Wicksteed, pp. 164–165. 
48 Ibid, 2.7 198b1-2; pp. 164–165. 
49 Ibid. 
50 Summers, The Judgement of Sense, p. 237. 
51 Erwin Panofsky, Idea: A Concept in Art Theory (New York 1960), p. 42; Panofsky’s own emphases. (Originally 
published in German as Idea: Ein Beitrag zur Begriffsgeschichte der alteren Kunsttheorie, Leipzig 1924). 
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It is this altered and rationalised view of what constitutes ‘craft’ (the procedural imitation of 
nature, centring on intellectual foresight) that we find, of course, reflected in the imagery of the 
Poetria nova.  We saw earlier how Horace advised against the example of the sculptor – and how 
Geoffrey after him implied that the painter (also a piecemeal or ‘fictitious’ artist) was less worthy 
of imitation than those technicians (for example, medics and architects) who, ‘like’ nature, 
prepare mentally.  This favouritism has been established by Aristotle himself.  For while he took 
up the art of sculpting to discriminate the four causes, he explained elsewhere how the exemplary 
human craftsman or technician will in fact have knowledge of the ‘final cause’ of his chosen 
activity, bringing him closer to the natural ideal.52  At the opening of the Metaphysics, he claimed 
craftsmen of the highest order will ‘know the “why” and the cause’ of their activities:53   
 
We suppose artists to be wiser than men of experience … ; and this is because the 
former know the cause, but the latter do not.  For men of experience [empeiria] 
know only that the thing is so, but do not know why, while the others know the ‘why’ 
and the cause.  Hence we think that master-workers [technites] in each craft are more 
honourable and know in a truer sense and are wiser than the manual workers 
[cheirotechnes], because they know the causes of things that are done.54 
 
Here then, the artist or craftsman is distinguished from the man of experience (empeiria).  This 
distinction corresponds, Aristotle suggests, to the distinction between ‘master-workers’ 
(technites), and ‘manual workers’ or ‘mechanics’ (cheirotechnes).55  The latter are not ‘true’ 
craftsmen in his eyes.  Art, techne proper, involves knowledge of ends, a theory of the activity to 
be undertaken, like that which nature seems to possess.  The cheirotechnis or mechanic has only 
practical familiarity with nature – or what Aristotle calls ‘knowledge of individuals’.56     
 
As Richard Parry explains, in Aristotle’s theory of knowledge, ‘a mixed picture 
of episteme and techne begins to emerge.’57  The craftsman is a theoretician, who studies, teaches 
and puts into practice abstract artistic principles.  Aristotle often calls the type of knowledge 
                                                        
52 Sedley, Creationism, p. 177. 
53 Metaphysics 1.1 981a28–29; Barnes, 2: pp. 1552–1553. 
54 Ibid. 981a25–981b1; Barnes, 2: p. 1553. 
55 Barnes translates cheirotechnis (χειροτέχνης) as ‘mechanic’ at 981b32; Barnes, 2: p. 1553. 
56 Ibid 981a30–35; Barnes, 2: pp. 1552–1553.  Cheirotechnes means literally ‘skilled with the hands’ (chiro– from 
kheír, ‘hand’). 
57 Richard Parry, ‘Episteme and Techne’, The Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy (Fall 2014 Edition), ed. by 
Edward N. Zalta.  URL = https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2014/entries/episteme-techne/ [accessed 16 July 
2018]. 
 117 
 
 
 
possessed by ‘master-workers’ episteme (or in Latin, scientia).  The arts which best fill the criteria 
for a techne are therefore not sculpting and painting (or weaving, metalworking, etc. – which 
above all demand sensitivity to materials, derived from experience).  The hands-on activity of 
‘making’, poiesis, which involves working with nature’s particulars, no longer qualifies an activity 
as a craft, an ‘art’, in Aristotle’s epistemology.58    
 
Instead, techne is typified by those crafts which are learned between the workshop and the lecture 
room.  Unsurprisingly, Aristotle’s chief exempla are architecture and medicine.  The former of 
these is, Aristotle says, ‘a reasoned state of capacity to make … involving a true course of 
reasoning’.59  Likewise, the activity of medicine follows a ‘true course of reasoning’ based in a pre-
possessed definition of health.60  Both the technite of medicine and of architecture can explain 
his goals: ‘in general it is a sign of the man who knows, that he can teach’.61   
 
While it was unavailable to Geoffrey and his contemporaries, in the Rhetoric Aristotle then made 
use of these distinctions worked out in his scientific works, modelling the rhetor on the medic 
because he ‘can instruct or persuade about its own particular subject-matter’, just as the medic is 
able to persuade or explain ‘about what is healthy and unhealthy’.62  As we know, Geoffrey had 
indirect access to this type of craft imagery through Horace.63  But his own re-articulation of it 
seems to be been born of additional knowledge (not necessarily exhaustive) of Aristotle’s own 
discussions.  His opening passage, describing the architect arranging his material ‘in the inner 
chamber of the mind’ before acting; his use of the medic as a guide to the generation of ornatus 
from an a priori ‘rationale’; and particularly his remarks about nature as a procedural model for 
the poet, which the poet should act ‘as’: all of these seem to reflect a student experimenting with 
the new epistemological assertions of the Physics, Metaphysics and Ethics.   
                                                        
58 I am indebted to Carl Mitcham’s commentary of this point (that for Aristotle, ‘“making” does not fall within the 
logical structure of techne’) in his Thinking Through Technology: the Path between Engineering and Philosophy 
(Chicago 1994), p. 122.  I add the term ‘art’ here (in inverted commas), since Aristotle’s new conception of ‘craft’ 
brings it closer to the modern concept of ‘art’ (i.e. rational, ends-oriented skill).  In his 1938 study, The Principles 
of Art, Robin George Collingwood argues ‘craft’ needs to reassert its manual logic against its partner, ‘art’.  He shows 
the former has been overwritten by the Aristotelian formulation (a point I am also trying to draw out here).  
Collingwood, The Principles of Art (Oxford 1938), pp. 15–36. 
59 Nicomachean Ethics 6.4, 1140a8–10; Barnes, 2: pp. 1799–1800. 
60 Metaphysics 9.2 1094a5–10; Barnes, 2: pp. 1652–1653. 
61 Metaphysics 1.1 981b6–12; Barnes, 2: p. 1553. At 7.1 1032b30–1033a5 Aristotle discusses the necessary pre-
existence of a thing’s formula in the soul of the artist.  
62 Rhetoric 1.2, 1355b26–35; Barnes, 2: p. 2155. 
63 Vincent Gillespe talks about ‘Aristotelian readings of Horace’ and ‘Horatian readings of Aristotle’ in the thirteenth 
century, both of which help us to think about how Geoffrey arrived at his particular poetic theory (in Gillespe’s 
chapter ‘From the twelfth century’, p. 162.) 
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They reflect a student navigating those assertions from within a more recent medieval tradition, 
inspired primarily by the Timaeus, of drawing on the artes mechanicae to dramatise verbal or 
liberal art as a poietic and cosmological endeavour.  In the final part of the chapter, I want to 
show how Geoffrey’s Aristotelian ‘updating’ of the imagery of his predecessors anticipated a 
wholly new way of using the artes mechanicae – to actually affirm the ‘liberal’ status of the liberal 
arts – thus turning on its head the tradition that precipitated it. 
 
III. The ‘Liberal’ Mechanical Arts and Scholastic Inventio 
 
First – before showing how the artes mechanicae were used to this ‘liberalising’ effect after 
Geoffrey – it is necessary to consider the impact of Aristotle’s works on the discussion and 
‘ranking’ of mechanica in scholastic encyclopaedias.  In the wake of the recovery of both 
Aristotelian and Arabic thought from the turn of the century, scholars who had depended on the 
Didascalicon in their own education sought to modernise its arrangement of Scientia to accord 
with the new epistemology.  The most striking and thorough instance of this is Robert Kilwardby’s 
De ortu scientiarum, ‘On the Origin and Order of the Sciences’, which dates to the 1250s.  
Robert was a graduate of the new university in Paris, a theologian, and later to become 
Archbishop of Canterbury.  His De Ortu is self-consciously modelled on Hugh of Saint-Victor’s 
Didascalicon – and he spends considerable time reviewing Hugh’s category of mechanica for the 
modern student.64   
 
Following Hugh, this category is defined as belonging beneath the liberal arts: the hierarchical 
symmetry between the two categories – productive and theoretical, in fact first established in De 
nuptiis – is maintained.  But the nature of that hierarchical relationship has changed.  Kilwardby 
calls the mechanical arts ‘subalternate’ to the liberal arts [omnes mechanicae sublternantur 
scientiis speculativis].65  Today ‘subalternate’ is often used synonymously with ‘subordinate’ – i.e. 
inferior in quality or status.  But in the thirteenth century, it meant something between ‘inferior’ 
                                                        
64 The critical edition, which I cite here, is Robert Kilwardby, De ortu scientiarum, ed. by Albert G. Judy (Oxford 
1976). 
65 ‘Omnes mechanicae subalternantur scientiis speculativis…similiter architectonica, fabrilis et armatura quoad 
modum operandi sub geometria sunt … Similiter, lanificium quoad modum puto esse sub arithmetica et geometria 
… Similiter, in aliis mechanicis ubique invenies quod ipsae sint sub aliqua speculativa vel aliquibus.’  Robert 
Kilwardby, De ortu scientiarum 43.401 (trans. Whitney, p. 122). 
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and ‘successive’.66  It is still used in modern botany to refer to the lateral veins on a leaf which 
branch out from the central vein (the midrib).67  In the De ortu, its use signals a subtle but 
fundamental modification of the mechanical arts’ earlier (‘subordinate’) position.  It implies they 
are both under and ‘alternate’ to the liberal arts.  Or rather, they manifest or continue principles 
belonging to the liberal arts.  George Ovitt explains they are ‘a means of applying theory to the 
solution of specific problems’.68  Or in the words of Elspeth Whitney, they constitute the 
‘operative or instrumental side of the theoretical sciences’.69    
 
This is clarified by Kilwardby’s rhetorical question: whether the carpenter or stonecutter can truly 
work without the theoretical science of geometry.70  Hugh had not, on the whole, been concerned 
with such questions; they would risk destabilising his neat soteriological system.  The stonecutter 
or carpenter was for Hugh a maker, not a geometer (hence his example could be used to ‘poietic’ 
– effect).  But Kilwardby responds to his self-posed question as though the affirmative answer is 
obvious: ‘We see, therefore, that the speculative sciences are practical and the practical are 
speculative’ (‘speculativae sint practicae et practicae speculativae’).71   
 
Here, one should add, it is not only that the mechanic might perform or ‘demonstrate’ the 
interior calculations of the liberal artist or theoretician.  Kilwardby implies that the arts themselves 
involve a mixture of liberal and mechanical skill.  ‘Ars sine scientia nihil est’ (‘art is nothing 
without science’, or knowledge of principles), as it was put pithily by the fourteenth-century 
French architect Jean Mignot.72  The same man who calculates, demonstrates; and the same man 
                                                        
66 The mechanism of the ‘subalternation of the sciences’ became widespread in scholastic discourse and was 
elaborated by Robert Grosseteste (who we come to shortly, below, p. 122) and Thomas Aquinas, in both their 
commentaries on the Posterior Analytics (accompanied, in Thomas’ case, by discussions in his commentary on the 
Physics and the opening question to the Summa Theologiae).  For an overview of this encyclopaedic apparatus 
through the works of scholastic philosophers, see Steven J. Livesey’s chapter ‘The Subalternation of the Sciences’ 
in Theology and Science in the Fourteenth Century: Three Questions on the Unity and Subalternation of the 
Sciences from John of Reading’s Commentary on the Sentences (Leiden 1989), pp. 20–53. 
67 ‘subalternate, adj. and n.’, OED Online (Oxford University Press, June 2018) www.oed.com/view/Entry/192443. 
[accessed 19 July 2018]. 
68 George Ovitt, ‘The Status of the Mechanical Arts’, p. 103.  See also: Alfonso Maierù, ‘Robert Kilwardby on the 
Division of the Sciences’ in A Companion to the Philosophy of Robert Kilwardby, ed. by Henrik Lagerlund and 
Paul Thom (Leiden 2013), pp. 353–390, at 381–384. 
69 Whitney, ‘Paradise Restored’, p. 82. 
70 Kilwardby, De ortu scientiarum, p. 138. 
71 ‘Videtur ergo quod et speculativae sint practicae et practicae speculativae.’  Ibid. 
72 This remark is recorded in the proceedings of the chapter of Milan in 1400, in the debate over plans for the 
cathedral’s construction.  It is cited by Binski, who notes its Aristotelian inspiration – in opposition to an earlier 
reading by James S. Ackerman, who saw it as a declaration of the architect’s Platonism, and belief in the primacy of 
geometric form.  Binski questions ‘… was Mignot in fact stating no more than that ars (i.e. the techne of Ethics, VI.4) 
must be informed by the demonstrable principles and causes (i.e. episteme) which constitute scientia (geometry 
especially), so being, in effect, a good Aristotelian? ... It seems at least possible that Mignot was appealing to a 
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who demonstrates, calculates.  Importantly for us, Kilwardby ends up implying – in keeping with 
Aristotle’s Physics and Metaphysics – that the proper ‘mechanic’ will possess ‘ends’.  He will be 
liberal-minded: a designer, not just a ‘maker’.  The genuinely operative cheirotechnis is, following 
Aristotle’s recommendations, nudged out of this more analytic, more integrated view of the arts.   
 
Geoffrey of Vinsauf, writing in the first decades of the 1200s, of course did not have access to 
this revised view of the artes mechanicae.  But the imagery of his Poetria nova appears to 
anticipate this ‘subalternate’ way of thinking about the division of the arts.  Indeed, Kilwardby’s 
encyclopaedic classification helps to show how far from the Hugonian classification Geoffrey’s 
work sits.  At the same time, it also allows us to link Geoffrey’s mechanical exempla for poetic 
invention to later mechanical exempla in scholastic works – closer in time to Kilwardby’s De 
Ortu – which take these once-lowly artes precisely to assert or confirm the liberal, theoretical 
nature of human authorship and invention (in direct contrast to twelfth-century custom). 
 
These later mechanical exempla are the subject of a recent essay by Paul Binski.  From the mid 
1200s, Binski shows, the master-craftsman, specifically the architect, ‘penetrated into scholastic 
and rhetorical discourse’ to firm up and to dignify the concept of the human auctor as an 
‘originator’ of form, a demonstrator of intellect.73  Binski’s argument is conceived – in part – as a 
response to Alastair Minnis’ findings in the Medieval Theory of Authorship: that in the course 
of the thirteenth century (Paris taking a central place), there was a shift towards greater analysis 
of human auctoritas, as commentators looked to Aristotle’s theory of causes to clarify the 
formation of literary texts.74  From around the 1240s, Minnis shows, writers of academic 
prologues to biblical and other texts drew on the causal system established in the Physics and 
Metaphysics, creating a sharper picture of the text as a product of mental ‘ideation’.  The new 
‘Aristotelian prologue’, as he calls it, would describe the work under discussion as a product of 
the four aitiai we have already encountered: the causa materialis (designating the subject matter), 
causa formalis (the shape of the work in the artist’s mind), causa efficiens (the execution of the 
                                                        
scholar’s sense of intellectual order in claiming intellectual status for his art.  In this sense, his utterance could 
ultimately bear the stamp of the schools of Paris.’  ‘Working by Words’, p. 40.  For James S. Ackerman’s argument, 
see ‘“Ars Sine Scientia Nihil Est”: Gothic Theory of Architecture at the Cathedral of Milan’, Art Bulletin, 31 (1949), 
pp. 84–111. 
73 Binski, ‘Working by Words’, p. 20. 
74 Alastair Minnis, Medieval Theory of Authorship: Scholastic Literary Attitudes in the Later Middle Ages, 2nd edn 
(Philadelphia 1988), (introductory summary p. 5).  In Binski’s words, ‘In its Aristotelian form, [scholasticism] 
achieved a sharpening or intensification of the notion of authorial responsibility.’  Binski, ‘Working by Words’, p. 
26. 
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text) and causa finalis (the artist’s ultimate ‘goal’).75  The ‘Aristotelian prologue’ read (and 
encouraged others to read) the work as the efficient and naturalistic execution of a ‘form’, 
conceived in relation to a final cause – and the auctor, therefore, as a possessor of the logos of 
his composition, ‘put into’ practice.76 
 
Binski’s essay reveals another dimension to this Aristotelian influence in the scholastic 
conception of the author.  He argues that as schoolmen (or university men) looked to Aristotle’s 
causes to sharpen their definition of auctoritas, they also looked, for authorial exempla or 
analogues, to the causal procedures of the technai – through which Aristotle had (of course) 
initially defined the causes.77 ‘It became possible in academic circles’, he says, via the analogy to 
the crafts, ‘to think of authors as originators who gave form to something “in their way”, who 
created their own modus tractandi or way of treating subject matter.’78  The crafts made it possible 
to emphasise the importance of the intentio auctoris, the pre-sensory formation of a work.79 
 
In a critical antidote to the prevalent view of Geoffrey – as galvanising earlier medieval ideas of 
poet-craft, implied in the works of Carruthers and others – Binski draws on the example of the 
Poetria nova as a kind of precursor to this thirteenth-century development.80  Like so many 
scholars before him, he centres on Geoffrey’s architectural opening.  But unlike previous 
scholars, he sees this extended image as an early (or pre-mature) example of specifically scholastic 
analogical practice.  He notes how through it, poetry is cast as ‘a conceptual or “liberal” activity, 
a thing of the mind or the heart not the body.’81  
 
                                                        
75 Minnis, Medieval Theory, pp. 28–29.  
76 Ibid. 
77 (Binski uses the term exemplum for the use of the crafts at ‘Working by Words’, p. 27).  It is worth noting that 
Binski is building on (and proposing a ‘realignment’ of) the controversial thesis of Erwin Panofsky, in Gothic 
Architecture and Scholasticism (1951): that ‘there exists between Gothic architecture and Scholasticism a palpable 
and hardly accidental concurrence in the purely factual domain of space and time’ (p. 2) which resulted in a shared, 
‘dialectical’ modus operandi between these two spheres (both the scholastic summa and the high gothic cathedral, 
for example, exhibit a principle of the ‘division and subdivision’ of parts).  Panofsky saw this affinity as a product of 
the exposure of architects to ‘Scholastic point of view’.  Binski’s essay turns this on its head: ‘the steps taken here’, 
he concludes, ‘have followed it [the pathway of influence] from the concept of the architect and the architectural to 
the scholar’s cell (if cells they had), and not the other way around.  Architecture, or at least the role of the architect, 
was “good to think with” scholastically and rhetorically, and its impact on doctrines that are now considered 
‘scholastic’ was demonstrably greater than the impact of those doctrines, generally considered, on actual 
architecture.’  Binski, ‘Working by Words’, p. 28. 
78 Ibid., p. 22.  For the modus tractandi (the mode of managing or discussing) see Minnis, Medieval Theory, p. 29 
and 119–145. 
79 See Vincent Gillespe on the intentio auctoris, ‘From the twelfth century’, p. 148.  
80 Implied in the analyses of Carruthers and Cooper, for example (above, p. 107, n. 20). 
81 Binski, ‘Working by Words’, p. 26. 
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‘A similar idea to Vinsauf’s is also found’, he suggests, ‘in the pastoral correspondence of that 
eminent Aristotelian, Robert Grosseteste (d. 1253)’.82  In a letter from Grosseteste to his former 
student, Master Adam Rufus, Grosseteste uses craft to describe the prior possession of forms in 
intellect:  
 
So imagine in the artist’s mind [in mente artificis] the design [formam] of the work 
to be made [fiendi], as in the mind of the architect the design [formam] and likeness 
of the house to be built [fabricandae]; to this pattern and model he looks only that 
he may make the house in imitation of it.83   
 
Note the gerunds fiendi and fabricandae, which make the actual work almost hypothetical.  This 
passage takes to an extreme Geoffrey’s preceptive language of the archetype.  Here (forty years 
after the Poetria nova) Grosseteste sees (and deploys) the ‘mechanical artist’, the artifex – ‘in 
tune’ with his contemporary Kilwardby – as a conceiver above a demonstrator, as one who might 
‘never put his hand to the task’.84    
 
Binski does not consider the example of Saint Bonaventure (c. 1217–1274), whose take on the 
mechanical arts supports his account of the scholastic use of the artificer – and offers a crowning 
final case study here.  Bonaventure was an Italian Franciscan, who studied at the University of 
Paris and became a Master there in 1257, in company with Thomas Aquinas.  Here we are 
concerned with one of his shortest works, De reductione artium ad theologiam, ‘On the 
Reduction of the Arts to Theology’, dated by its modern editors to between 1253 and 1257.85  As 
its title suggests, the treatise is encyclopaedic in nature, dealing with the arts curriculum.  But it 
has an entirely spiritual aim (unlike Kilwardby’s De ortu) of clarifying how the arts shape man’s 
inner life and encourage the salvation of his soul.   
 
                                                        
82 Ibid. 
83 ‘Imaginare itaque in mente artificis, artificii fiendi formam, utpote in mente architecti, formam et similitudinem 
domus fabricandae, ad quam formam et exemplar solummodo respicit, ut ad eius imitationem domus faciat.’  Otto 
Lehmann-Brockhaus, Lateinische Schriftenquellen zur Kunst in England, Wales, und Schottland vom Jahre 901 
bis zum Jahre 1307, 5 vols (Munich 1956), 3: p. 6. 
84 Binski also cites the later thirteenth-century case of Nicholas de Biard (d.1261), a mendicant in Paris, who 
compared clerics to architects, who ‘say to the others “Here’s where to cut it for me”, and yet they themselves do 
not work [nihil laborant]’; or rather, they ‘work by words alone’. (‘… aliis dicunt: Par ci me le taille, et nihil laborant’; 
‘Operantur aliqui solo verbo.’)  ‘Working by Words’, p. 23.  The text comes from Paris Bib. Nat. MS lat. 16490 
(fol. 30) and was ascribed to Biard by Leopold Delisle, Inventaire des manuscrits de la Sorbonne conserves à la 
Bibliothèque Impériale (Paris 1870), 62, nos 15,176–16,718 (Binski, p. 45, n. 41).  
85 ‘De reductione artium ad theologiam’, in Doctoris seraphici s. Bonaventurae…opera omnia, 10 vols (Quaracchi 
1890), 5: pp. 317–325. 
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Like Kilwardby, though in stronger terms, Bonaventure confesses his debt to Hugh of Saint-
Victor: ‘Hugo vero omnia haec’ he says: ‘Hugh did it all’.86  Writing in the middle of the thirteenth 
century in Paris, Bonaventure was familiar with much of the Aristotelian corpus, but he was also 
deeply nostalgic for the ascetic vision of the Victorines, and his treatise is in many ways an attempt 
to restress, in the fashion of the Didascalicon, how divine wisdom is accessible only through a 
complete education in the arts.  It is this combination of old-fashioned, Hugonian ambition, 
mixed with – or rendered through the lens of – Aristotle’s science, which makes the work 
illuminating in the present context.   
 
The treatise opens with a statement of the manifold lights which emanate from the Father of 
Lights, patre luminum.87  The lowest of these lights is that of ‘mechanical art’, lumen artis 
mechanicae.  Taking his lead from Hugh, Bonaventure explains that mechanical art is ‘servile 
and of a lower nature than philosophical knowledge’.88  But he also wants to defend its importance 
in the scheme of human knowledge.  For Hugh, as we have seen, it was precisely these arts’ 
servility – their dealing with ‘the necessity of this life’ – that authorised their inclusion in the 
human philosophical and spiritual project.  They rallied the senses in imitation, I have suggested, 
envisaging the soul’s ability and responsibility to (poietically) ‘make sense’ of its earthly existence.  
In his treatise of over a century hence, Bonaventure construes a very different defence: 
 
If we may consider the artistic process, we will understand.  For an artefact proceeds 
from the artificer [exit ab artifice] according to a similitude existing in his mind [in 
mente]; this pattern or model the artificer plans [excogitat] carefully before he 
produces [antequam producat] and then he produces as he has predetermined [sicut 
disposuit].89   
 
 Mechanical art is characterised in Aristotelian and Kilwardbian terms, as a possession of form: 
‘artifex excogitat antequam producat’, ‘the artificer plans before he produces’.  Bonaventure uses 
the term excogitare for this ‘planning’ – the same verb Eriugena used in his ninth-century 
commentary to define the mechanical arts as arising from ‘human devising’ (excogitatione 
humana).    
                                                        
86 Bonaventure, De reductione 5.  I have used the IntraText Edition (copyright Éulogos 2007), IntraText Digital 
Library http://www.intratext.com/IXT/LAT0918/__P1.HTM [accessed 19 July 2018].  I cite the translation available 
on the University of Virginia’s College at Wise Online Library: 
http://people.uvawise.edu/philosophy/phil205/Bonaventure.html [accessed 19 July 2018]. 
87 De reductione 1. 
88 ‘… quia quodam modo servilis est et degenerat a cognitione philosophiae.’  Ibid. 2. 
89 ‘Si consideremus egressum, videmibus. Quod effectus artificialis exit ab artifice, mediante similitudine existente in 
mente; per quam Artifex excogitat antequam producat, inde producit, sicut disposuit.’  Ibid. 12.  
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In Eriugena’s commentary, this term – taken from Cicero’s definition of eloquence in the De 
Inventione – implied the (ancillae) mechanical arts were exemplary of the ‘making sense’ of 
nature, the contrivance of perceptions into ideas – required in the approach to wisdom.90  Here 
in Bonaventure, excogitare has a more straightforward ‘Ciceronian-Aristotelian’ meaning.91  The 
earlier medieval definition of the mechanical arts has undergone an internal transformation 
which Bonaventure would not even register: for him their belonging to ‘human devising’ 
demonstrates not their poietic orientation, and beginning in sense, but their intellectual 
orientation, and ending in (or descent to) sense. 
 
It is this intellectual-formal procedure of mechanical art that furnishes it for inclusion in the 
sapiential scheme.  Their inclusion is authorised because it directly mirrors or imitates the 
procedure of the higher arts: as in the artes mechanicae, for example, ‘speech signifies a mental 
concept … [which] assumes the form of the voice, and clothed therein, the intelligible word 
becomes sensible and is heard without.’92  This closely echoes, and may even be derived from, 
the language of Geoffrey’s opening: ‘let poetic art come forward to clothe the matter with words’.  
Bonaventure seems almost to have taken apart, analysed, and repurposed Geoffrey’s 
architectural analogy to serve as an epistemological defence of craft.  He goes a dramatic step 
further, though.  As we climb through the lights, we find that the mechanical arts exemplify not 
only trivial invention, but the preceptive invention of the divine wisdom itself.  For in a ‘like 
manner’, hunc modum, to the process of the artificer, Bonaventure says,  
 
Understand that no creature has proceeded from the Most High Creator except 
through the Eternal Word, “in Whom He ordered all things,” and by which Word 
he produced creatures bearing not only the nature of His vestige but the nature of 
His image … Therefore, considering the illumination of mechanical art as regards to 
the production of the work, we shall see therein the Word begotten and made 
incarnate, that is, the Divinity and the Humanity and the integrity of all faith.93   
                                                        
90 This supposition was indebted to Summers’ analysis of excogitatio in The Judgement of Sense at pp. 244–245 and 
198–199 (see above, pp. 34–35). 
91 Above (p. 117, n. 63) I cited Gillespe’s helpful specification of ‘Aristotelian readings of Horace’ and ‘Horatian 
readings of Aristotle’.  One can also talk, I think, about ‘Aristotelian readings of Cicero’ versus ‘Platonic readings of 
Cicero’, or ‘Timaean readings of Cicero’.  Bonaventure’s interpretation of excogitatio suggests the former kind of 
reading, while Eriugena’s take on this term (along with Hugh, Bernard, and Alan’s) signalled the latter. 
92 ‘Sermo significat mentis conceptum … induit formam vocis, et verbum intelligibile mediante illo indumento fit 
sensibile et auditur exterius.’ De reductione 16. 
93 ‘Per hunc modum intellige, quod a summo Opifice nulla creatura processit nisi per Verbum aeternum, “in quo 
omnia disposuit”, et per quod produxit non solum creaturas habentes rationem vestigii, sed etiam imagines … 
Considerantes igitur illuminationem artis mechanicae quantum ad operis egressum, intuebimur ibi Verbum 
generatum et incarnatum, id est Divinitatem et humanitatem et totius fidei integritatem.’ Ibid. 12. 
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While this extraordinary argument is beyond the remit of Binski’s essay, it has received 
persuasive analysis from Mary Carruthers – whose comments we can turn to in conclusion.  She 
describes (and summarises) the above passage as:  
 
Bonaventure’s remarkable justification for the intellectual value of mechanical art.  
For in making human artefacts, we can understand something true about the 
generation and Incarnation of Christ, and the living form and union of God and the 
soul.  The process of human artistic creation, in Bonaventure’s analysis is a spiritual 
generation of a kind, and its realization also a kind of incarnation.94   
 
As Bonaventure explains and Carruthers encapsulates, the mechanical arts involve the ‘descent 
of a design into materials’ found not only in the higher arts, but in the incarnation itself.  If we 
look to the production of an artefact, ‘we shall see therein’, Bonaventure says, ‘the Word 
begotten and made incarnate’.  Indeed, Carruthers suggests that ‘in a certain way, the Incarnation 
itself could be seen as a feat of trompe l’œil artistry.’95  The artificer – because he mirrors the 
preceptive art of the divine – experiences a kind of insight or understanding into higher truths, 
belied by the apparently ‘servile’ reputation of artis mechanicae.  By forging this analogy between 
human art and incarnation, Carruthers says, Bonaventure ‘offers a remarkable justification for 
the intellectual value of mechanical art’ – unlike anything in the earlier (and perhaps, later) 
Middle Ages.   
 
This brings us to our conclusion proper: for Carruthers’ claim is incontestable.  Bonaventure 
does attribute unprecedented ‘intellectual value’ to mechanical art.  De reductione seems to offer 
ultimate validation and promotion of the mechanical arts as a means to wisdom – liberating them 
from their bottommost position as merely physical activities in the twelfth-century Didascalicon.   
 
However, in the course of this Bonaventuran ‘liberation’, the mechanical arts have also lost a 
certain, if not ‘intellectual’, then imaginative value – the value they possessed in the earlier culture 
of the schools.  In the pre-Aristotelian, paideic world of Eriugena, Hugh, Bernard, and Alan, the 
mechanical arts were also seen to exemplify the human discovery of wisdom.  But this was on 
the basis of what is unique to them: making, poiesis, not on the basis of what they share or take 
                                                        
94 Carruthers, The Experience of Beauty, p. 202. 
95 Ibid., p. 203. 
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from ‘theory’, episteme.  They proclaimed the epistemological integrity of the senses and 
imagination: guiding the soul’s upward transformation of perception into understanding.   
 
The thirteenth-century efficacy of the mechanical arts discussed in the last part of this chapter 
needs to be understood, I would argue, as a reversal of this rationale, its successor, rather than 
as definitive of the ‘value’ placed on craft in the medieval era.  Geoffrey of Vinsauf – with his 
dual reliance on the cosmologists, and on the ‘preceptive’ view of techne conveyed via Horace 
and Aristotle – is uniquely revealing of this historical variation and transition.  He bridges the 
traditions of mechanica as an asceticising lens on the whole arts curriculum, and mechanica as a 
means of intellectualising specific arts, of confirming their ‘liberal’ status.   
 
We may be grateful for the ‘modern’ picture of the artificer as a thinker, as a figure of disegno 
even, forged in his exempla, and in Bonaventure’s defence of mechanical art.  But we should be 
alert, I would argue, to his historical situation and evolution.  In the scheme of the Middle Ages, 
he is a late arrival.  Behind him lies an earlier medieval (and much more ancient) figure of the 
thinker-as-artificer, the liberal artist as a ‘maker’ or poietes, dignified not because he knows more 
than the material, but because he knows through and within the silva of his experience. 
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Conclusion 
 
 
A manuscript dating from the fifteenth century, now in Cambridge University Library, contains 
a text, written in 1462, known as Les Douze Dames de Rhétorique.1  The text divides the 
procedures of rhetoric among twelve personifications of courtly women, or dames, who each in 
turn describes her special role in the process of rhetorical composition.2  The manuscript (c.  
1467) includes an iconographical cycle to accompany those speeches (enseignes), which shows 
each of the women practising what she preaches.3  One of these personifications is Deduccion 
Loable, or ‘Praiseworthy Composition’.  Her role, as she describes it, is to ‘seek firm foundations 
and products that will not give way, the ends and projections of which are of one kind and of 
identical appearance.’4  She then arranges her ‘decorations’, she says, ‘until I arrive, after much 
hard work [labeurs dures], at the goal I have formed in my mind [la fin comprise en mon corage].5 
 
In the accompanying iconography, this dame is shown, in marvellous detail, as an architect at 
work on a building (figure 16).  She sits in a study or workshop (or a mixture of the two), 
surrounded by timbers, two unfinished timber-frames through the window behind her.  Her 
mallet lies on the ground to her right.  In her left hand are a set-square and compass, while she 
raises her right hand to her head, contemplating (what would seem to be) a set of written 
instructions in the open book at her feet.  A further book lies open on the table to her left, 
surrounded by flowers – perhaps signifying the rhetorical colores of her trade.   
                                                        
1 The fable is found in the correspondence of three Burgundian intellectuals: Georges Chastellain, Jean Robertet, 
and Jean de Montferrant of Burgey.  Its history is outlined by David Cowling, ‘Verbal and Visual Metaphors in the 
Cambridge Manuscript of the Douze Dames de Rhétorique (1463)’, Journal of the Early Book Society 4, ed. by 
Martha W. Driver (2000), pp. 94–118; and Cynthia Brown, ‘A Late Medieval Cultural Artifact: The Twelve Ladies 
of Rhetoric (Les douze dames de rhétorique)’, Allegorica: A Journal of Medieval and Renaissance Literature 16 
(1995), pp. 73–105.  The Cambridge manuscript (Nn.3.2) is the best quality of a total of nine manuscripts which 
contain the text (outlined by Cowling and Brown).  See also the online catalogue for Cambridge University Library 
MS Nn.3.2: https://cudl.lib.cam.ac.uk/ (where a complete bibliography is also provided).   
2 The dames are given names such as Gravité de Sens (‘Solemn Sense’), Vielle Acquisition (‘Old Acquisition’), 
Multiforme Richesse (‘Manifold Richness’), Florie Mémoire (‘Flourishing Memory’).  For the full ‘cast’ see 
references in previous note. 
3 The identity of the artist or workshop is unknown, although the manuscript seems to have been produced in 
Flanders (before 1468) for the court of Burgundy (where Les Douze Dames was written).  Cowling, ‘Verbal and 
Visual Metaphors’, p. 95. 
4 ‘… Là où par rigles et mesures j’observe poins, lieux, furnitures, formes, manieres et jointures duisans à contigue 
ancrage, fondatïons je quiers segures, productïons non deffectures, et dont les fins et pourgectures sont d’un estre 
et d’un acoutrage …’.  Translated by Cowling, ‘Verbal and Visual Metaphors’, pp. 108–109 (MS fols 36v–37r). 
5 ‘… et là j’assortis mes parures, mes fleurs, mes couleurs, mes verdures, jusqu’à partaindre en labeurs dures la fin 
comprise en mon corage.’  Ibid. 
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The props of architecture create a mindscape; a visual allegory of the process of ‘deduction’ as it 
applies to rhetoric.  The timber-frames in the background are to be read as the dame’s ‘goal’, it 
seems: they stand for the end or telos she is conceiving (on the basis of her instructions) in the 
foreground.  The pieces of wood at her feet are the ‘particular’ materials which lack arrangement 
without that forethought.  Perhaps she has tried to compose them too hastily, and had to ‘defer’ 
her hand.  Or perhaps they have been provided by a manual operative, a cheirotechnes working 
under her direction.  Her next step, we sense, will be to pick these odd bits up and fit them 
together with greater purpose, towards the end, la fin, that she has ‘formed in her mind’ 
(‘comprise en [son] corage’). 
 
The image has been discussed by Mary Carruthers.  She notes: ‘the figure is shown not yet 
working manually but planning, her finger thoughtfully to her head. She has stopped to 
previsualize her constructions, to plan and then to execute.’6  David Cowling, also the translator 
of Les Douze Dames, concurs: ‘the pensive expression of the lady appears to depict the effort of 
concentration required to turn into a reality the mental image of a work in progress’.7  For 
Carruthers, and for Cowling, Deduccion Loable is a perfect expression of the medieval analogy 
between craft and verbal art.  For them it proves, among other things, the durability of the picture 
of the poet-craftsman or poet-designer put forward by Geoffrey of Vinsauf in his Poetria nova, 
shaping his work in his mind before he gives it any material form, ‘fashioning it mentally before 
doing so materially’.8  ‘Praiseworthy composition’, Carruthers adds, can be seen ‘heeding the 
advice of Geoffrey of Vinsauf.’9  Likewise, Cowling notes that the preceptive process Deduccion 
enacts is ‘a process evoked most famously in Geoffrey of Vinsauf’s Poetria nova.’10  By extension, 
this image can be seen to capture the dynamic of the craft or ‘mechanical’ metaphors of 
thirteenth-century scholastics Robert Grosseteste, and particularly Saint Bonaventure – 
themselves ‘heeding’ the advice of Geoffrey. 
 
This image, however, shows us only a particular iteration in the metaphorical relationship 
between craft and verbal composition in the Middle Ages.  Contrast it with the figures for verbal 
art – Donatus, Aristotle, and Cicero – on the west façade of Chartres Cathedral (figures 13, 14, 
                                                        
6 Carruthers, ‘The Concept of Ductus’, p. 205. 
7 Cowling, ‘Verbal and Visual Metaphors’, p. 101. 
8 Carruthers, The Experience of Beauty, p. 204 (cited above, Chapter Four, p. 108, n. 23). 
9 Carruthers, ‘The Concept of Ductus’, p. 205. 
10 Cowling, ‘Verbal and Visual Metaphors’, p. 101. 
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and 17), finished between 1145 and 1150.  Found in the archivolts of the southern portal, each 
of these figures is positioned beneath a traditional female personification of their discipline: 
Donatus is the nonpareil of Grammar; Aristotle of Dialectic; and Cicero of Rhetoric.11  These 
men are shown hunched over their writing tablets, eyes concentrated downward, hands set busily 
to some stage in the task of composition.  Behind Donatus and Aristotle a supply of reed pens 
is racked; Aristotle’s also holds what looks like a blotting sponge.  These figures (along with 
mathematicians Boethius, Euclid, Pythagoras and Ptolemy) are usually described as the 
‘authorities’ of the Arts personified above them.12  Here they are also the practitioners, the 
‘artisans’ of the Liberal Arts.  Alan of Lille, who would have known this portal, chose Donatus 
for the decoration of his chariot, calling him artifex Grammaticae.13  In the Anticlaudianus, 
Donatus exemplified the artisanry, the ‘mechanical art’ of Alan’s personification of Grammar, 
her crafting of materia into the beam to support the axle.   
 
At Chartres, we find none of those accoutrements of ‘mechanical art’ shown in the image of 
Deduccion Loable – or described by Alan of Lille in his allegories.  The artifices are shown at 
work on texts – not on buildings or at a forge.  But like Donatus on the chariot, they can be seen 
to behave ‘mechanically’; to present liberal art in a ‘mechanical’ light or disposition.  They are 
the doers and makers of philosophy, who offer a caveat to the visitor, showing how the revered 
Artes Liberales above them actually come alive in (and cultivate) the soul: through active, 
productive study.14  Arranged around the archivolts, as a ‘gloss’ almost, they can be seen to belong 
to a twelfth-century, peculiarly Chartrian tradition, of concentrating on and representing the 
‘mechanical psychology’ proper to the liberal arts – their basis in making.   
 
The figure of Deduccion Loable is the more obvious ‘mechanical artist’, holding the tools of the 
architect, preparing to set to work on her timber frames.  But (following the enseigne) it must 
also be said that this image depicts ‘mechanical art’ behaving liberally.  This visual metaphor or 
allegory requires that the architect thinks: that he (or she) possesses knowledge, to which she 
                                                        
11 This selection – already mentioned in Chapter Three – of course indicates the importance of Aristotle as the 
authority on dialectic before his natural scientific works were reintroduced at the end of the twelfth century (and he 
became known not only as the father of dialectic but ‘The Philosopher’).   
12 For example, by John W. Baldwin, The Scholastic Culture of the Middle Ages, 1000–1300 (Long Grove, IL 
1971), p. 113.  (As in Chapter Three, I capitalise the Arts when wanting to refer strictly to the personifications). 
13 Alan of Lille, Anticlaudianus 2.477–484; Wetherbee, pp. 292–293 (cited above, pp. 93).   
14 A more extended analysis of the ‘artifices’ within the portal scheme might address their relation to the figures on 
the tympanum – including what was known as the Sedes Sapientiae, ‘Seat of Wisdom’, of Virgin and Child.  The 
Arts on the archivolts – their personifications and practitioners – can be seen ‘working towards’ this visual ‘goal’. 
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subjects the material (tellingly consigned to the floor in the image).  One could argue – in fact – 
that this image asserts the rhetorical and ‘liberal’ character of craft and the craftsman, just as much 
(if not more than) it asserts the ‘mechanical’ character or ‘craft’ of the rhetorician.   
 
The Chartres portal points to an earlier understanding of the ‘rapport’ between liberal and 
mechanical – missing from the studies of Carruthers and Cowling – but which forms an important 
preface to the picture of verbal craft or ‘intellectual craft’ they elucidate.  At Chartres, the artifices 
of Donatus, Aristotle, and others, concentrated in study, are the exempla for their personified 
counterparts: our eye moves from the worker to the abstraction, rather than from ‘thinking’ to 
‘doing’ (as it does with Deduccion).  This portal exemplifies a tradition – that fed into to the 
‘Vinsaufian’ tradition, and indirectly informed works like Les Douze Dames – in which craft, or 
‘mechanical art’, was understood as a kind of verso to the liberal: a way of re-imagining and re-
setting the student’s understanding of his task, to ‘make’ or ‘devise’ wisdom, not simply to obtain 
or possess it.   
 
*** 
 
Thus far in medieval studies, the artes mechanicae have been thought to play a rather unassuming 
role in the intellectual culture of the Middle Ages.  Beyond the cursory references of Carruthers 
and Binski, who have raised them in relation to scholastic ideas about verbal craft, they have 
been considered, by and large, the property of scholars working on the history of medieval 
science, technology, and medieval ‘systems of knowledge’.  For historians of medieval literature 
and art, the term ‘mechanical arts’ has tended to suggest the parallel category to the famous liberal 
arts.  But it has not, to date, lent itself obviously to the study of the medieval imagination, or to 
what Jacques le Goff called ‘the history of conscience’.15   
 
This thesis has tried to enlarge our view of the mechanical arts and their place in medieval 
thought; to show they belong just as much to the history of imagination, or ‘conscience’, and the 
sources of literature and art, as they do to histories of medieval science and technology.  This 
might have been ventured in a number of other ways.  The Middle Ages seem not to have had, 
for example, a fixed and repeated ‘iconography’ of the mechanical arts.  But one might fruitfully 
                                                        
15 Jacques Le Goff, The Medieval Imagination, trans. by Arthur Goldhammer (Chicago 1988), p. 5. (Originally 
published as L’Imaginaire medieval, Paris 1985). 
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have sought out depictions of the seven artes mechanicae defined by Hugh in contemporaneous 
visual arts and/or texts.  Such a project would have its own unique set of outcomes for our 
appreciation of these artes, beyond the traditional perspective provided by historians of science 
and technology, and may well be the subject of a future art-historical or literary study. 
 
I have taken an approach that is, in many ways, less straightforward.  I have not gathered together 
examples and illustrations of the artes mechanicae.  Rather, I have tried to understand in greater 
depth what was meant by the ‘mechanical arts’ or ‘the mechanical’ in the wider philosophy of the 
French schools.  While these arts formed a category in medieval ‘systems of knowledge’, I have 
argued, they can also be examined in the context of a more imaginative kind of medieval 
encyclopaedism: one which considered the parts of these established ‘systems’ in their 
metaphorical or psychological relations, and not simply their hierarchical relations.  The artes 
mechanicae designated seven individual activities in the Didascalicon; but ‘mechanical art’ could 
also be taken as a type of knowledge, the knowledge practiced by the artificer (of all and any of 
the ‘seven’ arts).  This type of knowledge presented a mirror to the liberal (especially trivial) arts.  
It was used at times as an exhortation, at times as an admonishment, to the higher arts, that they 
should behave productively, poietically. 
 
My exploration of this metaphorical ‘side’ to the mechanical arts has focussed on a necessarily 
limited number of sources: but sources which are known to medievalists as some of the most 
authoritative and expressive of the mentalité of the medieval schools prior to the rise of 
universities.  The ‘family’ of works which form the subject of my first three chapters all originated 
from centres between the Île de France and the Loire Valley, and in the years between the 1120s 
and 1180s.  By far the most familiar of the authors I consider, at least for historians of the 
mechanical arts, is Hugh of Saint-Victor himself: the first medieval writer to ‘approve’ of 
mechanica as a component of Scientia.  Winthrop Wetherbee – whose extensive knowledge of 
the twelfth century has been called on throughout this thesis – noted the common temptation to 
identify a ‘Promethean strain’ in Hugh’s inclusion of the mechanical arts: that ‘humanisme 
intégral that views all human skills as means to redemption.’16   
 
Hugh has his ‘Promethean’ moments: his catalogues of the procedures and tools of the 
mechanical arts evince an awareness of, and enthusiasm for, contemporary crafts and 
                                                        
16 Wetherbee, ‘Philosophy, Cosmology’, p. 23. 
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technologies, the continuity of ancient methods, and the improvement of those methods by 
medieval practitioners.  But he also invokes mechanical art to elucidate larger issues about the 
origins, purpose, and practice of philosophy as a whole.  Hadot suggested in his Veil of Isis that 
before ‘mechanics’ came to be thought of as means by which man intervenes in nature, 
harnessing it to his own ends (the ‘Promethean attitude’) – mechanics or mechanical art was 
considered as a way of visualising the processes of thought and imagination; as part of a broadly 
poetic approach to nature.  Hadot designates this the ‘Orphic’ understanding of mechanics.  And 
it is this (essentially ancient Greek, or pre-Socratic) understanding that I think plays out – beyond 
the ‘catalogues’ of the mechanical arts – in Hugh’s discussion.  Partly as a result of his sensitivity 
to Eriugena’s original positioning of the arts, in the union of wisdom and eloquence, and partly 
as a result of his dependence on the myth of the Timeaus, Hugh’s vision of the artes mechanicae 
can be seen to embrace craft as an epistemological model, a poetic and poietic thing.  Hugh 
categorises the mechanical arts as a part of philosophy; but he also considers them an ‘image’, I 
have argued, a way of visualising the ‘practical-poietic’ psychology required for philosophy to 
make us cultus.  
 
This imaginative, ‘Orphic’ perspective on mechanica, which runs through and underneath the 
more literal encyclopaedic perspective of the Didascalicon, presented an allegorical opportunity 
for the wholly ‘imaginative’ and poetic encyclopaedists of Chartres: Bernard Silvestris and Alan 
of Lille.  I have striven to show that these authors, often positioned in an antagonistic relationship 
to Hugh (wary of the poetic ‘hodgepodge’), can also be seen – with respect to mechanica – as 
engaged in a sustained dialogue with him.  In his Cosmographia, it is possible to see Bernard 
(also a commentator on the De nuptiis) privileging the ‘mechanical’ over the ‘liberal’: or the 
mechanical as the active, allegorical embodiment of the liberal.  The ‘enactment’ of philosophy 
by the artificers Natura, Noys, and Physis entails a reversal or amalgamation of the established 
categories of knowledge, with the mechanical envisaging the behaviour of the liberal soul – a 
reversal that could be seen to make explicit the implications of Hugh’s discussion twenty years 
earlier.   
 
The same could be said of Alan of Lille’s De Planctu and Anticlaudianus: well-known 
‘successors’ to the Cosmographia.  In these works, the exemplary potential of mechanica, as the 
poietic ‘face’ of the liberal arts, arguably comes into force as a means of cautioning students not 
to ignore their cosmic, ‘Orphic’ duty to nature (as set out in the Cosmographia and Didascalicon).  
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The image of the chariot sees the Liberal Arts in the likeness of their ‘mirror’ category, joining 
and disjoining matter – I suggested – to present a more starkly apophatic lesson for dialecticians 
about the confinement of divine knowledge to making, to the soul’s sense-work. 
 
In my discussion of Alan, and again in the first part of this conclusion, I raised the example of 
the famous Chartres portal – whose arrangement of the Liberal Arts, ‘glossed’ by artifices, I think 
echoes the ‘mechanical’ characterisations of the liberal arts given, particularly in the 
Anticlaudianus (but also in the Cosmographia and De Planctu – and to some extent in the 
Didascalicon).  The arrangement of the portal also helps as a kind of visual gauge for the twelfth-
century tradition, as against the new thirteenth-century dispensation.  
 
Geoffrey of Vinsauf’s Poetria nova has been considered, as in the work of Mary Carruthers and 
David Cowling, as a summa in medieval thinking about poet-craft.  Completed by 1215, it is the 
first medieval text to have used the crafts or ‘mechanical arts’ (as Carruthers suggests) to dignify 
the auctor as a man of design, of foresight.  But this work also betrays, I would venture, the 
influence – and thus a reworking – of the allegorists’ use of the mechanical arts.  The image of 
Deduccion Loable, besides demonstrating the endurance of Geoffrey’s vision of the writer’s 
‘craft’, makes vivid – I think – just how radical this reworking was.  Deduccion strikes a chord 
with the modern viewer: her image articulates an almost familiar (might we say democratic?) 
conception of the shared processes of writer and builder, thinker and maker, and a propinquity 
between the ‘academic’ and the ‘vocational’.  A book published in 2017 by Paola Bertucci 
suggests that this notional affinity between the mechanical and liberal artist obtained well beyond 
the fifteenth century.17   When philosophes of the French Enlightenment discussed the 
mechanical artist, they emphasised – again – that he worked liberally.  It was on this assumption, 
Bertucci shows, that his work might be compared with that of the liberal artist: he ‘already’ shared 
in and illustrated the esprit philosophique.18   
 
                                                        
17 Paola Bertucci, Artisanal Enlightenment: Science and the Mechanical Arts in Old Regime France (New Haven 
2017).   
18 Diderot, Bertucci says, reiterated ‘the predominance of theoretical learning over practical activity [in the 
mechanical arts].  This was a philosophe’s point of view.’ (p. 5).  The term esprit philosophique is discussed at p. 
10.  While Bertucci’s introduction deals with the philosophe’s view of the mechanical arts, (pp. 1–30), the book as 
a whole ‘makes a radical change of historical protagonists’, considering how eighteenth-century artistes regarded 
themselves, and their own relation to ‘philosophers, savants, and routine-bound craftsmen’.  
https://yalebooks.yale.edu/book/9780300227413/artisanal-enlightenment [accessed October 2018]. 
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How far conceptions of the craftsman in this later period can be considered continuous with that 
found in Deduccion – or in the Poetria nova – is a subject for another enquiry.  My concern here 
has not been with the longevity of Geoffrey’s model – but to show how Geoffrey’s model, his 
‘intellectual justification’ of craft, was not ubiquitous or even pre-eminent in the Middle Ages.  It 
was preceded, it would appear, by an earlier, poietic recruitment of the artes mechanicae – 
epitomised by the Chartres portal – to reduce the liberal arts to ‘making’, the scholar to his senses.  
In this earlier dispensation it was the mechanical art, the making itself that had the metaphorical 
upper hand.  The work of the artificer was not lifted – via association with the liberal – to 
intellectual status.  The intellectual status of the liberal was shown to depend on practice, making, 
poiesis: just as the artifices on the door at Chartres shoulder, and at the same time elevate, the 
Liberal maidens above them.   
 
The mechanical arts’ poietic valence in the pedagogical literature of the twelfth century – the 
lesson they extended the student to ‘make sense’ of his experience, to re-cognise nature in his 
soul – is remote from our thinking today.  Perhaps this is why – setting aside the question of the 
artes mechanicae for a moment – so little has been written on the importance of ancient poiesis 
as a model in medieval pedagogy.  It is only more recently, and haltingly, that studies have 
emerged which posit a ‘poetics’ of medieval education.19  This development in medieval studies 
should – I think – be encouraged.  Pierre Hadot suggests in the Veil of Isis – a great inspiration 
for the present work – that the poetic or ‘Orphic’ attitude, rooted in Pre-Socratism, does find its 
more recent proponents: Goethe, but also Wittgenstein, and Merleau-Ponty – the latter drew the 
conclusion in his Praise of Philosophy (1953) that ‘philosophy is relearning how to see the 
world’.20  These are figures beyond the scope of my discussion.  But their own turns to ‘Orphism’, 
in a modern age, advises the timeliness – perhaps – of an historical turn to poiesis today. 
 
Here, I have been able to give only an outline of poiesis as it mattered to medieval schoolmen.  
I have arrived at this theme, or model, by following the rather ‘unassuming’ category of the artes 
mechanicae.  According to the hierarchies of the page, these were a parallel category to the liberal 
arts – to be shuffled about by encyclopaedists and classifiers of knowledge.  But to think of them 
simply as a classification is to forget that the word mechanica also evoked something to the 
                                                        
19 For example, by Catherine Brown; M. B. Pranger; and Phil Knox et al. (above, pp. 6–7, notes 30–33). 
20 Cited by Hadot, The Veil of Isis, p. 313 (and pp. 300–315); Merleau-Ponty repeated this conclusion in ‘What is 
Phenomenology?’, in The Essential Writings of Merleau-Ponty, ed. by Alden L. Fisher (New York 1969), pp. 27–
44, at 42. 
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medieval mind that was super-literal, super-categorical.  There is a secret history of the 
mechanical arts – an evocative history – that lies behind their conventional history.  It is this 
secret history of the mechanical arts, the history of their associative power, that I have tried to 
uncover here.  Beyond the hierarchies of the page, the mechanical arts were felt to be a guide, a 
lens through which to look upon the human condition as a whole.  They showed the student 
then – and they show us now – that his philosophy, though it might look like a list of disciplines 
and doctrines, to be learned and scaled, required something more active and imaginative; that 
philosophy was ‘relearning how to see the world’ itself.   
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Figure 1. The major French Schools in the first half of the twelfth century. 
 
Map taken from Whitney S. Stoddard’s Art and Architecture in Medieval France (New York 1972), 
showing key monuments and pilgrimage routes to Santiago da Compostela, c. 1000–1130s. 
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Figure 2. Orpheus from a homily, In sancta lumina, of Gregory Nazianzen, Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale, 
Gr. Coislin 239, fol. 122v (c. eleventh century). 
 
The image is included in John Block Friedman’s Orpheus in the Middle Ages (Cambridge, UK 1970), 
pp. 152–53. 
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Figure 3. Hugh of Saint-Victor in Leiden, Bibliothek der Rijksuniversiteit, MS Vucanius 45, fol. 130 
(thirteenth century). 
 
On the open book appears the first sentence of the Didascalicon: ‘Omnium expetendorum prima est 
sapientia, in qua perfecti boni forma consistit’ (‘Of all things to be sought, the first is that Wisdom in 
which the Form of the Perfect Good stands fixed’). 
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Figure 4.  Philosophia est amor sapientiae. 
 
Boethius’ Lady Philosophy in a manuscript of the Consolatio: Leipzig, Universitäs Bibliothek MS 1253, 
fol. 3r (c. 1230).   
 
She is depicted with a ladder of the seven liberal arts – from Grammatica on the bottom rung, to 
Astronomia at the topmost – surmounted by the ‘wisdom’ of Holy Scripture.  This image would have 
been welcome in the Didascalicon. 
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Figure 5. The Marriage of Philology and Mercury on the Quedlinberg Tapestry (fragment), The 
Quedlinberg Treasury (c. 1200). 
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Figure 6.  Philosophia et septem artes liberales as illustrated in the Hortus deliciarum (‘Garden of 
Delights’), a manuscript compiled by Herrard of Landsberg at the Hohenberg Abbey in Alsace (begun 
1167) – drawing heavily on earlier works like the Didascalicon.  The manuscript was burned in 1870, but 
has been reconstructed from copies made earlier in the nineteenth century. 
 
Perhaps influenced by Hugh’s strictures in Book Three, ‘poets or magicians’ are shown seated beneath 
Philosophy and the liberal arts, beyond their formative influence.  The text describes poets being guided 
by impure spirits (the black birds who whisper into their ears). 
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Figure 7. Possible portrait of Bernard Silvestris in Oxford, Bodleian Library, MS Digby 46, fol. 1v (c. 
1350–1375). 
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Figure 8. Possible portrait of Bernard Silvestris (prefacing the Cosmographia) in Cambridge University 
Library, MS Kk.iv.25, fol. 118v (early thirteenth century). 
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Figure 9. Diagram of Scientia in the Commentary on Martianus Capella’s De nuptiis Philologiae et 
Mercurii attributed to Bernard Silvestris, in Cambridge, Cambridge University Library, MS Mm.I.18, fol. 
5v (c. 1200–1220). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Facsimile by Haijo Jan Westra, The Commentary on Martianus Capella’s De nuptiis Philologiae et 
Mercurii Attributed to Bernardus Silvestris (Toronto 1986), p. 81. 
 
 
 
 
 145 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10. The cosmos according to Honorius Augustodunensis’ Clavis Physicae, in 
Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale, MS Lat. 6734, fol. 3v (twelfth century). 
 
The mass labelled ‘materia informis’ in the central roundel seems to resemble and perhaps helps us to 
imagine Bernard’s personification of matter, Silva, ‘yearning to emerge from her ancient confusion’.  
Unlike Honorius’ work, Bernard’s Cosmographia is not typically accompanied by an iconography and 
thus we have no direct representations of Silva herself. 
 
Around materia informis are shown – from the top – the divine ideas; primordial causes (tempus and 
locus); the four elements with their inhabitants; and the finis of creation, Christ, who theatrically draws 
back curtains on the imago mundi.  
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Figure 11. The only certain portrait of Alan of Lille, in dialogue with Peter the Chanter, in London, 
British Library, MS Add. 19767, fol. 217 (1228–1246). 
 
The two men are likely to have been together in Paris for several years in the 1170s (discussed by Gillian 
Evans, Alan of Lille, pp. 25–33). 
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Figure 12.  The south portal of the west façade of Chartres Cathedral, showing in its architraves the 
practitioners of the Liberal Arts, accompanied by female personifications above (like Alan and Martianus’ 
ancillae) (c. 1144–1145). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The portal with labels by Randall B. Smith, taken from an article ‘Christianity and the Liberal Arts in the 
University’, Crisis Magazine (2012)  https://www.crisismagazine.com/2012/ [accessed 1 October 2018].   
 
Here the practitioner of grammar is identified as Priscian rather than Donatus.   Scholars flit between the 
two.  I opt for Donatus, given the resonance with Alan’s choice of practitioner.  The label ‘Mathematics’, 
top right, should technically be ‘Arithmetic’. 
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Figure 13. Donatus on the portal at Chartres (bottom right of figure 12). 
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Figure 14. Aristotle on the portal at Chartres (bottom left of figure 12). 
 
 
 
 
 
 150 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 15.  Wisdom’s Heavenly Journey in Alan of Lille’s Anticlaudianus, from a German or Southern 
Bohemian manuscript: London, Wellcome Library, MS 49, fol. 68r (c. 1420). 
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Figure 16. Deduccion Loable (‘Praiseworthy Composition’) from Les Douze Dames de Rhétorique, in 
Cambridge University Library, MS Nn.3.2, fol. 36v (c. 1467). 
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Figure 17.  Cicero on the portal at Chartres (near top left of the archivolt in figure 12). 
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